The Independent Advisory Board for Turkish Social Security Institution: A Policy Transfer Trail from the United Kingdom Case

Yıl 2022, , 109 - 127, 28.04.2022

Varol Dur , Muhiddin Şahin

https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2022.02.07

Öz

Social security is a policy area requiring technical, bipartisan, and objective expertise and a high level of consultation and consensus with stakeholders for proper decision-making and implementation. For assuring these necessities in the context of social security challenges, the UK government system employs an impartial advisory body. Using this example, this study intends to examine the historical and political backdrop and the implementation of the advisory committee and provide an outline for possible Turkish application. Based on the case study analysis executed in this paper, an obvious need for an independent advisory body in the Turkish social security system has been identified. However, the implementation and boundaries of such a body’s independence would directly determine its efficiency and requirement of existence.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Social Security, Public Management, United Kingdom, Advisory Mechanisms

Türkiye İçin Bağımsız Bir Sosyal Güvenlik Danışma Kurulu Önerisi: İngiltere Örneği

Öz

Sosyal Güvenlik sadece teknik, tarafsız ve objektif uzmanlık gerektiren bir alan değil, aynı zamanda düzgün bir karar alma ve uygulama için tüm paydaşların danışma ve uzlaşmasına ihtiyaç duyan bir politika alanıdır. İngiltere hükümet sistemi bu gereklilikleri yerine getirmek için bir bağımsız danışma kurulu kullanmaktadır. Bu makalenin amacı da bu danışma kurulunun siyasi ve tarihi arka planını incelemek ve bu dersten faydalanarak Türkiye için olası bir taslak oluşturmaktır. Makalede uygulanan vaka örneği incelemesine dayanarak, Türk sosyal güvenlik sisteminin bağımsız bir danışma organına ihtiyacı tespit edilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, bu organın bağımsızlığının nasıl uygulanacağı ve sınırlarının ne olacağı, sadece bu yapının verimliliğini değil, aynı zamanda varlığının devamına ihtiyaç duyulup duyulmayacağını da belirleyecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Sosyal Güvenlik, Kamu Yönetimi, Birleşik Krallık, Danışma Mekanizmaları

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