BibTex RIS Kaynak Göster

NEDEN DEVLETLER KİTLESEL MÜLTECİ AKINLARINDA KÜLFET PAYLAŞIMINDA BULUNURLAR?

Yıl 2015, Cilt: 5 Sayı: 2, 65 - 110, 05.08.2016

Öz

Sorumluluk paylaşımı olarak da adlandırılan külfet paylaşımı, kamu mallarının ve ortak girişimlerin maliyetinin devletler arasında nasıl paylaşılması gerektiği ile ilgilenir. Kitlesel mülteci akınlarında külfet paylaşımı bu akın ile ilgili maliyet ve sorumlulukların paylaşımı anlamına gelir. Külfet paylaşımı mülteci akınlarının daha iyi bir şekilde yönetilmesi ve sağlanan korumanın daha çok kişiye ulaştırılabilmesi için vazgeçilmezdir. Buna rağmen Mültecilerin Hukuki Statüsüne İlişkin Cenevre Sözleşmeşi kapsamında sözleşme yükümlülüklerini paylaşma zorunluluğu bulunmamaktadır. Avrupa Birliği'nin İşleyişine Dair Antlaşma’nın 80. Maddesi dışında devletlerin başka devletlerin mültecilere ilişkin külfetlerini paylaşmak zorunluluğunu barındıran ve bu zorunluluğu yaptırıma bağlayan uluslararası ve bölgesel bir anlaşma da bulunmamaktadır. Külfet paylaşımını düzenleyen uluslararası hukuki bir çerçevenin yokluğunu göz önünde bulundurarak bu makale, devletleri kitlesel akınlarda külfet paylaşımına sevk eden nedenleri araştırmaktadır. Bu nedenleri belirlemek için, külfet paylaşımının kitlesel akınlarda sağladığı yararlar ortaya konulacak, külfet paylaşımı ile ilgili mevcut literatür çözmede önemli rol oynayan iki külfet paylaşımı uygulaması incelenecektir. akınlarınlarında devletleri işbirliği ve külfet paylaşımına iten nedenler belirlenecektir. belirlenmesinden uygulanabilen bir külfet paylaşımı önerisi getirilebilir mi sorusu tartışılacaktır. Bu konuların incelenmesi sonucu mülteci akınlarınlarında devletleri işbirliği ve külfet paylaşımına iten nedenler belirlenecektir. Makalenin son bölümünde bu nedenlerin belirlenmesinden yola çıkılarak tüm mülteci akınlarında uygulanabilen bir külfet paylaşımı önerisi getirilebilir mi sorusu tartışılacaktır.

