Seniority: A Blessing or A Curse? The Effect of Economics Training on the Perception of Distributive Justice

Yıl 2014, Cilt: 22 Sayı: 22, - , 01.09.2014

İbrahim Seçilmiş

https://doi.org/10.17233/se.50477

Cited By: 1

Öz

This paper examines the impact of the level of economics knowledge on the perception of equity in a Rawlsian sense when distributional issues are of concern to the students at different stages of their education. The purpose is to question the widely held belief that economics teaching has an influence on ethical views of individuals. To examine the relationship between fairness judgments and the level of the economics education, I use a survey-type experimental design, originally developed by Gaertner (1992), in which six different situations are investigated. By carrying out the questionnaire survey among both undergraduate and graduate students of public finance, I find that a clear learning effect does not exist. However, on the other hand, I cannot conclude against the indoctrination hypothesis in favor of the self-selection hypothesis; because the study seeks only to achieve a better understanding of the learning effect. Moreover, my results suggest that personal features, parental background and future income expectations of the students are mostly not strong variables enough to affect the response patterns.

Anahtar Kelimeler

-

Kaynakça

• Ai, C. & E.C. Norton (2003), “Interaction terms in logit and probit models”, Economics Letters, 80(1), 123-129.
• Amiel, Y. & F.A. Cowell (1999), Thinking about inequality: Personal judgment and income distributions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Amiel, Y. & F.A. Cowell & W. Gaertner (2009), “To be or not to be involved: a questionnaire-experimental view on Harsanyi’s utilitarian ethics”, Social Choice and Welfare, 32(2), 299-316.
• Bauman, Y. & E. Rose (2011), “Selection or indoctrination: Why do economics students donate less than the rest?”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 79(3), 318-327.
• Beckman, S.R. & J.P. Formby & W.J. Smith & B. Zheng (2002), “Envy, malice and Pareto efficiency: An experimental examination”, Social Choice and Welfare, 19(2), 349-367.
• Bellemare, C. & S. Kröger & A. Van Soest (2008), “Measuring Inequity Aversion in a Heterogeneous Population Using Experimental Decisions and Subjective Probabilities”, Econometrica, 76(4), 815-839.
• Bentham, J. (1789), An Introduction to the Principle of Morals and Legislations, reprinted (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1948).
• Benz, M. & S. Meier (2008), “Do people behave in experiments as in the field?—evidence from donations”, Experimental Economics, 11(3), 268-281.
• Bernasconi, M. (2002), “How should income be divided? questionnaire evidence from the theory of ‘Impartial preferences’”, Journal of Economics, 9, 163-195.
• Bolton, G.E. & A. Ockenfels (2006), “Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments: comment”, The American Economic Review, 96(5), 1906-1911.
• Bond, D. & J.C. Park (1991), “An Empirical Test of Rawls's Theory of Justice: A Second Approach, in Korea and the United States”, Simulation & Gaming, 22(4), 443.
• Bosmans, K. & E. Schokkaert (2004), “Social welfare, the veil of ignorance and purely individual risk: An empirical examination”, Research on Economic Inequality, 11, 85-114.
• Büchner, S. & G. Coricelli & B. Greiner (2003), New Experimental Results on the Solidarity Game, (D. d. e. p. U. d. Siena, Trans.): Max-Planck-Inst. for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group.
• Cappelen, A.W. & E.O. Sorensen & B. Tungodden (2010), “Responsibility for what? Fairness and individual responsibility”, European Economic Review, 54(3), 429-441.
• Carlsson, F. & D. Daruvala & O. Johansson-Stenman (2005), “Are People Inequality-Averse, or Just Risk-Averse?”, Economica, 72(287), 375-396.
• Carlsson, F. & G. Gupta & O. Johansson-Stenman (2003), “Choosing from behind a veil of ignorance in India”, Applied Economics Letters, 10(13), 825-827.
• Carter, J.R. & M.D. Irons (1991), “Are economists different, and if so, why?”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(2), 171-177.
• Cipriani, G.P. & D. Lubian & A. Zago (2009), “Natural born economists?”, Journal of Economic Psychology, 30(3), 455-468.
• Cowell, F.A. & E. Schokkaert (2001), “Risk perceptions and distributional judgments”, European Economic Review, 45(4–6), 941-952.
