Kartellerin Ortaya Çıkarılmasında Kullanılabilecek Araçlar Bağlamında Rekabet Kurumu Uygulamasına Bir Öneri: İhbarcı Koruma ve Ödül Programları

Yıl 2018, Sayı: 69, 66 - 125, 01.06.2018

Mücteba Altun

Öz

Rekabet otoritelerinin en önemli görevlerinden biri olan kartellerin etkin bir şekilde ortaya çıkarılması için, kartel tarafı teşebbüslerin delil bırakmama noktasındaki yeteneklerini aşacak yeni araçlar geliştirilmesi gerektiği söylenebilir. Pişmanlık programları, bu bağlamda geliştirilmiş ve birçok ülke uygulamasında etkin olarak kullanılmıştır. Bununla birlikte, pişmanlık programlarının etkinliğinin tartışılmaya başlandığı gelinen noktada, bu programların kartelleri ortaya çıkarmakta tek başına yeterli olmayacağı ileri sürülebilir. Uygulamış olduğu pişmanlık programının beklenen faydaları sağlamadığı da göz önüne alındığında, pişmanlık programını geliştirmenin yanı sıra Rekabet Kurumunun farklı rekabet uygulamalarında giderek artan bir şekilde kullanılmaya başlanan ihbarcı koruma ve ödül programlarını tartışması ve Türkiye örneğine uygun bir tasarım geliştirerek hayata geçirmesi yerinde olacaktır

Anahtar Kelimeler

İhbar, ihbarcı koruma, muhbir koruma, ihbarcı ödül programı, muhbir ödül programı

An Offer For Turkish Competition Enforcement As Part Of Tools To Uncover Cartels: Whistleblower Protection and Reward Programs

Öz

Absolutely, one of the most crucial duties of competition authorities is uncovering cartels. In this regard, to manage this duty effectively, authorities should develop new tools aiming to stay one step ahead of cartel members who improve their skills about leaving no trace of evidence. Leniency programs have been introduced and effectively used in this context, in many different countries’ competition enforcement. However, at this stage when efficacy of leniency programs are on the table, it is arguable that those programs cannot be enough to uncover cartels singlehandedly. Within this framework, given the Leniency Program of Turkish Competition Authority has not been successful enough to meet the benefits sought, Turkish Competition Authority may focus on discussing, proposing and implementing convenient legislation and tools to protect and reward whistleblowers, which are increasingly spreading in different jurisdictions’ competition enforcement, as well as improving the effectiveness of the Leniency Program