Kaynakça

  • ALBORZI Mohammed R., Evaluating the Effectiveness of International Refugee Law: The Protection of Iraqi Refugees (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006).
  • ALLAIN Jean, “The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-refoulement‟ (2001) 13 IJRL 533.
  • AMBROSO Guido, „The Balkans at a Crossroads: Progress and Challenges in Finding Durable Solutions for Refugees and Displaced Persons from the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia‟ (UNHCR 2006).
  • Amnesty International, „Bosnia-Herzegovina: “Who's Living in My House?”: Obstacles to the Safe Return of Refugees and Displaced People‟ 19 March 1997, EUR 63/001/1997, < http://www.refworld.org/docid/45b5067 e2.html> accessed 1 December 2015.
  • Amnesty International, „The Protection of Kosovo Albanian Refugees‟ 19 May 1999, EUR 65/03/99 < http://www.unhcr.org /refworld/ docid / 3 e6a9c914.html> accessed 1 December 2015.
  • ANKER Deborah, FITZPATRICK Joan, SHACKNOVE Andrew, „Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hathaway/Neve and Schuck‟ (1998) 11 Harvard Human Rights Journal 295.
  • BARCHER Ann C., „First Asylum Southeast Asia: Customary Norm or Ephemeral Concept?‟ (1991-1992) 24 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 1253.
  • BARUTCISKI Micheal, SUHRKE Astri, „Lessons from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: Innovations in Protection and BurdenSharing‟ (2001) 14(2) Journal of Refugee Studies 95.
  • BETTS Alexander, „International Cooperation in the Global Refugee Regime‟ (November 2008) GEG Working Papers 2008/44.
  • BETTS Alexander, „Towards a Mediterranean Solution? Implications for the Region of Origin‟ (2006) 18 IJRL 652.
  • BETTS Alexander, Protection by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime (Cornell University Press 2009).
  • BETTS Alexander, „Comprehensive Plans of Action: Insights from CIREFCA and the Indochinese CPA‟ (UNHCR 2006) < http://www.unhcr.org/43eb6a152.pdf> accessed 1 December 2015
  • BOSWELL Christina, „Burden- Sharing in European Union: Lessons from the German and UK experience‟ (2003) 16(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 316.
  • BRONÉE Sten A., „The History of Comprehensive Plan of Action‟ (1993) 5(4) IJRL 534.
  • ÇETINGÜLEÇ M., „At a Cost of $500 Million Each Month, Turkey Staggers under Growing Refugee Burden‟ Al Monitor, 20
  • October 2015 <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015 /10/turkey-syria-refugees-spent-billion-in-three-months.html#> accessed 1 December 2015.
  • COLES G. J. L., „Temporary Refuge and the Large Scale Influx of Refugees‟ (1978) 8 Australia YBIL 189.
  • Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26 October 2012.
  • Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between member states in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, OJ l.212/12, 7 August 2001.
  • Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5.
  • COURTLAND ROBINSON William, „The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989–1997: Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck‟ (2004) 7(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 319.
  • COURTLAND ROBINSON William, Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International Response (Zed Books 1998).
  • DAVIES Sarah E., Legitimising Rejection International Refugee Law in Southeast Asia (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008). DURIEUX Jean-Francois, MCADAM Jane, „Nonrefoulement Through Time: the Case for a Derogation Clause to the Refugee Convention in Mass Influx Emergencies‟ (2004) 16(1) IJRL 17.
  • EDWARDS Alice, „Temporary Protection, Derogation and the 1951 Refugee Convention‟ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 595.
  • EGGLI Vibeke A., Mass Refugee Influx and the Limits of Public International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2002) EINARSEN Terje, „Refugee Protection beyond Kosovo: Quo Vadis?‟ (2001) 14(2) Journal of Refugee Studies 119.
  • European Commission, Directorate-General Home Affairs, „Study on the Feasibility of Establishing a Mechanism for the Relocation of Beneficiaries of International Protection‟, July 2010,
  • JLX/2009/ERFX/PR/1005 < http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/elibrary/docs/pdf/final_report_relocation_of_refugees_en.pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.
  • ExCom Conclusion No 100 (LV) „Conclusion on International Cooperation and Burden and Responsibility Sharing in Mass Influx Situations‟ (2004).
  • FITZPATRICK Joan, „Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime‟ 92 (2000) (2) AJIL 279.
  • FUNDO Christian A., „Toward a More Individualized Assessment of Changed Country Conditions for Kosovar Asylum Seekers‟ (2010) 43 Cornell International Law Journal 625.
  • German Presidency Draft Council Resolution on Burdensharing, July 1994 (Council Document 7773/94 ASIM 124).
  • GOODWIN-GILL Guy S., MCADAM Jane, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, OUP 2007).
