Electricity Market Design for Germany

Yıl 2010, Cilt: 12 Sayı: 12, - , 01.09.2010

Ray Rees Sebastian Scholz

Öz

Germany has two ambitious goals: It wants to generate 20% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2020; and it wants to reach its nuclear phase-out target by 2021, according to the Atomic Energy Law of 2002. To be successful, it needs a strong transmission network that connects the offshore wind parks at the North and Baltic Sea with regions of high population and industry densities. At the same time it has to be keeping its generation capacity at a high enough level. This paper describes recent reforms in the electricity sector and makes suggestions on how to improve the current state of market performance in the industry.

Anahtar Kelimeler

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Kaynakça

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