Cognitive Style and False Memories: Relationship of Rational and Experiential Thinking to DRM lists performance

Öz

In this study, false memories that occur when people misrecognize the words that are not presented to them during the learning phase, and the assumption of dual process theories in information processing as an individual difference were examined in terms of logical and intuitive thinking styles. The relationship between false memories revealed by DRM (Deese Roediger McDermott) lists and thinking style was examined using the Rational Experiential Thinking Scale (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) and the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005). The response performances of the groups that received high and low scores in the responses to the applied scales to the DRM lists during the recognition test were compared. In addition, remember/know evaluations of individuals regarding their answers and recognition memory processes were examined. As a result, significant memory errors were observed in both logical and intuitive thinking styles. While evaluating critical words, people could not distinguish whether they were really presented to them or not. While the most incorrect answers were given for critical words, also remember response was made for critical words. Although it is not statistically significant, the finding that people in the analytical group exhibit less false recall than intuitive people is worth examining in further studies.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• DRM
• False memories
• Rational Experiental Thinking style
• Cognitive style
• Remember/Know

Bilişsel Stil ve Sahte Anılar: Mantıksal ve Deneyimsel Düşünmenin DRM listeleri performansı ile ilişkisi

Öz

Bu çalışmada, kişilerin öğrenme aşamasında kendilerine sunulmayan kelimeleri hatırlama aşamasında yanlış şekilde tanımaları ile ortaya çıkan sahte hatıralar, bir bireysel farklılık olarak bilgiyi işlemlemede ikili süreç teorilerinin varsayımı mantıksal ve sezgisel düşünme biçimleri açısından incelenmiştir. DRM (Deese Roediger McDermott) listeleri ile ortaya konan sahte hatıraların, düşünme stili ile olan ilişkisi, Mantıksal Deneyimsel Düşünme Ölçeği (Pacini ve Epstein, 1999) ve Bilişsel yansıma testi (Frederick, 2005) kullanılarak incelenmiştir. Uygulanan ölçeklere verilen yanıtlarda yüksek ve düşük puan alan grupların, tanıma testi aşamasında DRM listelerine verdikleri yanıt performansları karşılaştırılmıştır. Ayrıca kişilerin verdikleri yanıtlarına ilişkin yaptıkları hatırlıyorum/biliyorum değerlendirmeleri ile tanıma belleği süreçleri incelenmiştir. Sonuç olarak hem mantıksal hem sezgisel düşünme tarzında anlamlı bellek yanılgıları gözlemlenmiştir. Kişiler kritik kelimeleri değerlendirirken kendilerine gerçekten sunulup sunulmadıklarını ayırt edememişlerdir. En fazla yanlış yanıt kritik kelimeler için verilirken, verilen yanıtları değerlendirme aşamasında yine en fazla hatırlıyorum yanıtı kritik kelimeler için yapılmıştır. İstatistiksel olarak anlamlı olmasa da ortalamalara bakıldığında analitik gruptaki kişilerin sezgisel kişilerden daha az sahte hatırlama ortaya koymaları bulgusu ilerleyen çalışmalara incelenmeye değerdir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• DRM
• Sahte hatıralar
• Mantıksal sezgisel düşünme stili
• Bilişsel stil
• Hatırlıyorum/biliyorum

Kaynakça

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