  • HANS Asha, SURKHE Astri, „Responsibility Sharing‟ in James C. Hathaway (ed), Reconceiving International Refugee Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997) 83.
  • HATHAWAY James C., NEVE Alexander R., „Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection‟ (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 115.
  • HATHAWAY James C., The Right of Refugees under International Law (CUP 2005).
  • HEIN Jeremy, From Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia: a Refugee Experience in the United States (Twayne Publishers 1995).
  • HELTON Arthur C., „Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees: An Experiment in Refugee Protection and Control‟ (1990) 8 NYL Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 111.
  • HURWITZ Agnes, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (OUP 2009).
  • ILO, „Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and their Employment Profile‟ (ILO 2013).
  • International Crisis Group (ICG), „Macedonia: Towards Destabilisation? The Kosovo Crisis Takes its Toll on Macedonia‟, 21 May 1999.
  • International Law Association, „Report of the Committee on Refugee Procedures of the ILA (Delhi Conference, 2002). Final Report and Draft Guidelines on Temporary Protection‟ (2002).
  • JACOBSEN Karen, „Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes‟ (1996) 15(3) International Migration Review 655.
  • KAPLAN M. „Syrian Refugee Crisis and Jordan Budget Deficit: Amid Economic Slowdown, Asylum Seekers Cost Country $6.6B‟ International Business Times, 19 October 2015 < http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-refugee-crisis-jordan-budget-deficitamid-economic-slowdown-asylum-seekers-2146203> accessed 1 December 2015.
  • KJAERUM Morten, „Human Rights, State Security and Burden-Sharing: People or States First‟ (2001) 14 Journal of Refugee Studies 116.
  • KJAERUM Morten, „Temporary Protection in Europe in the 1990's‟ (1994) 6 IJRL 444.
  • KNEEBONE Susan, MCDOWELL Christopher, MORRELL Gareth, „A Mediterranean Solution? Chances of Success‟ (2006) 18 IJRL 492.
  • KUSHNER Tony, „Kosovo and the Refugee Crisis, 1999: The Search for Patterns amidst the Prejudice‟ (1999) 33 (3) Patterns of Prejudice 73.
  • LAUTERPACHT Elihu, BETHLEHEM Daniel, „The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion‟ in E. Feller, V. Türk, F. Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (CUP 2003) 78.
  • LOESCHER Gil, MILNER James, Protracted Refugee Situations: Domestic and International Security Implications (Routledge 2005).
  • LONG Katy, The Point of No Return: Refugees, Rights, and Repatriation (OUP 2013).
  • NOLL Gregor, „Risky Games? A Theoretical Approach to Burden‐Sharing in the Asylum Field‟ (2003) 16(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 236.
  • NOLL Gregor, Negotiating Asylum: The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common Market of Deflection (Vol 6, 2000 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers).
  • OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 10 September 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45.
  • ROSENBLUM Marc R., SALEHYAN Idean, „Norms and Interests in US Asylum Enforcement‟ (2004) 41(6) Journal of Peace Research 677.
  • SCHUCK Peter H., „Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal‟ (1997) 22 YJIL 243.
  • SCHUCK Peter H., „Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, Fifteen Years Later Fifteen Years Later‟ (2013) 480 Yale Law & Economics Research Papers.
  • SKORDAS Achilles „Article 7 1951 Convention‟ in A. Zimmermann, F. Machts, J. Dorschner (eds), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 715.
  • SKORDAS Achilles, „Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum Standards for Giving Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass
  • Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts Between Member States in Receiving such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof‟ in K. Hailbronner (ed), EU Immigration and Asylum Law Commentary on EU Regulations and Directives (Hart Publishing 2010) 803.
  • SUHRKE Astri, „Burden Sharing During Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective Versus National Action‟ (1988) 11(4) IJRL 396.
  • THIELEMANN Eiko R., „Between Interests and Norms: Explaining Burden‐Sharing in the European Union‟ (2003) 16(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 253.
  • THIELEMANN Eiko R., ARMSTRONG Carolyn, „Understanding European Asylum Cooperation under the Schengen/Dublin System: A Public Goods Framework‟ (2013) 22(2) European Security 148.
  • THORBURN Joanne, „Transcending Boundaries: Temporary Protection and Burden-Sharing in Europe‟ (1995) 7(3) IJRL 459.
  • TRAN Yen, „Closing of the Saga of the Vietnamese Asylumseekers: The Implications on International Refugees and Human Rights Laws‟ (1994) 17 Houston Journal of International Law 463.
  • UNGA, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, 85.

