Yolsuzluğun Refah Düzeyi Üzerine Etkisi: Panel Veri Analizi

Yıl 2014, Cilt: 19 Sayı: 3, 253 - 266, 01.09.2014

  Yrd.doç.dr.taner Güney Doç.dr.mustafa Durman

Öz

In order to determine the effect of corruption on the level of welfare for countries, analyses of data for the period between 1998 and 2012 from 148 countries were initially included in the study. Oneway random effect and fixed effect models were included in the analyses where unbalanced panel data method was employed. Pursuant to the results of the analyses, effect of corruption on personal income is in negative direction and statistically significant. Therefore, level of welfare of countries decreases with increasing level of corruption. The result of the analyses depict that the relation between public expenditure on health, trade gap and urbanization and the personal income is in positive direction. The relation between rate of inflation and rate of employment and personal income is in negative direction

Anahtar Kelimeler

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YOLSUZLUĞUN REFAH DÜZEYİ ÜZERİNE ETKİSİ: PANEL VERİ ANALİZİ

Öz

Bu çalışmada yolsuzluğun ülkelerin refah düzeyi üzerindeki etkisini belirlemek amacıyla, 1998-2012 döneminde, 148 ülke verisinin dâhil edildiği analizler yer almaktadır. Dengesiz panel veri yönteminin kullanıldığı analizlerde, tek yönlü rassal etkiler ve sabit etkiler modellerine yer verilmektedir. Analiz sonuçlarına göre yolsuzluğun kişisel gelir üzerinde etkisi negatif yönlü ve istatistiksel olarak anlamlıdır. Buna göre yolsuzluk düzeyinin yükselmesi ülkelerin refah düzeyini azaltmaktadır. Ayrıca, analiz sonuçları kişisel gelir ile kamunun sağlık harcaması, ticari açıklık ve kentleşme değişkenleri arasında pozitif yönlü bir ilişki olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Enflasyon oranı ve işsizlik oranı ile kişisel gelir arasında ise negatif yönlü bir ilişki bulunmaktadır

Anahtar Kelimeler

Refah, Yolsuzluk, Kişisel Gelir, Sosyal Refah, Panel Veri

Kaynakça

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