A “Middle Power”s Diplomacy to its Vicinity: Caucasus Projection of Türkiye’s Regional Ownership Vision and 3+3 Platform

Öz

One of the prominent actors in the international system in terms of various classifications of power is the ‘middle power’. Another important issue related to this concept is ‘middle power diplomacy’. Although it has different and sometimes opposing distinctive features, Türkiye has the qualities of both a ‘middle power’ and an actor conducting ‘middle power diplomacy’. An important phenomenon within Türkiye’s foreign policy instruments is the concept of ‘regional ownership’. For Ankara, the vision of regional ownership manifests itself through different foreign policy instruments for various regions. The aim of this study is to analyse the 3+3 Platform within the framework of Türkiye’s vision of regional ownership. In this context, the study analyses the characteristics of the concept of ‘regional ownership’ in the literature and seeks an answer to the extent to which the 3+3 Platform meets these characteristics. Case analysis, one of the qualitative research methods, was used in the study. Accordingly, the study analyses the information, documents and reports shared by the official authorities of the countries that are parties to the 3+3 Platform, as well as the discourses of the high-level officials of these actors.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Türkiye
• Middle Power
• Regional Ownership
• Caucasus
• 3+3 Platform

Bir “Orta Güç ”ün Yakın Çevresine Yönelik Diplomasisi: Türkiye’nin Bölgesel Sahiplenme Vizyonunun Kafkasya İzdüşümü ve 3+3 Platformu

Öz

Uluslararası sistemde gücün çeşitli sınıflandırmaları açısından öne çıkan aktörlerden biri “orta güç”lerdir. Bu kavram ile ilişkili diğer önemli bir husus da “orta güç diplomasisi”dir. Farklı ve bazen de bir birine muhalif ayırt edici özellikleri olmasına rağmen, Türkiye hem “orta gücün” hem de “orta güç diplomasisini” yürüten aktörün niteliklerini barındırmaktadır. Türkiye’nin dış politika araçları içerisinde yer alan önemli bir fenomen ise “bölgesel sahiplenme” kavramıdır. Ankara açısından bölgesel sahiplenme vizyonu çeşitli bölgeler için farklı dış politika araçları ile kendini göstermektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Türkiye’nin bölgesel sahiplenme vizyonu çerçevesinde 3+3 Platformu’nu incelemektir. Bu bağlamda çalışmada “bölgesel sahiplenme” kavramının literatürdeki özellikleri ele alınmakta ve 3+3 Platformu’nun bu özellikleri karşılama düzeyinin cevabı aranmaktadır. Çalışmada nitel araştırma yöntemlerinden vaka analizine başvurulmuştur. Bu doğrultuda çalışmada 3+3 Platformu’nun tarafı olan ülkelerin resmi makamları tarafından paylaşılan bilgi, belge ve raporların yanı sıra söz konusu aktörlerin üst düzey yetkililerinin söylemleri incelenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Türkiye
• Orta Güç
• Bölgesel Sahiplenme
• Kafkasya
• 3+3 Platformu

Kaynakça

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