WHY DO STATES SHARE THE BURDEN DURING REFUGEE EMERGENCIES?

Yıl 2015, Cilt: 5 Sayı: 2, 65 - 110, 05.08.2016

Öz

Burden sharing, which is sometimes referred to as responsibility sharing, deals with how costs of common initiatives or the provision of public goods should be shared between states. Burden sharing in mass influx situations implies sharing the costs and responsibilities associated with the displacement. The principal instrument for the protection of refugees worldwide, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees does not create a duty for its signatories to share the asylum related burdens of another state in mass influx situations. Except Article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union there are no enforceable international or regional treaties that oblige states to share the asylum related burdens of another state. In the light of the absence of a legal framework obliging states to participate in burden sharing arrangements, this article addresses the question: What does motivate states to share the burden in mass influx situations? To address this question, this article reviews various literature on burden sharing including past proposals by James C. Hathaway and Peter Schuck and analyses two burden sharing practices namely, the Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme which played crucial roles in solving the Vietnamese and Kosovar refugee crises. Following this analysis, the article identifies different elements that motivate states to share the burden in mass influx situations and examines whether these elements can be integrated to a generic burden sharing proposal

Kaynakça

  • ALBORZI Mohammed R., Evaluating the Effectiveness of International Refugee Law: The Protection of Iraqi Refugees (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006).
  • ALLAIN Jean, “The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-refoulement‟ (2001) 13 IJRL 533.
  • AMBROSO Guido, „The Balkans at a Crossroads: Progress and Challenges in Finding Durable Solutions for Refugees and Displaced Persons from the Wars in the Former Yugoslavia‟ (UNHCR 2006).
  • Amnesty International, „Bosnia-Herzegovina: “Who's Living in My House?”: Obstacles to the Safe Return of Refugees and Displaced People‟ 19 March 1997, EUR 63/001/1997, < http://www.refworld.org/docid/45b5067 e2.html> accessed 1 December 2015.
  • Amnesty International, „The Protection of Kosovo Albanian Refugees‟ 19 May 1999, EUR 65/03/99 < http://www.unhcr.org /refworld/ docid / 3 e6a9c914.html> accessed 1 December 2015.
  • ANKER Deborah, FITZPATRICK Joan, SHACKNOVE Andrew, „Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hathaway/Neve and Schuck‟ (1998) 11 Harvard Human Rights Journal 295.
  • BARCHER Ann C., „First Asylum Southeast Asia: Customary Norm or Ephemeral Concept?‟ (1991-1992) 24 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 1253.
  • BARUTCISKI Micheal, SUHRKE Astri, „Lessons from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: Innovations in Protection and BurdenSharing‟ (2001) 14(2) Journal of Refugee Studies 95.
  • BETTS Alexander, „International Cooperation in the Global Refugee Regime‟ (November 2008) GEG Working Papers 2008/44.
  • BETTS Alexander, „Towards a Mediterranean Solution? Implications for the Region of Origin‟ (2006) 18 IJRL 652.
  • BETTS Alexander, Protection by Persuasion: International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime (Cornell University Press 2009).
  • BETTS Alexander, „Comprehensive Plans of Action: Insights from CIREFCA and the Indochinese CPA‟ (UNHCR 2006) < http://www.unhcr.org/43eb6a152.pdf> accessed 1 December 2015
  • BOSWELL Christina, „Burden- Sharing in European Union: Lessons from the German and UK experience‟ (2003) 16(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 316.
  • BRONÉE Sten A., „The History of Comprehensive Plan of Action‟ (1993) 5(4) IJRL 534.
  • ÇETINGÜLEÇ M., „At a Cost of $500 Million Each Month, Turkey Staggers under Growing Refugee Burden‟ Al Monitor, 20
  • October 2015 <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015 /10/turkey-syria-refugees-spent-billion-in-three-months.html#> accessed 1 December 2015.
  • COLES G. J. L., „Temporary Refuge and the Large Scale Influx of Refugees‟ (1978) 8 Australia YBIL 189.
  • Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26 October 2012.
  • Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between member states in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, OJ l.212/12, 7 August 2001.
  • Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5.
  • COURTLAND ROBINSON William, „The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989–1997: Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck‟ (2004) 7(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 319.
  • COURTLAND ROBINSON William, Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International Response (Zed Books 1998).
  • DAVIES Sarah E., Legitimising Rejection International Refugee Law in Southeast Asia (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008). DURIEUX Jean-Francois, MCADAM Jane, „Nonrefoulement Through Time: the Case for a Derogation Clause to the Refugee Convention in Mass Influx Emergencies‟ (2004) 16(1) IJRL 17.
  • EDWARDS Alice, „Temporary Protection, Derogation and the 1951 Refugee Convention‟ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 595.
  • EGGLI Vibeke A., Mass Refugee Influx and the Limits of Public International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2002) EINARSEN Terje, „Refugee Protection beyond Kosovo: Quo Vadis?‟ (2001) 14(2) Journal of Refugee Studies 119.
  • European Commission, Directorate-General Home Affairs, „Study on the Feasibility of Establishing a Mechanism for the Relocation of Beneficiaries of International Protection‟, July 2010,
