Güvenlik ve Mahremiyet Perspektifinden Türkiye’nin Temaslı Takip Uygulaması

Yıl 2024, Cilt: 27 Sayı: 4, 1417 - 1426, 25.09.2024

Ayşe Sayın , Mehmet Tahir Sandıkkaya

https://doi.org/10.2339/politeknik.1118577

Öz

Temas takip uygulamaları güvenlik ve kişisel bilgilerin kötüye kullanımı endişelerine yol açabilir. Türkiye'nin COVID-19 pandemisi sırasında kullanıma sunduğu temas takip uygulaması Hayat Eve Sığar (kısaltılmış hâli ile HES), güvenlik ve kişisel bilgilerin gizliliği gözetilerek henüz ele alınmamıştır. HES'in özellikleri kamuya duyurulmadığından bunların belirlenmesi için var olan temas takip yaklaşımları ile HES karşılaştırılarak uygulamanın çözümlenmesine çalışılmıştır. Bu karşılaştırma, HES'in güvenlik ve kişisel bilgilerin kötüye kullanılabilirliği açılarından özelliklerini göstermiş böylece HES'in dikkate alınması gereken açıklarını da ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu çalışmada, HES'in güvenlik açıklarını azaltabilecek çözüm ve teknikler önerilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, kullanımdaki son HES uygulamasının tasarımından kaynaklı veri yetkilisinden ya da çevreden kaynaklanabilecek ihlaller içermektedir. Bu çözümleme ile önümüzdeki yıllarda ortaya çıkacak benzer uygulamaların tasarımında dikkat edilmesi gereken konulara dikkat çekilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

temaslı takip, güvenlik ve mahremiyet, HES, Hayat Eve Sığar

Turkey’s Contact Tracing Infrastructure From Security and Privacy Perspective

Öz

Contact tracing applications may lead to security and privacy concerns. Turkey’s contact tracing application (Hayat Eve Sığar, abbreviated as HES), which is introduced during COVID-19 pandemic, have not been covered yet for its security and privacy features. Comparison of HES with the existing cutting-edge contact tracing approaches could be used to analyse and determine the features of HES. Comparison indicated the undocumented security and privacy features of HES and revealed a set of vulnerabilities that could cause serious attacks. Mitigation techniques against vulnerabilities are proposed but current HES application includes serious attacks that could be performed by an insider or an outsider. The analysis emphasized to be considered in the design of similar applications that will emerge in the future.

Anahtar Kelimeler

contact tracing, security and privacy, HES, Hayat Eve Sığar

Kaynakça

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