HÂKİM DURUMUN KÖTÜYE KULLANILMASININ SONUCU OLARAK ZORUNLU LİSANSLAMA: DEĞERLENDİRME KRİTERLERİ VE UYGULANAN STANDARTLAR

Yıl 2010, Sayı: 43, 11 - 49, 01.09.2010

Ali Arıöz Özgür Can Özbek

Öz

Fikri mülkiyet haklarının lisanslanmasının reddi de dahil olmak üzere bütün alt kategorileriyle birlikte sözleşme yapılmasının reddi davaları rekabet hukukunun en tartışmalı alanlarından biridir. Bütün liberal ekonomik düşünce sistemleri sözleşme özgürlüğünü gerçek ve tüzel kişiler için en temel iktisadi özgürlüklerinden biri olarak gördükleri için zorunlu arz ya da lisanslama gerekliliği çok dikkatli bir değerlendirme gerektirir. da zorunlu lisanslamanın değerlendirmesi için gerekli kriterler bakımından zayıf bir ışık tutmaktadır

Anahtar Kelimeler

Zorunlu Lisanslama, Fikri Mülkiyet Hakları, Zorunluluk Kriteri, Güdülerin Dengelenmesi Testi, 82. Madde Uygulama Öncelikleri

COMPULSORY LICENSING AS A CONSEQUENCE OF ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION: THE CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION AND THE STANDARTS APPLIED

Öz

Refusal to deal cases -with all its sub-divisions including refusal to license intellectual property right cases- are one the most controversial subjects of competition law. Since every liberal economic thought accepts that the right to contract is one of the very basic economic liberties of legal and natural persons, an obligation for compulsory supply or licensing needs careful assesment

Anahtar Kelimeler

Compulsory Licensing, Intellectual Property Rights, Indispensability Criterion, Incentive-Balancing Test, Article 82 Enforcement Priorities

Kaynakça

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