INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

Yıl 2021, Sayı: 42, 141 - 154, 08.01.2021

Muharrem Akın Doğanay , Mustafa Değer

https://doi.org/10.30794/pausbed.739302

Cited By: 2

Öz

There is an increasing emphasis on the role of institutions in explaining the economic growth of DLC. However, there is no consensus on which institutions and governance indicators are essential for growth. This study aims to examine the effects of institutions on economic growth in DLC empirically.
In this study, for the 62 Developing countries are examined and analyzed by the GMM in the 2002-2017 periods. Data obtained from the World Bank. Among the institutional quality indicators, regulatory quality seems to be an essential factor. Political stability and absence of violence, on the contrary, affect economic growth negatively and significantly in DLC.
The findings of the study show that institutions are important in economic growth. Therefore, for stable and permanent growth, DLC should give priority to institutional strengthening policies.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Institutions, Governance, Economic growth, GMM Method

GELİŞMEKTE OLAN ÜLKELERDE KURUMLAR VE EKONOMİK BÜYÜME: DİNAMİK PANEL VERİ ANALİZİ

Öz

GOÜ'lerin ekonomik büyümesini açıklamada kurumların rolüne giderek daha fazla önem verilmektedir. Ancak, hangi kurumların ve yönetişim göstergelerinin daha önemli olduğu konusunda bir fikir birliği yoktur. Bu çalışmanın amacı GOÜ'lerde kurumların ekonomik büyüme üzerindeki etkilerini ampirik olarak incelemektir.
Bu çalışmada, Dünya Bankası'ndan 62 GOÜ için elde edilen veriler 2002-2017 döneminde incelenmiş ve GMM yöntemi ile analiz edilmiştir. Kurumsal kalite göstergeleri arasında idari kalite en önemli faktör olarak görünmektedir. Siyasi istikrar ve şiddetsizlik, aksine, GOÜ'lerde ekonomik büyümeyi olumsuz ve önemli ölçüde etkilemektedir.
Çalışmanın bulguları kurumların ekonomik büyümede önemli olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu nedenle, istikrarlı ve kalıcı bir büyüme için GOÜ, kurumsal yapıyı güçlendirme politikalarına öncelik vermelidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kurumlar, Yönetişim, Ekonomik büyüme, GMM Yöntemi

Kaynakça

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