• D'Aspremont, C. & L. Gevers (1977), “Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice”, The Review of Economic Studies, 44(2), 199-209.
• dela Cruz-Dona, R. & A. Martina (2000), “Diverse groups agreeing on a system of justice in distribution: Evidence from the Philippines”, Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 11(1), 35-76.
• Deschamps, R. & L. Gevers (1978), “Leximin and utilitarian rules: A joint characterization”, Journal of Economic Theory, 17(2), 143-163.
• Dworkin, R. (1981a), “What is equality? Part 1: Equality of welfare”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 10(3), 185-246.
• Dworkin, R. (1981b), “What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resources”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 10(4), 283-345.
• Engelmann, D. & M. Strobel (2004), “Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments”, The American Economic Review, 94(4), 857-869.
• Engelmann, D. & M. Strobel (2006), “Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments: Reply”, The American Economic Review, 96(5), 1918-1923.
• Faravelli, M. (2007), “How context matters: A survey based experiment on distributive justice”, Journal of Public Economics, 91(7-8), 1399-1422.
• Fehr, E. & M. Naef & K.M. Schmidt (2006), “Inequality aversion, efficiency, and maximin preferences in simple distribution experiments: Comment”, The American Economic Review, 96(5), 1912-1917.
• Fishburn, P.C. (1974), “Lexicographic Orders, Utilities and Decision Rules: A Survey”, Management Science, 20(11), 1442-1471.
• Fleurbaey, M. (1998), “Equality among Responsible Individuals. In J.-F. Laslier”, M. Fleurbaey & N. Gravel & A. Trannoy (Eds.), Freedom in Economics : New Perspectives in Normative Analysis (pp. 206-234), London: Routledge.
• Fleurbaey, M. & F. Maniquet (2011), “Compensation and Responsibility”, in K.J. Arrow & A. Sen & K. Suzumura (Eds.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare (Vol. 2, pp. 507-604): Elsevier.
• Frank, B. & G.G. Schulze (2000), “Does economics make citizens corrupt?”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 43(1), 101-113.
• Frank, R.H. & T.D. Gilovich & D.T. Regan (1993), “Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(2), 159-171.
• Frank, R.H. & T.D. Gilovich & D.T. Regan (1996), “Do Economists Make Bad Citizens?”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(1), 187-192.
• Frey, B.S. & S. Meier (2003), “Are political economists selfish and indoctrinated? Evidence from a natural experiment”, Economic Inquiry, 41(3), 448-462.
• Frey, B.S. & S. Meier (2004a), “Pro-social behavior in a natural setting”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 54(1), 65-88.
• Frey, B.S. & S. Meier (2004b), “Social Comparisons and Pro-Social Behavior: Testing ‘Conditional Cooperation’ in a Field Experiment”, The American Economic Review, 94(5), 1717-1722.
• Frey, B.S. & S. Meier (2005), “Selfish and indoctrinated economists?” European Journal of Law and Economics, 19(2), 165-171.
• Frey, B.S. & W.W. Pommerehne (1993), “On the fairness of pricing--An empirical survey among the general population”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 20(3), 295-307.
• Frey, B.S. & W.W. Pommerehne & B. Gygi (1993), “Economics Indoctrination or Selection? Some Empirical Results”, The Journal of Economic Education, 24(3), 271-281.
• Frohlich, N. & J.A. Oppenheimer (1990), “Choosing Justice in Experimental Democracies with Production”, The American Political Science Review, 84(2), 461-477.
• Frohlich, N. & J.A. Oppenheimer (1992), Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
• Frohlich, N. & J.A. Oppenheimer (1994), “Preferences for Income Distribution and Distributive Justice: A Window on the Problems of Using Experimental Data in Economics and Ethics”, Eastern Economic Journal, 20(2), 147-155.
• Frohlich, N. & J.A. Oppenheimer & C.L. Eavey (1987a), “Choices of Principles of Distributive Justice in Experimental Groups”, American Journal of Political Science, 31(3), 606-636.
• Frohlich, N. & J.A. Oppenheimer & C.L. Eavey (1987b), “Laboratory Results on Rawls's Distributive Justice”, British Journal of Political Science, 17(01), 1-21.
• Gaertner, W. (1992), “Distributive judgments”, in: W. Gaertner & M. Klemisch-Ahlert (Eds.), Social Choice and Bargaining Perspectives on Distributive Justice (pp. 22–59), Heidelberg Springer.
