Avrupa Birliği’nin dış yardım politikası: “Dış yardım süper gücü” mü?

Öz

Son yıllarda, uluslararası kalkınma yardımları alanında belirgin bir dönüşüm yaşanmaktadır. Bu dönüşümün en dikkat çekici boyutlarından biri, önde gelen donör ülkelerin dış yardımlarında gözlenen gerilemedir. Dünyanın en çok dış yardım sağlayan donör ülkesi ABD’nin kalkınma yardımlarında kapsamlı kesintilere gitmesi ve bu çerçevede ülkenin resmî kalkınma ajansı olan Birleşik Devletler Uluslararası Kalkınma Ajansı’nın (USAID) faaliyetlerine son vermesi, bu değişimin en belirgin göstergesi olmuştur. Benzer şekilde, Birleşik Krallık hükümeti de dış yardımlarda kesintiye gideceğini açıklamıştır. Bu gelişmeler, küresel dış yardım mimarisinde hem mali kapasite hem de politik liderlik bakımından önemli bir boşluğun ortaya çıkmasına yol açmıştır. Bu ortamda, Avrupa Birliği (AB), kurumları ve üye devletleriyle birlikte, dünyanın en büyük donörü konumunda bulunması nedeniyle söz konusu boşluğu doldurabilecek en güçlü aktörlerden biri olarak öne çıkmıştır. Nitekim AB, uluslararası literatürde sıklıkla “dış yardım süper gücü” (aid superpower) olarak tanımlanmakta ve Avrupa Komisyonu Başkanı Ursula von der Leyen’in, AB’nin dünya çapında en büyük insani yardım sağlayıcısı olduğuna ve kalkınma işbirliğinde öncü rolüne sıklıkla yaptığı vurgu, bu algıyı pekiştirmektedir. Bu çalışma, Avrupa Birliği’nin “dış yardım süper gücü” olarak tanımlanmasının geçerliliğini sorgulamakta; ayrıca ABD ve Birleşik Krallık’ta son dönemdeki dış yardım kesintileri ve dış yardım karşıtı söylemlerin yarattığı liderlik boşluğunu AB’nin doldurma potansiyelini değerlendirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Avrupa Birliği
• Dış Yardım
• Kalkınma İşbirliği
• Küresel Avrupa
• Küresel Geçit

The European Union's foreign aid policy: "An Aid superpower"?

Öz

In recent years, a significant transformation has been taking place in the field of international development aid. One of the most striking aspects of this transformation is the decline observed in the foreign aid contributions of leading donor countries. The United States, the world’s largest provider of foreign aid, has implemented substantial cuts to its development assistance, and in this context, the termination of operations by its official aid agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has become the most prominent indicator of this shift. Similarly, the United Kingdom government has also announced reductions in its foreign aid spending. These developments have created a considerable gap in the global aid architecture, both in terms of financial capacity and political leadership. In this environment, the European Union (EU), together with its institutions and member states, has emerged as one of the strongest actors capable of filling this gap, given its position as the world’s largest donor. Indeed, the EU is frequently described in international literature as an “aid superpower,” and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s repeated emphasis on the EU being the world’s largest provider of humanitarian assistance and its leading role in development cooperation further reinforces this perception. This study questions the validity of defining the European Union as an “aid superpower” and evaluates the Union’s potential to fill the leadership vacuum created by the recent aid cuts and anti-aid rhetoric in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• European Union
• Foreign Aid
• Development Cooperation
• Global Europe
• Global Gateway

Kaynakça

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