Anahtar Kelimeler

Whistleblower, Whistleblower Protection, Whistleblower

Kaynakça

• ALP, M. (2013), Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’nin Heinisch/ Almanya Kararı Işığında Whistleblowing (İşçinin İfşa ve İhbarı) ve İş İlişkisinde İfade Özgürlüğü, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, Cilt:15, Özel S.
• AVRUPA KOMİSYONU (2018a). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee, Avrupa Komisyonu, Brüksel, (23.04.2018) COM(2018) 214 final https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0214, Erişim Tarihi: 04.09.2018.
• AVRUPA KOMİSYONU (2018b), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Persons Reporting on Breaches of Union Law, Avrupa Komisyonu, Brüksel, (23.04.2018), COM(2018)218 final.
• AVRUPA KONSEYİ (2014), Protection of Whistleblowers - Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 30 April 2014 and explanatory memorandum, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3441_ en.htm , Erişim tarihi: 03.09.2018.
• AVRUPA KONSEYİ (2014), Protection of Whistleblowers - Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)7 adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 30 April 2014 and explanatory memorandum, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3441_ en.htm , Erişim tarihi: 03.09.2018.
• BAEKGAARD, O. (1984), “The Cost of Whistleblowing, Stanley Adams v. Hoffman-La Roche”, The Multinational Monitor, June 1984, Vol:5, No:6, https://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/ issues/1984/06/baekgaard.html, Erişim Tarihi: 14.10.2018.
• BREUVART, C. M. EVANS, P. WERNER, H.B. D’ERQUILINNES ve C. KYE (2017), European Commission Launches Competition Law Anonymous Whistleblower Tool, Jones Day publications, https://www. jonesday.com/European-Commission-Launches-Competition- Law-Anonymous-Whistleblower-Tool-04-25-2017/?RSS=true , Erişim Tarihi: 26.09.2018.
• BROWN, A. J., D. LEWIS, R. MOBERLY ve W. VANDEKERCKHOVE (2014), International Handbook on Whistleblowing Research, Edward Elgar Pub, Birleşik Krallık.
• BUDAK T. (2009), “Türk Vergi Hukukunda İhbar ve İhbar İkramiyesi”, İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Maliye Araştırma Merkezi Konferansları, 52. Seri, http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/ article-file/7235 , Erişim Tarihi: 09.10.2018.
• CEMALOĞLU, N. ve M.İ. AKYÜREK (2017), “Örgütlerde Whistleblowing (Bilgi Uçurma), Turkish Journal of Educational Studies, 4 (3), Ekim 2017.
• COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL (2018), UK: Up to 100.000 cash rewards for cartel whistleblowers, Competition Policy International, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/ uk-up-to-100000-cash-rewards-for-cartel-whistleblowers/, Erişim Tarihi: 26.09.2018.
• ÇELİK, Ö. F. (2017), Yerinde İncelemelerde Elektronik Posta Analizine İlişkin Süreç Modeli Önerisi, Uzmanlık Tezi, Rekabet Kurumu, Ankara.
• DURANT A. ve W. WAYNE (2004), Business must encourage whistleblowers, Company Lawyer, 25(5).
• ERDEM, M.R. (2009), “Suçu Bildirmeme Suçu”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, Sayı 80.
• EUROPEAN COMPETITION NETWORK BRIEF (2010a), “Hungary: Introduction of Awards for Informants in Cartel Cases” European Competition Network, 02/2010, http://ec.europa.eu/ competition/ecn/brief/02_2010/hu_informant.pdf, Erişim tarihi: 01.10.2018.
• EUROPEAN COMPETITION NETWORK BRIEF (2010b), “Slovakia: Leniency extended to Criminal Enforcement” European Competition Network, 04/2010, http://ec.europa. e u / c o m p e t i t i o n / e c n / b r i e f / 0 4 _ 2 0 1 0 / b r i e f _ 0 4 _ 2 0 1 0 . pdf#page=22&zoom=100,0,464, Erişim tarihi: 05.10.2018.
• EUROPEAN COMPETITION NETWORK BRIEF (2012), “The German Competition Authority Sets Up Anonymous Whistleblowing System”, e-Competitions Bulletin (June 2012), Art. No 48456.
