SİHA’ların Muharebe Etkinliğini Artırmak: Kapsamlı Askeri ve Teknolojik Sistemlere Entegrasyon İçin Alternatif Bir Analiz

Öz

Son yıllarda hem uluslararası askeri operasyonlar hem de sınır içi güvenlik operasyonlarında silahlı insansız hava aracı kullanımı giderek artarken uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründe ise silahlı insansız hava araçlarının rolüne ilişkin tartışmalar devam etmektedir. Uzmanların bir kısmı silahlı insansız hava aracı teknolojisini çığır açan veya ezber bozan bir gelişme olarak değerlendirirken, karşıt görüşlü uzmanlar tarafından ise bu teknolojik gelişmenin etkisinin sınırlı olacağı şeklinde değerlendirmeler yapılmaktadır. Bu çalışma ise literatürde devam eden bu tartışmanın içerisinde kendini herhangi bir tarafta konumlandırmadan silahlı insansız hava araçlarının çatışma sahnesinde etkililiğini artırmaya ilişkin olarak alternatif bir değerlendirme ve öneri sunmaktadır. Bu çalışma, silahlı insansız hava araçlarının çatışmalarda daha etkili kılınması için modern askeri ve elektronik savaş sistemlerinin yanı sıra becerili ve eğitimli askeri uzmanlar tarafından desteklenmesi gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Bu hipotezin doğruluğunu test edebilmek amacıyla vaka çalışması yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Türkiye’nin Libya İç Savaşı’na müdahalesi, Türkiye’nin Suriye’nin İdlib bölgesinde gerçekleştirdiği Bahar Kalkanı operasyonu ve Türkiye’nin 44 Günlük Vatan Savaşı’nda Azerbaycan’la iş birliği örnek vakalar olarak kullanılmıştır. Bahsedilen üç vakanın analizi sonucunda, çalışmanın savunduğu hipotezin geçerli olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• SİHA
• Türkiye
• Suriye
• Libya
• Azerbaycan

INCREASING DRONES’ COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS: AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS FOR INTEGRATION INTO COMPREHENSIVE MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS

Öz

While the use of armed unmanned aerial vehicles in both international military operations and internal security operations has been increasing in recent years, debates on the role of armed unmanned aerial vehicles in the international relations literature remain limited. While some experts consider armed unmanned aerial vehicle technology as a groundbreaking or game-changing development, others argue that the impact of this technological development is limited. This study presents an alternative assessment and new suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of armed unmanned aerial vehicles in conflict zones without positioning this study on any side of the ongoing debate in the literature. This study argues that armed drones should be supported by skilled military experts and modern military and electronic systems in order to make them more effective in conflicts. In order to test the accuracy of this hypothesis, this study examines Türkiye’s intervention in the Libyan Civil War, Türkiye’s Operation Spring Shield in Syria’s Idlib province, and Türkiye’s cooperation with Azerbaijan in the 44-day Patriotic War as case studies. Ultimately, the case studies uphold the hypothesis that the deployment of skilled military experts and modern military and electronic systems to support drones in combat increases their effectiveness.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Drone
• Türkiye
• Syria
• Libya
• Azerbaijan

Kaynakça

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