• Gaertner, W. (1994), “Distributive justice: Theoretical foundations and empirical findings”, European Economic Review, 38(3), 711-720.
• Gaertner, W. & J. Jungeilges (2002), “Evaluation via extended orderings: Empirical findings from Western and Eastern Europe”, Social Choice and Welfare, 19(1), 29-55.
• Gaertner, W. & J. Jungeilges & R. Neck (2001), “Cross-cultural equity evaluations: A questionnaire-experimental approach”, European Economic Review, 45(4-6), 953-963.
• Gaertner, W. & R. Neck & L. Schwettmann (2011), “Perceptions of Equity across Cultures and over Time: A Questionnaire-Experimental Approach”, International Advances in Economic Research, 1-11.
• Gaertner, W. & E. Schokkaert (2011), Empirical Social Choice Questionnaire-Experimental Studies on Distributive Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Gaertner, W. & L. Schwettmann (2007), “Equity, responsibility and the cultural dimension”, Economica, 74(296), 627-649.
• Giraud, G. & C. Renouard (2011), Is the veil of ignorance transparent?, CES Working Paper 2011. 26.
• Gneezy, U. & A. Rustichini (2000), “Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3), 791-810.
• Guala, F. (2005), The Methodology of Experimental Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Hammond, P.J. (1976), “Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle”, Econometrica, 44(4), 793-804.
• Harsanyi, J.C. (1953), “Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk-taking”, The Journal of Political Economy, 61(5), 434.
• Harsanyi, J.C. (1955), “Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility”, The Journal of Political Economy, 63(4), 309-321.
• Harsanyi, J.C. (1975), “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory”, The American Political Science Review, 69(2), 594-606.
• Harsanyi, J.C. (1977), Rational behavior and bargaining equilibrium, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
• Harsanyi, J.C. (1978), “Bayesian decision theory and utilitarian ethics”, The American Economic Review, 68(2), 223-228.
• Haucap, J. & T. Just (2010), “Not guilty? Another look at the nature and nurture of economics students”, European Journal of Law and Economics, 29(2), 239-254.
• Herne, K. & M. Suojanen (2004), “The role of information in choices over income distributions”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(2), 173.
• Hey, J.D. & C. Pasca (2011), “On choosing a constitution (at least the part relating to the distribution of income)”, Applied Economics Letters, 18(13), 1213-1217.
• Hu, Y.-A. & D.-Y. Liu (2003), “Altruism versus Egoism in Human Behavior of Mixed Motives: An Experimental Study”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 62(4), 677-705.
• Isaac, R.M. & K.F. McCue & C. Plott (1985), “Public goods provision in an experimental environment”, Journal of Public Economics, 26(1), 51-74.
• Jackson, M. & P. Hill (1995), “A Fair Share”, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 7(2), 169-179.
• Johannesson, M. & U.G. Gerdtham (1995), “A pilot test of using the veil of ignorance approach to estimate a social welfare function for income”, Applied Economics Letters, 2(10), 400-402.
• Johansson-Stenman, O. & F. Carlsson & D. Daruvala (2002), “Measuring Future Grandparents' Preferences for Equality and Relative Standing”, The Economic Journal, 112(479), 362-383.
• Jungeilges, J. & T. Theisen (2008), “A comparative study of equity judgements in Lithuania and Norway”, Journal of Socio-Economics, 37(3), 1090-1118.
• Jungeilges, J. & T. Theisen (2011), “State dependence in sequential equity judgements”, Social Choice and Welfare, 37(1), 97-119.
• Kagel, J. & C. Kim & D. Moser (1992), ‘Fairness’ in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh.
• Kariv, S. & W.R. Zame (2008), Piercing the Veil of Ignorance, Mimeo, <http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~kariv/KZ_I.pdf.>, 14 August 2013.
• Kirchgassner, G. (2005), “(Why) are economists different?”, European Journal of Political Economy, 21(3), 543-562.
• Konow, J. (2000), “Fair Shares: Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions”, The American Economic Review, 90(4), 1072-1091.
• Konow, J. (2001), “Fair and square: the four sides of distributive justice”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 46(2), 137-164.
• Konow, J. (2003), “Which Is the Fairest One of All? A Positive Analysis of Justice Theories”, Journal of Economic Literature, 41(4), 1188-1239.