  • JLX/2009/ERFX/PR/1005 < http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/elibrary/docs/pdf/final_report_relocation_of_refugees_en.pdf> accessed 1 December 2015.
  • ExCom Conclusion No 100 (LV) „Conclusion on International Cooperation and Burden and Responsibility Sharing in Mass Influx Situations‟ (2004).
  • FITZPATRICK Joan, „Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Regime‟ 92 (2000) (2) AJIL 279.
  • FUNDO Christian A., „Toward a More Individualized Assessment of Changed Country Conditions for Kosovar Asylum Seekers‟ (2010) 43 Cornell International Law Journal 625.
  • German Presidency Draft Council Resolution on Burdensharing, July 1994 (Council Document 7773/94 ASIM 124).
  • GOODWIN-GILL Guy S., MCADAM Jane, The Refugee in International Law (3rd edn, OUP 2007).
  • HANS Asha, SURKHE Astri, „Responsibility Sharing‟ in James C. Hathaway (ed), Reconceiving International Refugee Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1997) 83.
  • HATHAWAY James C., NEVE Alexander R., „Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection‟ (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 115.
  • HATHAWAY James C., The Right of Refugees under International Law (CUP 2005).
  • HEIN Jeremy, From Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia: a Refugee Experience in the United States (Twayne Publishers 1995).
  • HELTON Arthur C., „Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees: An Experiment in Refugee Protection and Control‟ (1990) 8 NYL Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 111.
  • HURWITZ Agnes, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (OUP 2009).
  • ILO, „Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and their Employment Profile‟ (ILO 2013).
  • International Crisis Group (ICG), „Macedonia: Towards Destabilisation? The Kosovo Crisis Takes its Toll on Macedonia‟, 21 May 1999.
  • International Law Association, „Report of the Committee on Refugee Procedures of the ILA (Delhi Conference, 2002). Final Report and Draft Guidelines on Temporary Protection‟ (2002).
  • JACOBSEN Karen, „Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes‟ (1996) 15(3) International Migration Review 655.
  • KAPLAN M. „Syrian Refugee Crisis and Jordan Budget Deficit: Amid Economic Slowdown, Asylum Seekers Cost Country $6.6B‟ International Business Times, 19 October 2015 < http://www.ibtimes.com/syrian-refugee-crisis-jordan-budget-deficitamid-economic-slowdown-asylum-seekers-2146203> accessed 1 December 2015.
  • KJAERUM Morten, „Human Rights, State Security and Burden-Sharing: People or States First‟ (2001) 14 Journal of Refugee Studies 116.
  • KJAERUM Morten, „Temporary Protection in Europe in the 1990's‟ (1994) 6 IJRL 444.
  • KNEEBONE Susan, MCDOWELL Christopher, MORRELL Gareth, „A Mediterranean Solution? Chances of Success‟ (2006) 18 IJRL 492.
  • KUSHNER Tony, „Kosovo and the Refugee Crisis, 1999: The Search for Patterns amidst the Prejudice‟ (1999) 33 (3) Patterns of Prejudice 73.
  • LAUTERPACHT Elihu, BETHLEHEM Daniel, „The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion‟ in E. Feller, V. Türk, F. Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (CUP 2003) 78.
  • LOESCHER Gil, MILNER James, Protracted Refugee Situations: Domestic and International Security Implications (Routledge 2005).
  • LONG Katy, The Point of No Return: Refugees, Rights, and Repatriation (OUP 2013).
  • NOLL Gregor, „Risky Games? A Theoretical Approach to Burden‐Sharing in the Asylum Field‟ (2003) 16(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 236.
  • NOLL Gregor, Negotiating Asylum: The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the Common Market of Deflection (Vol 6, 2000 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers).
  • OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 10 September 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45.
  • ROSENBLUM Marc R., SALEHYAN Idean, „Norms and Interests in US Asylum Enforcement‟ (2004) 41(6) Journal of Peace Research 677.
  • SCHUCK Peter H., „Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal‟ (1997) 22 YJIL 243.
  • SCHUCK Peter H., „Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, Fifteen Years Later Fifteen Years Later‟ (2013) 480 Yale Law & Economics Research Papers.
  • SKORDAS Achilles „Article 7 1951 Convention‟ in A. Zimmermann, F. Machts, J. Dorschner (eds), The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 715.
  • SKORDAS Achilles, „Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum Standards for Giving Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass
  • Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts Between Member States in Receiving such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof‟ in K. Hailbronner (ed), EU Immigration and Asylum Law Commentary on EU Regulations and Directives (Hart Publishing 2010) 803.
  • SUHRKE Astri, „Burden Sharing During Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective Versus National Action‟ (1988) 11(4) IJRL 396.
  • THIELEMANN Eiko R., „Between Interests and Norms: Explaining Burden‐Sharing in the European Union‟ (2003) 16(3) Journal of Refugee Studies 253.
  • THIELEMANN Eiko R., ARMSTRONG Carolyn, „Understanding European Asylum Cooperation under the Schengen/Dublin System: A Public Goods Framework‟ (2013) 22(2) European Security 148.
  • THORBURN Joanne, „Transcending Boundaries: Temporary Protection and Burden-Sharing in Europe‟ (1995) 7(3) IJRL 459.
  • TRAN Yen, „Closing of the Saga of the Vietnamese Asylumseekers: The Implications on International Refugees and Human Rights Laws‟ (1994) 17 Houston Journal of International Law 463.
  • UNGA, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, 85.
Toplam 65 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Diğer ID JA25JD86HB
Bölüm Makale
Yazarlar

