Merkez Bankası Kredibilitesi ve Makroekonomik Performans -Türkiye’den Kanıtlar-

Öz

Merkez bankası kredibilitesi, merkez bankalarının beklenti yönetiminin başarısını açıklamaktadır. Merkez bankası kredibilitesinin makroekonomik değişkenler üzerindeki etkisi, para politikası uygulamalarının başarısını yansıtmaktadır. Bu çalışmada, Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası'nın (TCMB) kredibilite gelişmelerinin Türkiye'nin makroekonomik performansı üzerindeki etkileri Ocak 2008 - Ağustos 2023 dönemi için Bayesian Vektör Otoregresyon (BVAR) modeli kullanılarak incelenmektedir. BVAR modelinden elde edilen kanıtlar, ülke risk priminin, döviz kurunun değişim oranının, reel faiz oranındaki değişimin, çıktı boşluğunun ve enflasyon boşluğunun merkez bankası kredibilitesindeki bir birim pozitif şoka azalan ve istatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir şekilde tepki verdiğini göstermektedir. Dolayısıyla, merkez bankası kredibilitesindeki artış ülkeye yönelik risk algısını azaltmakta, döviz kuru ve faiz oranlarında istikrar sağlamakta, çıktı ve enflasyonu sırasıyla potansiyel ve hedeflenen seviyelerine yaklaştırmakta ve böylece Türkiye'nin makroekonomik performansını olumlu yönde etkilemektedir. Bu noktadan hareketle, çalışmanın bulguları çerçevesinde, merkez bankasının optimal politika uygulamalarını desteklemek ve enflasyonist olmayan bir ekonomik büyümeyi gerçekleştirmek için merkez bankası kredibilitesinin artırılması bir politika önerisi olarak sunulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Merkez Bankası Kredibilitesi
• Makroekonomik Performans
• BVAR

Central Bank Credibility and Macroekonomic Performance -Evidence from Turkey-

Öz

Central bank credibility explains the success of central banks' expectations management. The effect of central bank credibility on macroeconomic performance reflects the success of monetary policy implementations. In this study, the effects of the credibility developments of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) on the Turkey’s macroeconomic performance are examined by using the Bayesian Vector Autoregression (BVAR) model for the period of January 2008 – August 2023. The evidence obtained from the BVAR model suggest that the sovereign risk premium, the rate of change of exchange rate, the change in real interest rate, output gap and inflation gap react to a one-unit positive shock in central bank credibility by decreasing and statistically significant manner. Therefore, increase in central bank credibility reduces the risk perception towards the country, provides the stability in exchange rate and interest rate, and brings output and inflation closer to their potential and targeted levels, respectively, and thus positively affects the macroeconomic performance of Turkey. From this point, within the framework of the findings of the study, in order to support the optimal policy implementations of the central bank and to realize a non-inflationary economic growth, improving central bank credibility is proposed as a policy recommendation.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Central Bank Credibility
• Macroeconomic Performance
• BVAR

Kaynakça

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