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Yıl 2006, Sayı: 15, 137 - 159, 01.02.2006

Bernd Rudolph Florian Haagen Melek Acar Boyacıoğlu

Öz

During the last years finance theory has been considering the meaning of institutional framework in the process of forming financial contracts in various countries. In this context the following paper compares the different, for Anglo-Saxon and German market typical contract structures of venture capital financing. Thereby it has to be questioned, whether the institutional features has an influence over the incentive-optimal contract creation. Through a comparative analysis of convertible preferred stocks, participating preferred stocks and sleeping partnership, it has been pointed out that sleeping partnership, as the common type of financing form in Germany, can create comparable incentives with the convertibles. As a result this type of financing can equally be faced with the Anglo-Saxon financial practices. Therefore institutional framework has an influence on the choice of financial structure. Consequently the American research results can not directly be transferred into German venture capital market

Anahtar Kelimeler

Venture Capital Incentive Conflict Sleeping Partnership Convertible Preferred

Kaynakça

  • Aghion, Philippe / Bolton, Patrick (1992): An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, in: Review of Economic Studies 59, s. 473-494.
  • Admati, Anat R. / Pfleiderer, Paul (1994): Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists, in: The Journal of Finance 49, s. 371-402.
  • Bascha, Andreas (2001): Hybride Beteiligungsformen bei Venture Capital, Wiesbaden.
  • Bascha, Andreas / Walz, Uwe (2002): Financing Practices in the German Venture Capital Industry. An Empirical Assessment, CFS Working Paper 2002 / 08.
  • Baums, Theodor / Möller, Matthias (2000): Venture Capital: U.S. - amerikanisches Modell und deutsches Aktienrecht, Arbeitspapier, Universität Osnabrück.
  • Becker, Ralf / Hellmann, Thomas (2002): The Genesis of Venture Capital – Lessons from the German Experience, Working Paper, CESifo München, November 2002.
  • Betsch, Oskar / Groh, Alexander / Schmidt, Kay (2000): Gründungs- und Wachstums-finanzierung innovativer Unternehmen, Oldenbourg.
  • Bergemann, Dirk / Hege, Ulrich (1998): Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard, and Learning, in: Journal of Banking & Finance 22, s. 703 – 735.
  • Black, Bernard S. / Gilson, Ronald J. (1998): Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Bank versus Stocks Markets, in: Journal of Financial Economics 47, s. 243-277.
  • Bottazzi, Laura / Rin, Marco Da / Hellmann, Thomas (2004): What Role of Legal System in Venture Capital? Theory and Evidence, Working Paper Bocconi University, March.
  • BVK (2004): Teilstatistik für Venture Capital der BVK Jahresstatistik 2003, unter: http://www.bvk-ev.de/pdf/61.pdf (Stand: 10. Jul. 2004).
  • Casamatta, Chaterine (2003): Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists, in: The Journal of Finance 58, s. 2059-2085.
  • Chandler, Gaylen / Hanks, Steven (1993): Founder Competence, the Environment, and Venture Performance, in: Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 18, s. 77-88.
  • Cornelli, Francesca / Yosha, Oved (2003): Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities, in: The Review of Economic Studies 70, s. 1 –48.
  • Bascha/Walz (2002), yaygınlaşmanın düşük olmasından devlet müdahalelerini sorumlu
  • tutmaktadırlar. Ritzer-Angerer (2004), gizli iştirakin kullanımına gerekçe olarak vergisel
  • avantajlarına karşın hiçbir dezavantajın bulunmamasını göstermektedirler.
  • Cumming, Douglas (2002): United States Venture Capital Financial Contracting: Foreign Securities, Working Paper, University of Alberta, May.
  • Denis, David J. (2004): Entrepreneurial Finance: an Overview of the Issues and Evidence, in: Journal of Corporate Finance 10, s. 301-326.
  • Dessein, Wouter (2004): Information and Control in Ventures & Alliances, Working Paper, University of Chicago, May.
  • Diamond, Douglas (1991): Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, s. 709-737.
  • Fiedler, Marc-Oliver / Hellmann, Thomas (2001): Against all odds: The late but rapid development of the German Venture Capital Industry, Stanford Graduate School of Business.
  • Fink, Alexandra (2003): Corporate-Venturing-Kooperationen: Praxisbefunde, Anreiz- probleme und Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten, Bad Soden.
