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KARTELLERİN SEMPTOMLARI VE İKTİSADİ TEŞHİSİ: YOLUN NERESİNDEYİZ?

Yıl 2015, Sayı: 63, 3 - 37, 01.09.2015

Öz

Rekabet hukukunca en ciddi ihlal türleri arasında sayılan kartellerin/açık işbirliklerinin tespitinde hukuki ve iktisadi ispat standardı hakkında yürütülen tartışmalar ve çalışmalar sınırsızdır. Bu çalışmakartellerin tespitinde iktisadi açıdan katedilen yola dairdir. Bu konuda iktisat teorisi birbirini destekleyici iki ana koldan ilerlemektedir. Teori, bir yandan anlaşmacı/işbirlikçi pazar sonuçlarını rekabetçi sonuçlardan ayırt etmenin yollarını ararken, diğer yandan özellikle son zamanlarda açık anlaşmaları/işbirliklerini, otoritelerce genellikle ihlal sayılmayan zımni anlaşmalardan ayırt eden pazar ve firma niteliklerini tespit etmeye çalışmaktadır. Ancak, teorinin ve uygulamaların, açık işbirliklerinizımni anlaşmalardan ayırt etmek için “mükemmel” bulgulara erişebilmiş olduğunu söylemek henüz mümkün gözükmemektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı da bu düzlemde elde edilen bulguların bir değerlendirmesini yapmak ve iktisat ayağı oldukça kısıtlı kalan Türkiye’deki kartel tespitine dair literatürekatkı sağlamaktır. Çalışmada, teorinin ve analizlerin daha güçlü olduğu gerekçesiyleişbirlikçive rekabetçi davranışları ayırmada kullanılabilecek“artı faktörler”/“işbirliği göstergeleri” ve ekonometrikyöntemler incelenmektedir. Sonuçlar şunu göstermektedir ki, teori bulguları ve analizler, bir nevi ezber bozan niteliktedir: pazardaki yasadışı işbirliğini tespit eden “her derde deva” bir yöntem bulunmamaktadır. Bir pazarda işbirliğiningöstergesi olabilecek davranış farklı firma davranışı ve yapısı olan diğer bir pazarda rekabetin olduğuna işaret edebilmektedir. Bu bakımdan, iktisadi bulguların pazara özgü yapı ve davranış bağlamında değerlendirilmesi gerekmektedir. İktisat teorisinde daha güçlü sonuçlara erişilmesi ve bu sonuçların antitröst incelemelerindepazar koşulları dikkate alınarak kullanılması da, iktisadi bulguların “delil” niteliği kazanmasına şüphesiz ki katkıda bulunacaktır

