Uluslararası Finansal Panik Yaklaşımı ve 1997/8 Asya Krizi

Geleneksel kriz teorilerinin Asya krizini izah edemediği üzerinde üçüncü nesil kriz teorileri temsilcileri arasında bir ittifak vardır. Çalışmamızda “uluslar arasıfinansal panik” yaklaşımının Asya krizine bakışaçısıüzerine odaklanılmıştır. Uluslararasıfinansal panik yaklaşımıRadelet and Sachs 1998a,b tarafından inşa edilmiştir. Bu münasebetle sözkonusu yaklaşım hususunda önemli ölçüde bu 2 çalışma mihver alınmıştır. Uluslararasıfinansal panik yaklaşımına göre Asya krizi uluslar arasıkarakterde ve kendiliğinden vaki self-fulfilling bir finansal panik vakasıdır. Kriz öncesi dönemde Uzakdoğu Asya ülkelerinde makroekonomik temeller bir krizin meydana gelmesini gerektirmeyecek kadar sağlamdır. Kriz hiç kimse tarafından arafesinde bile tahmin edilememiştir. Kötümser beklentilerin varlığıpaniğin patlak vermesi bakımından anahtar rolü oynamıştır. Uluslararasıfinansal panik yaklaşımıfinansal paniğin meydana gelmesi bakımından sözkonusu ülkenin “döviz cinsinden kısa vadeli uluslar arasıborçlarının yükümlülüklerinin merkez bankasıuluslar arasırezervlerine oranı” unsurunu merkez alır ve Asya krizinin vuku bulmasınıbu unsur merkezinde izah etmeye çalışır. Uluslararasıfinansal panik meydana gelmesi açısından ülkenin “döviz cinsinden kısa vadeli uluslararasıborçlarının yükümlülüklerinin merkez bankasıuluslararasırezervlerine oranı” 1.0’ıaşmışolmalıdır. Bununla beraber uluslararasıfinansal paniğin meydana gelmesi açısından sözkonusu oranın 1.0’ıaşmışolması şarttır, fakat yeterli değildir. Bu oran 1.0’ıaştığında finansal paniğin meydana gelmesi yalnızca mümkün olup kaçınılmaz değildir. Bu durumda finansal paniğin meydana gelip gelmeyeceğini bir taraftan kötümser beklentilerin var olup olmadığı, diğer taraftan da bir finansal şokun ortaya çıkıp çıkmadığıbelirler.

There is an allience amongs representatives of third generation theories on that the traditional canonical crisis theories haven’t been able to explain the Asian crisis. The first generation crisis theories are locked on the weakness-soundness of the macreconomic fundamentals as explaining whether a financial crisis will happen or not. If the macroeconomic fundamentals are sound, the financial crisis will never occur. If the macroeconomic fundamentals, on the other hand, are weak, the financial crisis will occur exactly. The crisis happens as mecanical, and the central bank continues to maintain the fixed currency rate as blindly until it exhausts the final dollar of its international reserves. As if the central bank is locked on maintaining the fixed rate. The expectations haven’t any role on whether or not the financial crisis will happen. In a country, it can be known exactly when or whether a crisis occur or not. Also, the second generation crisis theories assign an essential importance to the macroeconomic fundamentals in the matter of whether a crisis will happen or not. But the second generation crisis theories, in opposite to the first generation crisis theories, claim that the soundness-weakness of the macroeconomic fundamentals stay in backround as secondary and that the existence of pessimist or optimist expectations determines if or not a financial crisis will happen. However, the second generation crisis theories imagine three probable situations about the soundness-weakness of the macroeconomic fundamentals: two opposite situations, and intermediate third situation between these opposite situations white, black, and gray . In the case of that the macroeconomic fundamentals are so sound white or too weak black , the expectations haven’t any role in respect to a crisis happen or not happen. In the country and in a specific time, it can be known exactly whether a crisis occur or not. In the third situation gray area , on the other hand, the character of the expectations being of them as pessimist or optimist determine if or not a financial crisis occurs. In the case of the fact that there are the pessimist expectations, the crisis will happen exactly; that there are the optimist expectations, the crisis will never happen. Therefore, it cannot be anticipated exactly when or whether a crisis happen or not. Furthermore, in according to the second generation crisis theories, the governments and the central banks don’t lock blindly on maintaining the fixed currency rate. The governments and the central banks compare the benefits and the cost increase in the interest rate, contraction in the economy and decrease in economic growth rate, increase unemployement rate of the fixed rate in respect to the economic welfare and political general elections. They face with a trade-off between maintaininig the fixed exchange rate, and as a concequence, increase in the interest and unemployement rates. Despite the fact that the central bank has sufficient international reserves, if the central bank and the government think that the economic-political cost of maintaining the rate exceeds its benefits, they may decide to abandon defending the fixed exchange rate as a strategical preference. The fixed exchange rate system, therefore, collapses. The case in reality in the Asian crisis, however, was different from the theorical framework on which the first and second generation crisis theories depend because the macroeconomic fundamentals so sound that it is impossible a crisis to happen.. In our study it was foccused on “the international -self-fulfilling- financial panic” approach’s perspective about the Asian crisis. The international financial panic approach was constructed by Radelet and Sachs 1998a,b . Therefore, these two pappers were accepted as the origine about this approach. In according to the “international -self-fulfilling- financial panic” approach, the Asian financial crisis was an occurrence as a self-fulfilling financial panic and in the international charactere. Firstly, in the pre-crisis period the macroeconomic fundementals in the East Asian countries had been so sound that it had required no-happenning of a crisis. In this frame in the 5 countries in