• FENRYCH, L., D. JAHIC (2018), Poland finally warms to whistleblowing by weighing legal rights and protections, South Eastern Coalition on Whistleblower Protection (11.06.2018), https:// see-whistleblowing.org/poland-warms-to-whistleblowing-by- weighing-legal-protections/ , Erişim Tarihi: 10.10.2018.
• FERRINGTON, A., J. S. BARRAS, M. D. SMITH, S. MARTEL, M. BRUNOT, J. WEİSSGERBER, D. LIAW ve A. WAN (2015), Whistleblower Protection Around the World, Employment Law Watch, Reed Smith, https://www.employmentlawwatch.com/2015/ 02/ articles/employment-france/whistleblower-protection-around-the- world/ , Erişim Tarihi: 10.10.2018.
• G20 (2011), Study on Whistleblower Protection Frameworks, Compendium of Best Practices and Guiding Principles for Legislation, https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/anti-corruption/48972967.pdf ; Erişim Tarihi: 04.09.2018.
• GINALI, A. (2010), “Vergi İhbarı Sonucu Ödenecek İhbar İkramiyesinin Usul ve Esasları”, Mali Çözüm Dergisi, İstanbul Serbest Muhasebeci Mali Müşavirler Odası, Eylül-Ekim 2010.
• GÜNDÜZ, H. (2018), Rekabet İhlallerine İlişkin Soruşturmalar ve Para Cezaları: Rekabet Kurulu’nun 20 Yılının Bilançosu, 1. Baskı, On İki Levha Yayıncılık, İstanbul.
• HUGHES, J., & HATCH, J. H. (2017). Senate Passes the Criminal Antitrust Anti-Retaliation Act, and Takes Another Shot at Increased Protections for Whistleblowers, Antitrust Update, https://www. pbwt.com/antitrust-update-blog/senate-passes-the-criminal- antitrust-anti-retaliation-act-and-takes-another-shot-at-increased- protections-for-whistleblowers, Erişim Tarihi: 27.09.2018.
• IATROU, N. ve B. ROE (2013), The Canadian Competition Bureau Introduces Criminal Cartel Whistleblowing Initiative, e-Competitions Bulletin May 2013, Art. No: 59633.
• KOCAER, Ş. (2005), Kartellerle Mücadelede Pişmanlık Programlarının Uygulanması, Uzmanlık Tezi, Rekabet Kurumu, Ankara.
• KULESZA, M. (2016), “The (in)effectiveness of leniency: Will Poland start paying whistleblowers?”, In Principle (10.11.2016), http:// www.codozasady.pl/en/the-ineffectiveness-of-leniency-will-poland- start-paying-whistleblowers/ , Erişim Tarihi: 10.10.2018.
• LUZ R. D. ve G. SPAGNOLO (2017), Leniency, Collusion, Corruption, And Whistleblowing, Journal of Competition Law&Economics, 13(4), 729-766, Oxford University Press.
• MACAR REKABET OTORİTESİ (2014), “2.7 Billion fine on several ready-mix concrete manufacturers in Budapest”, Macar Rekabet Otoritesi, Basın Açıklaması, _http://www.gvh.hu/en/press_room/ press_releases/press_releases_2014/2_2_billion_fine_on_several_ ready_mix_concrete_man.html, Erişim Tarihi: 10.10.2018.
• MARX, L., C. MEZZETTI, ve R. MARSHALL (2015), Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3), s. 205-240, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/24467007, Erişim Tarihi: 26.09.2018.
• MCCONNELL, C. (2018), “Type A leniency applications down, US DOJ official says”, GCR, https://globalcompetitionreview. com/article/1170614/type-a-leniency-applications-down-us-doj- official-says, Erişim tarihi: 26.09.2018.
• MCLENNAN, M. (2018), “Fasken hires Pecman”, GCR, https:// globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1171015 /fasken-hires- pecman , Erişim Tarihi: 10.10.2018.
• OECD (2012), Whistleblower protection: encouraging reporting, OECD, Paris, http://www.oecd.org/ cleangovbiz/toolkit/50042935.pdf , Erişim Tarihi: 01.10.2018.
• OECD (2016a), Corporate Governance, Committing to Effective Whistleblower Protection - En., OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/ corporate/committing-to-effective-whistleblower-protection- 9789264252639-en.htm, Erişim Tarihi: 26.09.2018.
• OECD (2016b), Report Committing to Effective Whistleblowers Protection, OECD, Paris, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/ governance/committing-to-effective-whistleblower- protection_9789264252639-en#page1, Erişim tarihi: 03.09.2018.
• ORMAN, Z. (2017), Rekabet Hukuku Uygulamaları Kapsamında Adli Bilişim, Uzmanlık Tezi, Rekabet Kurumu, Ankara.