Kaynakça

  • ABRANTES-METZ, R.M. (2012), “Libor, Screening and Reform”, h t t p : / / e c . e u r o p a . e u / i n t e r n a l _ m a r k e t / e c o n o m i c _ a n a l y s i s / d o c s / presentations/121206_libor-screening-reform_en.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 26.05.2015.
  • ABRANTES-METZ, R.M., L.M. FROEB, J. GEWEKE ve C.T. TAYLOR (2006), “A Variance Screen for Collusion”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, No:24, s.467-486.
  • ABRANTES-METZ, R.M., M. KRATEN, A. D. METZ ve G.S. SEOW (2012)
  • “Libor Manipulation?”, Journal of Banking and Finance, No:36, s. 136-144. Airtours plc. v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-342/99, Airtours plc. v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-342/99. BAGWELL, K. ve R. STAIGLER (1997), “Collusion over the Business Cycle”
  • RAND Journal of Economics, No:28, s. 82-106. BAJARI, P. ve L. YE (2003), “Deciding between Competition and Collusion”
  • Review of Economics and Statistics, No:85, s.971-989. BALDWIN, L.H, R.C. MARSHALL ve J.F. RICHARD (1997), “Bidder
  • Collusion at Forest Service Timber Auctions”, Journal of Political Economy, No:105, s. 657-699. BANERJI, A. ve J.V. MEENAKSHI (2004), “Buyer Collusion and Efficiency of Government Intervention in Wheat Market in Northen India: An Asymetric
  • Structural Auction Analysis”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, No:86(1), s. 236-253. CHEN, J. ve J.E. HARRINGTON (2007), “The Impact of the Corporate Leniency
  • Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path”, V. Ghosal and J. Stennek (der.), The Political Economy of Antitrust Amsterdam: Elsevier içinde. COMANOR, W.S. ve M. SCHANKERMANN (1976), “Identical Bids and Cartel
  • Behaviour”, Bell Journal of Economics, No:9, s. 281-286. COMPTE, O., F. JENNY ve P. REY (2002), “Capacity Constraints, Mergers and Collusion”, European Economic Review, Vol.46, s.1-29.
  • CONNOR, J.M. (1997), “The Global Lysine Price Fixing Conspiracy of 1992
  • ”, Review of Agricultural Economics, No:19(2), s. 412-427. ÇÖRÜŞ, S. (2012), Kartellerin Tespit Edilmesinde Davranışsal Tarama
  • Teknikleri, Rekabet Kurumu Uzmanlık Tezleri, Rekabet Kurumu, Ankara DAVIS, P. ve E. GARCES (2010), Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis, Princeton University, ABD, s. 316.
  • GREEN, E. Ve R.H. PORTER (1984), “Noncooperative Collusion under
  • Imperfect Price Information”, Econometrica, No:52(1), s. 87-100. HARRINGTON, J. (2013), “Collusion and Cartels: Recent Policy Successes and Future Legal Challenges”, http://www.vfs.hhu.de/fileadmin/redaktion/
  • Fakultaeten/Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche_Fakultaet/DICE/Konferenzen_und_ Seminare/Vergangene_Konferenzen/Harrington_GEA_09.03.13_01.pdfErişim tarihi: 26.05.2015.
  • HARRINGTON, J.E. (2012), “A Theory of Tacit Collusion”, http://krieger2.jhu.edu/economics/wp-content/uploads/pdf/papers/wp588_ harrington.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 26.02.2016.
  • HARRINGTON, J. E (2008), “Detecting Cartels”, P. Buccirossi (der.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics içinde, MIT Press, Cambridge, s. 213-258.
  • HARRINGTON, J. E. ve A. SKRZYPACZ, A. (2007), “Collusion under
  • Monitoring of Sales”, The RAND Journal of Economics, No:38(2) s.314-331. HÜSCHELRATH, K., K. MÜLLER ve T. VEITH (2012), “Concrete Shoes for Competition: The Effect of the German Cement Cartel on Market Price”
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Discussion Paper No:12(35). KAYA, S.D. (2013), “Rekabet Endeksleri Üzerine Bir Not ve Hollanda Rekabet
  • Otoritesi Örneği” http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/default.aspx?nsw=ZcvWbYOfQTg WXWH0bE7CKQ==-H7deC+LxBI8=, Erişim Tarihi: 26.05.2015.
  • KOVACIC, W.E., R.C. MARSHALL, L.M. MARX ve H.L.WHITE (2011)
  • “Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law”, Michigan Law Review, Vol.110, s.393-436. KEKEVİ, G. (2007), Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Avrupa Topluluğu ve Türk
  • Rekabet Hukuku’nda Kartel Anlaşmalarının Denetimi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi MAS-COLELL, A., M.D. WHINSTON VE J.R. GREEN (1995), Microeconomic
  • Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford. MENA-LABARTHE, M. (2012), “Mexican Experience in Screens for Bid-Rigging”
  • Competition Policy International, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational. com/file/view/6644, Erişim tarihi: 26.05.2015.
  • NORMANN, H.T. ve M. FONCESA (2012), “Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion –The
  • Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments”, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics, Discussion Papers No. 65. OECD (1999), Oligopoly, OECD, Paris. http://www.oecd.org/daf/ competition/1920526.pdf, Erişim Tarihi:26.05.2015
  • OECD (2006), Prosecuting Cartels without Direct Evidence of Aggrement, prosecutionandlawenforcement/37391162.pdf, Erişim Tarihi:26.05.2015.
  • OECD (2013), Ex officio cartel investigations and the use of screens to detect cartels, http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/exofficio-cartel- investigation-2013.pdf, Erişim Tarihi:26.05.2015.
  • PAHA, J. (2009), “Simulation Methods In Cartel Prosecution”, http://www. univie.ac.at/RNIC/papers/Paha_simulations1.2.pdf, Erişim tarihi: 03.03.2016.
  • PETIT, L. (2012), The Economic Detection Instrument of the Netherlands
  • Competition Authority: The Competition Index, NMa Working Paper No. SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1992774 ya da http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.1992774, Erişim tarihi: 26.05.2015.
  • PORTER, R.H. (1983), “A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive
  • Committee, 1880-1886”, Bell Journal of Economics, No:14, s. 301-314.
  • PORTER, R.H. ve J.D. ZONA (1993), “Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement
  • Auctions”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.101, s.79-99. POSNER, R.A. (2001), Antitrust Law, Second Edition, University of Chicago Press, US.
  • REKABET KURUMU (2013), Yatay İşbirliği Anlaşmaları Hakkında Kılavuz, http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT%2F1%2FDocuments%2FKilavuz
  • %2FYatayisbirligikilavuz.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 29.02.2016.
  • ROTEMBERG, J.J. ve G. SALONER (1986), “A Supergame Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms”, American Economic Review, No:76, s. 390-407
  • SCHEFFMAN, D. ve M. COLEMAN (2003), “Quantitative Analyses of Potential
  • Competitive Effects of a Merger”, George Mason Law Review, No:12(2), s. 319- SCHERER, F.M. ve D. ROSS (2009), “Industrial Market Structure and Economic
  • Performance”, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship. SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496716.
  • STIGLER, G.J. (1964), “A Theory of Oligopoly”, Journal of Political Economy, No:72, s. 44-61.
  • STANDFORD ÜNIVERSITESI SÖZLÜĞÜ, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ prisoner-dilemma/, Erişim tarihi: 29.02.2016.
  • WERDEN, G. J. (2004), “Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion
  • Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory,” Antitrust Law Journal, No:71, s.719-799.

