The Antagonist Pro-Iranian Militias In The al-Hashd al-Shaabi As Sources Of Terror And Instability In Iraq

Öz

The precarious political and security situation in Iraq in the post-2003 era led to unprecedented instability and a power vacuum in the country, which turned into an arena of regional competition between the USA and Iran. While the former had a widescale military presence, the latter exerted influence through support to certain Shiite political factions and militias. Following the U.S. military withdrawal in 2011, the deterioration of the security situation manifested itself more visibly when Daesh gained ground and captured Mosul, the second-biggest city in the country. With the crippled security sector unable to fight Daesh, the militias in the country were brought together under the umbrella of the “al-Hashd al-Shaabi”, which was funded and supported by the government. Proving instrumental in defeating Daesh, the al-Hashd al-Shaabi organization also involved pro-Iranian militias with anti-West agendas that had mainly been formed in the early times of the post-2003 era and later within the anti-Daesh movement. These pro-Iranian militias under the al-Hashd al-Shaabi have been posing threats within separate contexts to the U.S., Türkiye and the international organizations led by NATO operating in the security realm in the country. Shedding light on the evolution and dynamics of the al-Hashd al-Shaabi first, this study examines the antagonist pro-Iranian militias as sources of terrorism and instability and puts forward implications through an analytical approach.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq
• al-Hashd al Sha’abi
• Popular Mobilization Forces

Irak’ta Terör ve İstikrarsızlık Kaynağı Olarak Haşdi Şabi İçindeki İran Yanlısı Hasım Milisler

Öz

2003 sonrası dönemde Irak’taki belirsizlik dolu politik ve güvenlik ortamı, ABD ile İran arasındaki bölgesel mücadelenin sahnesi haline gelen ülkede benzersiz bir istikrarsızlık ve güç boşluğu yaratmıştır. ABD’nin geniş ölçekli bir askeri varlığı bulunurken, İran da Şii politik gruplar ve milisleri desteklemek suretiyle etki yaratmıştır. ABD Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin 2011 yılındaki geri çekilmesi sonrasında, güvenlik ortamındaki bozulma, Daeş’in güç kazanarak ülkenin ikinci büyük kenti olan Musul’u ele geçirmesi ile kendini daha belirgin olarak göstermiştir. Güvenlik sektörünün Daeş’e karşı mücadelede yetersiz olması ile birlikte, ülkedeki milis güçler, hükümet tarafından desteklenen ve finanse edilen Haşdi Şaabi çatısı altında birleştirilmiştir. Daeş ile mücadelede etkili olan Haşdi Şaabi örgütü aynı zamanda, ağırlıklı olarak 2003 sonrası dönemin ilk zamanlarında ve daha sonra Daeş karşıtı akım içinde oluşan batı karşıtı tutumlu İran yanlısı milis güçleri de ihtiva etmiştir. Haşdi Şaabi içindeki İran yanlısı bu milisler, farklı içeriklerde ABD, Türkiye ve başta NATO olmak üzere güvenlik alanında ülkede faaliyet gösteren uluslararası organizasyonlara tehdit teşkil etmiştir. Bu çalışma, analitik bir yaklaşımla, öncelikle Haşdi Şaabi’nin gelişimi ve dinamiklerini ele almak suretiyle, terör ve istikrarsızlık kaynağı İran yanlısı hasım milisleri incelemekte ve çıkarımlar ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Irak’taki İran yanlısı milisler
• Haşdi Şabi
• Halkın Seferberlik Güçleri

Kaynakça

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