• PARK, I. (2008), “Protecting the Whistlebowers – Asian and European Perspectives”, 13th International Anti-Corruption Conference Workshop Session II, 31.10.2008, Atina/Yunanistan.
• REMETEI-FILEP, A. (2016), “The Hungarian informant reward programme”, International Competition Network Cartel Working Group (16.11.2016), Cartel leads / informants: experiences, challenges and difficulties, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/icn/index_ en.html , Erişim Tarihi: 28.09.2018.
• SCHENKOVA, K. (2014), “The Slovak National Council Introduces a Whistleblower Program in the Context of a Substantial Amendment of the Competition Act”, e-Competitions Bulletin May 2014,Art. No: 67465.
• STAWICKI, A. (2017), “The Polish Competition Authority Launches a Pilot Programme for Whistleblowers”, e-Competitions Bulletin (April 2017), Art. No: 83838.
• STEPHAN, A. (2014), “Is the Korean Innovation of Individual Informant Rewards a Viable Cartel Detection Tool?”, Centre for Competition Policy Working Paper 14-3, Birleşik Krallık, http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8199490/ CCP+Working+Paper+14-3.pdf/7a9c1d06-d790-4e83-86bf- d43c68c83d0d, Erişim Tarihi: 01.10.2018.
• STUCKE, M. E. (2015), “Leniency, Whistle-Blowing and the Individual: Should We Create Another Race to the Competition Agency?”, C Beaton-Wells and C Tran (eds), Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age: Leniency Religion içinde, Hart Publishing, http://awa2016.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/11_-_stucke.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 16.11.2018.
• SULLIVAN, K. R., K. BALL ve S. KLEBOLT (2011), The Potential Impact of Adding a Whistleblower Rewards Provision to ACPERA, the Antitrust Source, Ekim 2011, https://www.americanbar. org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/oct11_ sullivan_10_24f.authcheckdam.pdf , Erişim Tarihi: 28.09.2018.
• TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2013), International Principles for Whistleblower Legislation, Berlin, https://www. transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/international_ principles_ for_whistleblower_legislation, Erişim Tarihi: 04.09.2018.
• TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2018), A Best Practice Guide For Whistleblowing Legislation, Berlin, https://www. transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/best_practice_ guide_for_ whistleblowing_legislation, Erişim Tarihi: 04.09.2018.
• UĞUR, H. (2013), “Suçların İhbarı ve İhbarcıların Korunması”, Türkiye Barolar Birliği Dergisi, 108.
• UN (2015), Resource guide on good practices in the protection of reporting persons, United Nations, New York, https://www.unodc. org/documents/corruption/Publications/2015/15-04741_Person_ Guide_eBook.pdf, Erişim Tarihi, 03.09.2018.
• VANDENBORRE, I. ve G. THORSTEN (2017), Cartels&Leniency 2018 – Individuals as Whistleblowers, International Comparative Legal Guides, https://iclg.com/practice-areas/cartels-and-leniency- laws-and-regulations/individuals-as-whistleblowers , Erişim Tarihi: 26.09.2018.
• WOLFE, S., M. WOTH, S. DREYFUS ve A.J. BROWN (2014), Whistleblower Protection Laws in G20 Countries Priorities for Action, Final Report, http://transparency.org.au/wp-content/ uploads/2014/09/FINAL__-Whistleblower-Protection-Laws- in-G20-Countries-Priorities-for__-Action.pdf , Erişim Tarihi: 03.10.2018
• WYLD, T. M. (2018), “Pecman backs whistleblower payments”, GCR, https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1169403/pecman- backs-whistleblower-payments, Erişim Tarihi: 28.09.2018.
• YALÇINKAYA, M. (2015), Rekabet Hukuku Uygulamaları Kapsamında Elektronik Delil, Uzmanlık Tezi, Rekabet Kurumu, Ankara.
• ZUHAIR, M. (2016), “Are Pakistan’s Anti-Corruption Whistleblower Programs Working At All?”, Propakistani, https://propakistani. pk/2016/09/21/pakistans-anti-corruption-whistleblower- programs-working/, Erişim Tarihi: 10.10.2018. Diğer Kaynaklar