SYMPTOMS OF CARTELS AND THEIR ECONOMIC DETECTION: AN ASSESSMENT OF MILAGE

Yıl 2015, Sayı: 63, 3 - 37, 01.09.2015

Öz

The studies and discussions on the economic and legal standard of proof of cartels which are treated as one of the most serious infringements in antitrust are unlimited. This study is about the milage on the way to detect cartels with economic evidences. As developing two-sided, the economic collusion theory on the one hand seeks to differentiate competitive market outcomes from collusive ones, on the other hand -especially currently- is devoted to distinguish the market and firm characteristics in the case of tacit collusion which is not treated illegal by authorities from explicit agreements. However, it is too early to infer that the theory and its applications have reached “perfect” findings to discriminate tacit and explicit collusions. The aim of this study is to evaluate the findings of the theory and applications in this context and to contribute the literature in Turkey on economic detection of cartels which have remained quite limited. In the study, the “plus factors”/ “collusion markers” to be used in distinguishing collusion from competition are assessed as the theory and empirical analyses are more robust in this field. The results show that, the findings of the theory and analyses appear to break the early classical memorization: there is no cure-all indicator in the markets referringillegal collusion. Contrarily, an indicator inferringcollusion in a specific market could infer to competition in another market with different firm attributes and market design. Reaching more robust results in theory and using these results in antitrust investigations as respecting the specific market conditionswould undoubtedly contribute economic findings to be assessed legally as an “evidence”