  • Franzke, Stefanie / Grohs, Stefanie / Laux, Chrisitan (2003): Initial Public Offerings and Venture Capital in Germany, in: The German Financial System, hrsg. von Krahnen, Jan/ Schmidt, Reinhard, Oxford.
  • Gaida, Michael (2002): Venture Capital in Deutschland und den USA, Wiesbaden.
  • Gebhardt, Georg / Schmidt, Klaus M. (2002): Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreiz-probleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen, in: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 3, s. 235-255.
  • Gompers, Paul A. / Lerner, Josh (1999b): The Venture Capital Cycle, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
  • Hege, Ulrich / Palomino, Frédéric / Schwienbacher, Armin (2003): Determinants of Venture
  • Capital Performance: Europe and the United States, Working Paper, RICAFE Working Paper No. 001, July.
  • Hellmann, Thomas (2004): IPOs, Acquisitions and the Use of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital, Working Paper Stanford University.
  • Houben, Eike (2003): Optimale Vertragsgestaltung bei Venture Capital Finanzierungen, Wiesbaden.
  • Holmström, Bengt (1979): Moral Hazard and Observability, in: Bell Journal of Economics 10, s. 74-91.
  • Inderst, Roman / Müller, Holger M. (2004): The Effect of Capital Market Characteristics on the Value of Start-up Firms, in: Journal of Financial Economics 72, s. 319-356.
  • Jensen, Michael / Meckling, William (1976): Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in: Journal of Financial Economics 3, s.305- 360.
  • Kaplan, Steven N. / Martel, Frederic / Strömberg, Per (2004): How Do Legal Differences and
  • Learning Affect Financial Contracts, Working Paper, University of Chicago, June.
  • Kaplan, Steven N. / Strömberg, Per (2001): Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring, in: The American Economic Review 91, s. 426- 430.
  • Kaplan, Steven N. / Strömberg, Per (2003a): Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: Evidence From Venture Capital Analyses, Working Paper, University of Chicago, July.
  • Kaplan, Steven N. / Strömberg, Per (2003b): Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, in: Review of Economic Studies 70, s. 281-316.
  • Lazear, Edward (1986): Salaries and Piece-Rates, in: Journal of Business 59, s. 405- 431.
  • Merton, Robert / Bodie, Zvi (2004): The Design of Financial Systems: Towards a Synthesis of Function and Structure, Working Paper, Harvard Business School, July.
  • Pape, Ulrich / Beyer, Stephan (2001): Venture Capital als Finanzierungsalternative innovativer Wachstumsunternehmen, in: Finanz Betrieb 3, s. 627-638.
  • Prendgast, Canice (2002): The Tenuous Trade off between Risk and Incentives, in Journal of Political Economy 110, s. 1071-1102.
  • Repullo, Rafael / Suarez, Javier (2003): Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach, November.
  • Ritzer-Angerer, Petra (2004): Venture Capital-Finanzierung und stille Gesellschaft – Ein Beitrag zur Rechtsformwahl bei VC-Finanzierungsverträgen, Frankfurt a. M., erscheint Herbst 2004.
  • Ross, Stephen (1977): The Determination of financial Structure: An Incentive Signalling Approach, in: Bell Journal of Economics 8, s. 23-40.
  • Sahlman, William A. (1990): The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, in: Journal of Financial Economics 27, s. 473–521.
  • Schefczyk, Michael (1998): Erfolgsstrategien deutscher Venture Capital-Gesellschaften, Stuttgart.
  • Schefczyk, Michael (2000): Finanzieren mit Venture Capital, Stuttgart.
  • Schindele, Ibolya (2003): Advice and Monitoring: Venture Financing with Multiple Tasks, Working Paper, Amsterdam University, March.
  • Schmidt, Klaus M. (2003): Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance, in: The Journal of Finance 58, s. 1139-1166.
  • Schwienbacher, Armin (2002): An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Exits in Europe and
  • the United States, Working Paper, University of Namur, October.
  • Streuer, Olaf (2003): Mittelstandsfinanzierung im Fokus: Die stille Beteiligung als „Quasi“- Eigenkapital, Deutsche Industrie Bank Unternehmerthemen, März.
  • Stein, Ingrid (2003): Venture Capital-Finanzierungen: Kapitalstruktur und Exitentscheidung, Diss. München.
  • Weitenauer, Wolfgang (2000): Handbuch Venture Capital – Von der Innovation zum Börsengang, München.

