ABD- ÇİN REKABETİNDE TAYLAND’IN HEDGİNG STRATEJİSİ

Öz

Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesinden bu yana, ABD ve Tayland daha gergin ve mesafeli bir ilişkiye yönelmiştir, bu nedenle Çin işbirliğini derinleştirmeye daha fazla ilgi duymaya başlamıştır. 2006 ve 2014 askeri darbelerinin ardından ABD hükümeti Tayland'a yapılan askeri yardımı kesme kararı almış ve askeri rejimleri kamuoyu önünde eleştirmiştir. Çin, Tayland'a yönelik geleneksel dış politika yaklaşımından belirgin bir sapma göstermemiştir. Askeri rejimlerin liderliğinde ülke, iç istikrarı korumak, kapsayıcı ekonomik büyümeyi teşvik etmek, çevresindeki değişen jeopolitik ortamda manevra yapmak ve Çin yanlısı ve ABD yanlısı yönelimin daha fazla desteğini korumak için hedging stratejisini benimsemektedir. Bu makale, Çin-ABD rekabetini, daha geleneksel dengeleme ve eklemlenme kavramının aksine, Tayland'ın hedging stratejisinden ele almaktadır. Çin-ABD rekabetinin gerginliğine rağmen Tayland'ın neden ve nasıl Çin'e yönelik bir hedging stratejisi izlediğini incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Tayland
• Hedging Stratejisi
• Çin
• Kuşak ve Yol Girişimi
• ABD

THAILAND'S HEDGING STRATEGY IN THE US-CHINA COMPETITION

Öz

Since the end of the Cold War, The US and Thailand have seemed headed for a more strained and distant relationship. For this reason, China has become more interested in deepening cooperation. Following the 2006 and 2014 military coups, the US government has decided to cut military aid to Thailand and publicly criticized the military regimes. China has not deviated markedly from its traditional foreign policy approach towards Thailand. Under the leadership of military regimes, the country adopts hedging strategies in order to maintain domestic stability, to promote inclusive economic growth, to maneuver through the changing geopolitical environment around its peripheries, and to keep more support for pro-China and pro-U.S orientation. This article addresses the US- China rivalry from the hedging strategy of Thailand , as opposed to the concept of more traditional balancing and bandwagoning. It examines why and how, despite the tensions of the US- China rivalry, Thailand has pursued a hedging strategy towards China.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Thailand
• Hedging Strategy
• China
• Belt and Road Initiative
• The US

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