Kaynakça

  • ABRANTES-METZ, R.M. (2012), “Libor, Screening and Reform”, h t t p : / / e c . e u r o p a . e u / i n t e r n a l _ m a r k e t / e c o n o m i c _ a n a l y s i s / d o c s / presentations/121206_libor-screening-reform_en.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 26.05.2015.
  • ABRANTES-METZ, R.M., L.M. FROEB, J. GEWEKE ve C.T. TAYLOR (2006), “A Variance Screen for Collusion”, International Journal of Industrial Organization, No:24, s.467-486.
  • ABRANTES-METZ, R.M., M. KRATEN, A. D. METZ ve G.S. SEOW (2012)
  • “Libor Manipulation?”, Journal of Banking and Finance, No:36, s. 136-144. Airtours plc. v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-342/99, Airtours plc. v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-342/99. BAGWELL, K. ve R. STAIGLER (1997), “Collusion over the Business Cycle”
  • RAND Journal of Economics, No:28, s. 82-106. BAJARI, P. ve L. YE (2003), “Deciding between Competition and Collusion”
  • Review of Economics and Statistics, No:85, s.971-989. BALDWIN, L.H, R.C. MARSHALL ve J.F. RICHARD (1997), “Bidder
  • Collusion at Forest Service Timber Auctions”, Journal of Political Economy, No:105, s. 657-699. BANERJI, A. ve J.V. MEENAKSHI (2004), “Buyer Collusion and Efficiency of Government Intervention in Wheat Market in Northen India: An Asymetric
  • Structural Auction Analysis”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, No:86(1), s. 236-253. CHEN, J. ve J.E. HARRINGTON (2007), “The Impact of the Corporate Leniency
  • Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path”, V. Ghosal and J. Stennek (der.), The Political Economy of Antitrust Amsterdam: Elsevier içinde. COMANOR, W.S. ve M. SCHANKERMANN (1976), “Identical Bids and Cartel
  • Behaviour”, Bell Journal of Economics, No:9, s. 281-286. COMPTE, O., F. JENNY ve P. REY (2002), “Capacity Constraints, Mergers and Collusion”, European Economic Review, Vol.46, s.1-29.
  • CONNOR, J.M. (1997), “The Global Lysine Price Fixing Conspiracy of 1992
  • ”, Review of Agricultural Economics, No:19(2), s. 412-427. ÇÖRÜŞ, S. (2012), Kartellerin Tespit Edilmesinde Davranışsal Tarama
  • Teknikleri, Rekabet Kurumu Uzmanlık Tezleri, Rekabet Kurumu, Ankara DAVIS, P. ve E. GARCES (2010), Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust Analysis, Princeton University, ABD, s. 316.
  • GREEN, E. Ve R.H. PORTER (1984), “Noncooperative Collusion under
  • Imperfect Price Information”, Econometrica, No:52(1), s. 87-100. HARRINGTON, J. (2013), “Collusion and Cartels: Recent Policy Successes and Future Legal Challenges”, http://www.vfs.hhu.de/fileadmin/redaktion/
  • Fakultaeten/Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche_Fakultaet/DICE/Konferenzen_und_ Seminare/Vergangene_Konferenzen/Harrington_GEA_09.03.13_01.pdfErişim tarihi: 26.05.2015.
  • HARRINGTON, J.E. (2012), “A Theory of Tacit Collusion”, http://krieger2.jhu.edu/economics/wp-content/uploads/pdf/papers/wp588_ harrington.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 26.02.2016.
  • HARRINGTON, J. E (2008), “Detecting Cartels”, P. Buccirossi (der.), Handbook of Antitrust Economics içinde, MIT Press, Cambridge, s. 213-258.
  • HARRINGTON, J. E. ve A. SKRZYPACZ, A. (2007), “Collusion under
  • Monitoring of Sales”, The RAND Journal of Economics, No:38(2) s.314-331. HÜSCHELRATH, K., K. MÜLLER ve T. VEITH (2012), “Concrete Shoes for Competition: The Effect of the German Cement Cartel on Market Price”
  • Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Discussion Paper No:12(35). KAYA, S.D. (2013), “Rekabet Endeksleri Üzerine Bir Not ve Hollanda Rekabet
  • Otoritesi Örneği” http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/default.aspx?nsw=ZcvWbYOfQTg WXWH0bE7CKQ==-H7deC+LxBI8=, Erişim Tarihi: 26.05.2015.
  • KOVACIC, W.E., R.C. MARSHALL, L.M. MARX ve H.L.WHITE (2011)