KURUMSAL ÇERÇEVE ŞARTLARININ ALMANYA’DA RİSK SERMAYESİ FİNANSMANINA ETKİLERİ

Yıl 2006, Sayı: 15, 137 - 159, 01.02.2006

Bernd Rudolph Florian Haagen Melek Acar Boyacıoğlu

Öz

Finans teorisi farklıülkelerdeki finansal sözleşmelerin düzenlenmesinde kurumsal çerçeve şartlarının anlamınıson yıllarda yoğun bir şekilde incelemektedir. Bu çalışma, bu bağlamda risk sermayesi finansmanının Anglosakson ve Alman piyasalarıaçısından farklıniteliklerdeki tipik sözleşme yapılarınıkarşılaştırmaktadır. Burada kurumsal özelliklerin menfaatleri optimal şekilde dengeleyen sözleşmeler oluşturulmasına etki edip etmediğinin değerlendirilmesi gerekir. Dönüştürülebilir imtiyazlıhisse senetleri, kara iştirakli dönüştürülebilir imtiyazlıhisse senetleri ve gizli iştiraklerin karşılaştırmalıbir analizi sonucunda, Almanya’da yaygın bir finansman şekli olarak kullanılan gizli iştirakin, dönüştürülebilir finansal araçlarla kıyaslandığında, aynıölçüde cazip nitelik taşıyabileceği gösterilmektedir. Buna bağlıolarak sözkonusu finansman şekli, Anglosakson finansman uygulamalarına eşdüzeyde bir alternatif oluşturabilecektir. Kurumsal çerçeve şartlarıda finansman yapısının seçiminde etkili olmaktadır. Netice itibariyle Amerika’da yapılan araştırma sonuçlarının Alman sermaye piyasasına aynen uyarlanmamasıyerinde olacaktır. JEL Sınıflaması:G24, G32, G35

Anahtar Kelimeler

Risk sermayesi çıkar çatışmaları gizli iştirak dönüştürülebilir imtiyazlı hisse senetleri kurumsal çerçeve şartlar