• Laband, D.N. & R.O. Beil (1999), “Are economists more selfish than other 'social' scientists?”, Public Choice, 100(1), 85-101.
• Lebaron, F. (2001), “Economists and The Economics Order The field of economists and the field of power in France”, European Societies, 3(1), 91-110.
• Ledyard, J.O. (1995), “Public goods: A survey of experimental research”, in: J.H. Kagel & A.E. Roth (Eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics (pp. 111-194), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Lissowski, G. & T. Tyszka & W. Okrasa (1991), “Principles of Distributive Justice: Experiments in Poland and America”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35(1), 98-119.
• Loewenstein, G. (1999), “Experimental Economics from the Vantage-Point of Behavioural Economics”, The Economic Journal, 109(453), F25-F34.
• Marwell, G. & R.E. Ames (1981), “Economists free ride, does anyone else?: Experiments on the provision of public goods”, IV. Journal of Public Economics, 15(3), 295-310.
• Mill, J.S. (1861), Considerations on Representative Government, reprinted (South Bend, Ind.: Gateway Editions, 1962).
• Norton, E.C. & H. Wang & C. Ai (2004), “Computing interaction effects and standard errors in logit and probit models”, The Stata Journal, 4(2), 154-167.
• Ockenfels, A. & J. Weimann (1999), “Types and patterns: an experimental East-West-German comparison of cooperation and solidarity”, Journal of Public Economics, 71(2), 275-287.
• Oleson, P.E. (2001), An experimental examination of alternative theories of distributive justice and economic fairness, (Ph.D. dissertation), University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ.
• Rawls, J. (1971), A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Rawls, J. (1974), “Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion”, The American Economic Review, 64(2), 141-146.
• Read, D. (2005), “Monetary incentives, what are they good for?”, Journal of Economic Methodology, 12(2), 265-276.
• Rubinstein, A. (2006), “A Sceptic's Comment on the Study of Economics”, The Economic Journal, 116(510), C1-C9.
• Schildberg-Hörisch, H. (2010), “Is the veil of ignorance only a concept about risk? An experiment”, Journal of Public Economics, 94(11–12), 1062-1066.
• Schokkaert, E. & B. Capeau (1991), “Interindividual Differences in Opinions about Distributive Justice”, Kyklos, 44(3), 325-345.
• Schokkaert, E. & K. Devooght (2003), “Responsibility-sensitive fair compensation in different cultures”, Social Choice and Welfare, 21(2), 207-242.
• Schokkaert, E. & B. Overlaet (1989), “Moral intuitions and economic models of distributive justice”, Social Choice and Welfare, 6(1), 19-31.
• Selten, R. & A. Ockenfels (1998), “An experimental solidarity game”, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 34(4), 517-539.
• Sen, A. (1973), On economic inequality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Sen, A. (2000), “Social justice and the distribution of income”, in A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (Eds.), Handbook of income distribution (Vol. 1, pp. 59-85): Elsevier.
• Swope, K. & J. Cadigan & P. Schmitt & R. Shupp (2008), “Social Position and Distributive Justice: Experimental Evidence”, Southern Economic Journal, 74(3), 811-818.
• Traub, S. & C. Seidl & U. Schmidt (2009), “An experimental study on individual choice, social welfare, and social preferences”, European Economic Review, 53(4), 385-400.
• Traub, S. & C. Seidl & U. Schmidt & M.V. Levati (2005), “Friedman, Harsanyi, Rawls, Boulding–or somebody else? An experimental investigation of distributive justice”, Social Choice and Welfare, 24(2), 283-309.
• Vickrey, W. (1945), “Measuring Marginal Utility by Reactions to Risk”, Econometrica, 13(4), 319-333.
• Vickrey, W. (1960), “Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 74(4), 507-535.
• Vieider, F. (2011), “Separating real incentives and accountability”, Experimental Economics, 14(4), 507-518.
• Yaari, M.E. & M. Bar-Hillel (1984), “On dividing justly”, Social Choice and Welfare, 1(1), 1-24.
• Yezer, A.M. & R.S. Goldfarb & P.J. Poppen (1996), “Does Studying Economics Discourage Cooperation? Watch What we do, not what we say or How we Play”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(1), 177-186.
• Zsolnai, L. (2003), “Honesty versus Cooperation: A Reinterpretation of the Moral Behavior of Economics Students”, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 62(4), 707-712.