“FRAND” İlkeleri Çerçevesinde Lisanslanan “Standarda Esas Patentler”e Dair Mahkeme Emri Uygulamaları: AB Rekabet Hukuku Açısından Değerlendirme

Yıl 2017, Sayı: 67, 32 - 83, 01.06.2017

Tuba Yeşil

Öz

Son yıllarda “standarda esas patent1” SEP kavramının rekabet hukuku bağlamındaki birtakım sonuçları bakımından, yeni bir rekabetçi kaygı olarak ön plana çıktığı görülmektedir. Belirli bir standardın uygulanabilmesi için zaruri/vazgeçilmez nitelik taşıyan teknolojilere ilişkin patentleri ifade eden SEP2’ler özelinde gündeme gelebilecek rekabet karşıtı uygulamalar temel olarak; SEP sahibinin standardizasyon süreci sırasındaki “yanıltıcı uygulamaları”3 ve standardizasyon faaliyeti tamamlandıktan sonra ex-post gündeme gelebilen “SEP’ ler in stratejik kullanımı”4 şeklinde iki ana başlık altında toplanabilmektedir. Mevcut çalışmanın odaklandığı ikinci gruptaki stratejik uygulamalar, SEP sahibinin elindeki patentli teknolojiyi, ilgili standardın uygulanmasını engellemek için kullanmak suretiyle diğer firmaları piyasadan dışlaması durumunda ortaya çıkabilen “dışlayıcı uygulamalar5”dır. Anılan uygulamalar ise “engelleme6”, “lisanslamanın reddi7” ve “mahkeme emri uygulamaları” şeklinde karşımıza çıkabilmektedir. SEP sahibinin girişebileceği söz konusu “fırsatçı uygulamalar”a8 çözüm getirebilmek amacıyla Standart Belirleme Kuruluşları SBK genellikle katılımcılarının, ellerindeki SEP’leri “adil, makul ve ayrımcı olmayan koşullar FRAND 9” altında lisanslamalarını öngördüğü fikri mülkiyet politikaları hayata geçirmektedir.10Diğer taraftan, günümüzde rekabet hukuku bağlamında anılan uygulamalar arasında en çok tartışılanlardan biri “mahkeme emri uygulamaları”dır. Atlantik’in her iki yakasındaki rekabet otoritelerinin güçlü rekabetçi endişeler dile getiregeldiği mahkeme emri enstrümanı,11 özellikle “FRAND ilkeleri çerçevesinde lisanslanan SEP’ler” bağlamında kullanıldığında engellemeye imkan sağlayabilmesi ve standardizasyon faaliyetini olumsuz etkileyebilmesi yönüyle rekabet hukuku incelemesine tabi tutulmaktadır. Çalışmanın temel olarak cevabını araştırdığı soru ise “FRAND ilkeleri çerçevesinde lisanslanan SEP’lere ilişkin mahkeme emri uygulamaları” meselesinin mehaz Avrupa Birliği AB rekabet hukuku kapsamında nasıl yönetildiği ve “olması gereken hukuk” noktasında nasıl yönetilmesi gerektiğidir. İlgili AB Adalet Divanı ABAD ve Komisyon kararları ile ortaya konan AB rekabet hukuku yaklaşımı ışığında Türk rekabet hukuku literatürüne katkı sunmanın hedeflendiği çalışmada, rekabet hukukunun genel uygulamasında benimsenecek en uygun yöntemin formule edilmesi amaçlanmaktadır

Anahtar Kelimeler

Standarda esas patent SEP, FRAND ilkeleri, FRAND’e tabi SEP, mahkeme emri uygulamaları, engelleme, gönüllü lisans alan, güvenli liman

Injunctions Regarding FRAND Encumberd “Standard Essential Patents”: An Analysis In Terms Of EU Competition Law

Öz

Standard essential patents SEPs , which are patents that are declared by their owner as being necessary to implement a technical standard, have been a novel competitive concern along with the traditional competitive concerns as “collusion” or “exclusioniory conducts” in recent years. The anticompetitive practices arising in the SEP context can be divided into two fundemenatal categories as “SEP’s owner’s deceptice practices during the standardization process” and “the strategic licensing practices after the standard has been adopted”. The second category on which this study mainly focus contains three subtititles as “hold-up”, “refusal to license” and “injuction relief”. Injunction relief is one of the most controversial issues in the debate concerning SEPs among other types of strategic practices. Competition authorities on both sides of the Atlantic have expressed strong concerns with such practics, emphazsizing that requesting an injunction against an infiringer of FRAND-encumberd patents could faciliate holdup, distort the licensing negotiations and enable the SEP owner to extract opportunistic licensing terms. In oder to address the risks mentioned above, standard setting organisations usually adopt intellectual property rights policies that require participants to disclose and license their SEP’s free of charge or on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory FRAND terms.The central question the present study adress is how “injunctions” in respect of “FRAND-encumbered SEPs” are treated by competition authorities using antitrust enforcement tools. In that respect, the study aims to contribute a practical discussion on the antitrust liability of SEP owners who use injuctions for FRAND-encumbered SEPs by analysing decisions of European Commission and European Court of Justice. By providing a detailed analysis of the application of Eropean Union EU competition law, the ideal approach for the competition authorities is tried to be proposed

Anahtar Kelimeler

Standard essential patents SEP, FRAND terms, FRAND-encumbered SEP, injunctions, hold up, willing licensee, safe harbour

Kaynakça

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