Kaynakça

  • Aghion, Philippe / Bolton, Patrick (1992): An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting, in: Review of Economic Studies 59, s. 473-494.
  • Admati, Anat R. / Pfleiderer, Paul (1994): Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists, in: The Journal of Finance 49, s. 371-402.
  • Bascha, Andreas (2001): Hybride Beteiligungsformen bei Venture Capital, Wiesbaden.
  • Bascha, Andreas / Walz, Uwe (2002): Financing Practices in the German Venture Capital Industry. An Empirical Assessment, CFS Working Paper 2002 / 08.
  • Baums, Theodor / Möller, Matthias (2000): Venture Capital: U.S. - amerikanisches Modell und deutsches Aktienrecht, Arbeitspapier, Universität Osnabrück.
  • Becker, Ralf / Hellmann, Thomas (2002): The Genesis of Venture Capital – Lessons from the German Experience, Working Paper, CESifo München, November 2002.
  • Betsch, Oskar / Groh, Alexander / Schmidt, Kay (2000): Gründungs- und Wachstums-finanzierung innovativer Unternehmen, Oldenbourg.
  • Bergemann, Dirk / Hege, Ulrich (1998): Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard, and Learning, in: Journal of Banking & Finance 22, s. 703 – 735.
  • Black, Bernard S. / Gilson, Ronald J. (1998): Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Bank versus Stocks Markets, in: Journal of Financial Economics 47, s. 243-277.
  • Bottazzi, Laura / Rin, Marco Da / Hellmann, Thomas (2004): What Role of Legal System in Venture Capital? Theory and Evidence, Working Paper Bocconi University, March.
  • BVK (2004): Teilstatistik für Venture Capital der BVK Jahresstatistik 2003, unter: http://www.bvk-ev.de/pdf/61.pdf (Stand: 10. Jul. 2004).
  • Casamatta, Chaterine (2003): Financing and Advising: Optimal Financial Contracts with Venture Capitalists, in: The Journal of Finance 58, s. 2059-2085.
  • Chandler, Gaylen / Hanks, Steven (1993): Founder Competence, the Environment, and Venture Performance, in: Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 18, s. 77-88.
  • Cornelli, Francesca / Yosha, Oved (2003): Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities, in: The Review of Economic Studies 70, s. 1 –48.
  • Bascha/Walz (2002), yaygınlaşmanın düşük olmasından devlet müdahalelerini sorumlu
  • tutmaktadırlar. Ritzer-Angerer (2004), gizli iştirakin kullanımına gerekçe olarak vergisel
  • avantajlarına karşın hiçbir dezavantajın bulunmamasını göstermektedirler.
  • Cumming, Douglas (2002): United States Venture Capital Financial Contracting: Foreign Securities, Working Paper, University of Alberta, May.
  • Denis, David J. (2004): Entrepreneurial Finance: an Overview of the Issues and Evidence, in: Journal of Corporate Finance 10, s. 301-326.
  • Dessein, Wouter (2004): Information and Control in Ventures & Alliances, Working Paper, University of Chicago, May.
  • Diamond, Douglas (1991): Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, s. 709-737.
  • Fiedler, Marc-Oliver / Hellmann, Thomas (2001): Against all odds: The late but rapid development of the German Venture Capital Industry, Stanford Graduate School of Business.
  • Fink, Alexandra (2003): Corporate-Venturing-Kooperationen: Praxisbefunde, Anreiz- probleme und Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten, Bad Soden.
  • Franzke, Stefanie / Grohs, Stefanie / Laux, Chrisitan (2003): Initial Public Offerings and Venture Capital in Germany, in: The German Financial System, hrsg. von Krahnen, Jan/ Schmidt, Reinhard, Oxford.
  • Gaida, Michael (2002): Venture Capital in Deutschland und den USA, Wiesbaden.
  • Gebhardt, Georg / Schmidt, Klaus M. (2002): Der Markt für Venture Capital: Anreiz-probleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen, in: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 3, s. 235-255.
  • Gompers, Paul A. / Lerner, Josh (1999b): The Venture Capital Cycle, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
  • Hege, Ulrich / Palomino, Frédéric / Schwienbacher, Armin (2003): Determinants of Venture
  • Capital Performance: Europe and the United States, Working Paper, RICAFE Working Paper No. 001, July.