Meltem Ineli-ciger

Yayımlanma Tarihi 5 Ağustos 2016
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2015 Cilt: 5 Sayı: 2

Kaynak Göster

APA Ineli-ciger, M. (2016). NEDEN DEVLETLER KİTLESEL MÜLTECİ AKINLARINDA KÜLFET PAYLAŞIMINDA BULUNURLAR?. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, 5(2), 65-110.
AMA Ineli-ciger M. NEDEN DEVLETLER KİTLESEL MÜLTECİ AKINLARINDA KÜLFET PAYLAŞIMINDA BULUNURLAR?. SDÜHFD - SDLR. Ağustos 2016;5(2):65-110.
Chicago Ineli-ciger, Meltem. “NEDEN DEVLETLER KİTLESEL MÜLTECİ AKINLARINDA KÜLFET PAYLAŞIMINDA BULUNURLAR?”. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 5, sy. 2 (Ağustos 2016): 65-110.
EndNote Ineli-ciger M (01 Ağustos 2016) NEDEN DEVLETLER KİTLESEL MÜLTECİ AKINLARINDA KÜLFET PAYLAŞIMINDA BULUNURLAR?. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 5 2 65–110.
IEEE M. Ineli-ciger, “NEDEN DEVLETLER KİTLESEL MÜLTECİ AKINLARINDA KÜLFET PAYLAŞIMINDA BULUNURLAR?”, SDÜHFD - SDLR, c. 5, sy. 2, ss. 65–110, 2016.
ISNAD Ineli-ciger, Meltem. “NEDEN DEVLETLER KİTLESEL MÜLTECİ AKINLARINDA KÜLFET PAYLAŞIMINDA BULUNURLAR?”. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 5/2 (Ağustos 2016), 65-110.
JAMA Ineli-ciger M. NEDEN DEVLETLER KİTLESEL MÜLTECİ AKINLARINDA KÜLFET PAYLAŞIMINDA BULUNURLAR?. SDÜHFD - SDLR. 2016;5:65–110.
MLA Ineli-ciger, Meltem. “NEDEN DEVLETLER KİTLESEL MÜLTECİ AKINLARINDA KÜLFET PAYLAŞIMINDA BULUNURLAR?”. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi, c. 5, sy. 2, 2016, ss. 65-110.
Vancouver Ineli-ciger M. NEDEN DEVLETLER KİTLESEL MÜLTECİ AKINLARINDA KÜLFET PAYLAŞIMINDA BULUNURLAR?. SDÜHFD - SDLR. 2016;5(2):65-110.