  • “Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law”, Michigan Law Review, Vol.110, s.393-436. KEKEVİ, G. (2007), Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Avrupa Topluluğu ve Türk
  • Rekabet Hukuku’nda Kartel Anlaşmalarının Denetimi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi MAS-COLELL, A., M.D. WHINSTON VE J.R. GREEN (1995), Microeconomic
  • Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford. MENA-LABARTHE, M. (2012), “Mexican Experience in Screens for Bid-Rigging”
  • Competition Policy International, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational. com/file/view/6644, Erişim tarihi: 26.05.2015.
  • NORMANN, H.T. ve M. FONCESA (2012), “Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion –The
  • Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments”, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics, Discussion Papers No. 65. OECD (1999), Oligopoly, OECD, Paris. http://www.oecd.org/daf/ competition/1920526.pdf, Erişim Tarihi:26.05.2015
  • OECD (2006), Prosecuting Cartels without Direct Evidence of Aggrement, prosecutionandlawenforcement/37391162.pdf, Erişim Tarihi:26.05.2015.
  • OECD (2013), Ex officio cartel investigations and the use of screens to detect cartels, http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/exofficio-cartel- investigation-2013.pdf, Erişim Tarihi:26.05.2015.
  • PAHA, J. (2009), “Simulation Methods In Cartel Prosecution”, http://www. univie.ac.at/RNIC/papers/Paha_simulations1.2.pdf, Erişim tarihi: 03.03.2016.
  • PETIT, L. (2012), The Economic Detection Instrument of the Netherlands
  • Competition Authority: The Competition Index, NMa Working Paper No. SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1992774 ya da http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ ssrn.1992774, Erişim tarihi: 26.05.2015.
  • PORTER, R.H. (1983), “A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive
  • Committee, 1880-1886”, Bell Journal of Economics, No:14, s. 301-314.
  • PORTER, R.H. ve J.D. ZONA (1993), “Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement
  • Auctions”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.101, s.79-99. POSNER, R.A. (2001), Antitrust Law, Second Edition, University of Chicago Press, US.
  • REKABET KURUMU (2013), Yatay İşbirliği Anlaşmaları Hakkında Kılavuz, http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT%2F1%2FDocuments%2FKilavuz
  • %2FYatayisbirligikilavuz.pdf, Erişim Tarihi: 29.02.2016.
  • ROTEMBERG, J.J. ve G. SALONER (1986), “A Supergame Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms”, American Economic Review, No:76, s. 390-407
  • SCHEFFMAN, D. ve M. COLEMAN (2003), “Quantitative Analyses of Potential
  • Competitive Effects of a Merger”, George Mason Law Review, No:12(2), s. 319- SCHERER, F.M. ve D. ROSS (2009), “Industrial Market Structure and Economic
  • Performance”, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship. SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1496716.
  • STIGLER, G.J. (1964), “A Theory of Oligopoly”, Journal of Political Economy, No:72, s. 44-61.
  • STANDFORD ÜNIVERSITESI SÖZLÜĞÜ, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ prisoner-dilemma/, Erişim tarihi: 29.02.2016.
  • WERDEN, G. J. (2004), “Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion
  • Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory,” Antitrust Law Journal, No:71, s.719-799.
Toplam 48 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil Türkçe
Bölüm Research Article
Yazarlar

Şerife Demet Korkut Bu kişi benim

Yayımlanma Tarihi 1 Eylül 2015
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2015 Sayı: 63

Kaynak Göster

APA Korkut, Ş. D. (2015). KARTELLERİN SEMPTOMLARI VE İKTİSADİ TEŞHİSİ: YOLUN NERESİNDEYİZ?. Rekabet Dergisi(63), 3-37.