• 01.2016 tarih ve 16-02/44-14 sayılı Kurul kararı.
• “Canada Competition Act”, 66.1 ve 66.2 numaralı maddeler, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, c. C-34. http://www.laws.justice.gc.ca/ PDF/C-34.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 03.10.2018.
• ABD KONGRESİ (2013), A Bill to provide anti-retaliation protections for antitrust whistleblowers, 113. Congress, 1. Session, s. 42.
• ABD KONGRESİ (2015), An Act to provide anti-retaliation protections for antitrust whistleblowers, 114. Congress, 1. Session, s. 1599.
• ABD KONGRESİ (2017), An Act to provide anti-retaliation protections for antitrust whistleblowers, 115. Congress, 1. Session, s. 807.
• ANTI-CORRUPTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, “How to Report a Violation of Public Interest”, http://www. acrc.go.kr/en/board.do?command=searchDetail&method= searchList&menuId=0203160605, Erişim Tarihi: 11.10.2018.
• AVRUPA KOMİSYONU BASIN AÇIKLAMASI (2017), “Antitrust: Commission Introduces New Anonymous Whistleblower Tool”, Avrupa Komisyonu, Brüksel (16.03.2017), europa.eu/rapid/press- release_IP-17-591_en.htm, Erişim Tarihi: 24.09.2018.
• AVRUPA KOMİSYONU İHBAR ARACI SAYFASI, “Anonymous Whistleblower Tool”- “Cartels - How to Blow the Whistle”, Avrupa Komisyonu, ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/ whistleblower/ index.html, Erişim Tarihi: 24.09.2018.
• CMA, “Reward for Information About Cartels”, CMA, https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk /government/uploads/system/uploads/ attachment_data/file/299411/Informant_rewards_policy.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 02.10.2018.
• Concurrences Review’in White&Case ve CRA ile ortak düzenlediği Seminer (2018), “Cartels&Concerted Practices: What are the New Risks of Being Caught?”, Concurrences, http://www.concurrences. com/ en/conferences/cartels-concerted-practices-what-are-the- new-risks-of-being-caught-86607, Erişim Tarihi: 28.09.2018.
• GABEL, J. M. (2018), “European Community”, Encyclopedia Britannica, Community-European-economic-association, Erişim Tarihi: 14.10.2018.
• https://www.britannica.com/topic/European
• GELİR İDARESİ BAŞKANLIĞI 2017 Yılına Ait Faaliyet Raporu; GELİR İDARESİ BAŞKANLIĞI 2016 Yılına Ait Faaliyet Raporu; GELİR İDARESİ BAŞKANLIĞI 2015 Yılına Ait Faaliyet Raporu; GELİR İDARESİ BAŞKANLIĞI 2014 Yılına Ait Faaliyet Raporu; GELİR İDARESİ BAŞKANLIĞI 2013 Yılına Ait Faaliyet Raporu; GELİR İDARESİ BAŞKANLIĞI 2012 Yılına Ait Faaliyet Raporu, http://www.gib.gov.tr/kurumsal/stratejik-yonetim/faaliyet- raporlari, Erişim Tarihi: 09.10.2018.
• GOV.UK* Basın Açıklaması (2017), “CMA launches a campaign to crack down on cartels”, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/ news/cma-launches-campaign-to-crack-down-on-cartels , Erişim Tarihi: 02.10.2018.
• KAYIT DIŞI EKONOMİYLE MÜCADELE STRATEJİSİ EYLEM PLANI (2008 – 2010), Nisan 2009. http://www.gib.gov.tr/sites/ default/files/fileadmin/beyannamerehberi/ Kayit_disi_2009tr.pdf; Erişim Tarihi: 09.10.2018.
• NORRBOM VINDING (2018), “Denmark - Proposed directive on protection for whistleblowers”, Global HR Lawyers, https://theword. iuslaboris.com/hrlaw/insights/denmark-proposed-directive-on- protection-for-whistleblowers/, Erişim Tarihi: 10.10.2018.
• ONUNCU KALKINMA PLANI (2014-2018), Kayıt Dışı Ekonominin Azaltılması Programı Eylem Planı, Ocak 2015. http://www.gib.gov. tr/sites/default/files/fileadmin/ beyannamerehberi/2015kayitdisi. pdf , Erişim Tarihi: 09.10.2018.
• REKABET KURUMU (2007), “8. Yıllık Faaliyet Raporu”, Rekabet Kurumu, Ankara, https://www.rekabet.gov.tr/Dosya/faaliyet- raporlari/8-pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 07.10.2018.
• SLOVAK REKABET OTORİTESİ (2018), “Cartel Informant Reward”, Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic, (last update: 05.06.2018) reward/ , 11.10.2018.
• https://www.antimon.gov.sk/cartel-informant