  • Hellmann, Thomas (2004): IPOs, Acquisitions and the Use of Convertible Securities in Venture Capital, Working Paper Stanford University.
  • Houben, Eike (2003): Optimale Vertragsgestaltung bei Venture Capital Finanzierungen, Wiesbaden.
  • Holmström, Bengt (1979): Moral Hazard and Observability, in: Bell Journal of Economics 10, s. 74-91.
  • Inderst, Roman / Müller, Holger M. (2004): The Effect of Capital Market Characteristics on the Value of Start-up Firms, in: Journal of Financial Economics 72, s. 319-356.
  • Jensen, Michael / Meckling, William (1976): Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in: Journal of Financial Economics 3, s.305- 360.
  • Kaplan, Steven N. / Martel, Frederic / Strömberg, Per (2004): How Do Legal Differences and
  • Learning Affect Financial Contracts, Working Paper, University of Chicago, June.
  • Kaplan, Steven N. / Strömberg, Per (2001): Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring, in: The American Economic Review 91, s. 426- 430.
  • Kaplan, Steven N. / Strömberg, Per (2003a): Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: Evidence From Venture Capital Analyses, Working Paper, University of Chicago, July.
  • Kaplan, Steven N. / Strömberg, Per (2003b): Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, in: Review of Economic Studies 70, s. 281-316.
  • Lazear, Edward (1986): Salaries and Piece-Rates, in: Journal of Business 59, s. 405- 431.
  • Merton, Robert / Bodie, Zvi (2004): The Design of Financial Systems: Towards a Synthesis of Function and Structure, Working Paper, Harvard Business School, July.
  • Pape, Ulrich / Beyer, Stephan (2001): Venture Capital als Finanzierungsalternative innovativer Wachstumsunternehmen, in: Finanz Betrieb 3, s. 627-638.
  • Prendgast, Canice (2002): The Tenuous Trade off between Risk and Incentives, in Journal of Political Economy 110, s. 1071-1102.
  • Repullo, Rafael / Suarez, Javier (2003): Venture Capital Finance: A Security Design Approach, November.
  • Ritzer-Angerer, Petra (2004): Venture Capital-Finanzierung und stille Gesellschaft – Ein Beitrag zur Rechtsformwahl bei VC-Finanzierungsverträgen, Frankfurt a. M., erscheint Herbst 2004.
  • Ross, Stephen (1977): The Determination of financial Structure: An Incentive Signalling Approach, in: Bell Journal of Economics 8, s. 23-40.
  • Sahlman, William A. (1990): The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, in: Journal of Financial Economics 27, s. 473–521.
  • Schefczyk, Michael (1998): Erfolgsstrategien deutscher Venture Capital-Gesellschaften, Stuttgart.
  • Schefczyk, Michael (2000): Finanzieren mit Venture Capital, Stuttgart.
  • Schindele, Ibolya (2003): Advice and Monitoring: Venture Financing with Multiple Tasks, Working Paper, Amsterdam University, March.
  • Schmidt, Klaus M. (2003): Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance, in: The Journal of Finance 58, s. 1139-1166.
  • Schwienbacher, Armin (2002): An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Exits in Europe and
  • the United States, Working Paper, University of Namur, October.
  • Streuer, Olaf (2003): Mittelstandsfinanzierung im Fokus: Die stille Beteiligung als „Quasi“- Eigenkapital, Deutsche Industrie Bank Unternehmerthemen, März.
  • Stein, Ingrid (2003): Venture Capital-Finanzierungen: Kapitalstruktur und Exitentscheidung, Diss. München.
  • Weitenauer, Wolfgang (2000): Handbuch Venture Capital – Von der Innovation zum Börsengang, München.
Toplam 56 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil Türkçe
Bölüm Research Article
Yazarlar

Bernd Rudolph Bu kişi benim

Florian Haagen Bu kişi benim

Melek Acar Boyacıoğlu Bu kişi benim

Yayımlanma Tarihi 1 Şubat 2006
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2006 Sayı: 15

Kaynak Göster

APA Rudolph, B., Haagen, F., & Boyacıoğlu, M. A. (2006). KURUMSAL ÇERÇEVE ŞARTLARININ ALMANYA’DA RİSK SERMAYESİ FİNANSMANINA ETKİLERİ. Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi(15), 137-159.


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