Türkiye’nin ‘De Facto’ Döviz Kuru Rejiminin Belirlenmesi

Yıl 2017, Sayı: 37, 265 - 272, 01.02.2017

Kürşat Yalçıner Murat Çetinkaya Yasın Erdem Çevik

Öz

‘De facto-De jure’ uyuşmazlığını eleştiren ve ülkelerin kur rejimlerini sınıflandıran çalışmalar 1979 yılında başlamış ve halen önemini korumaktadır. Önde gelen çalışmaların sonuçları arasındaki uyumsuzluklar, araştırmacıları kur rejim esnekliğini belirleyen yeni modeller üzerine çalışmaya itmektedir. Bu modellerden biri de 2008 yılında Frankel ve Wei tarafından önerilmiştir. Bu çalışmada Frankel ve Wei 2008 tarafından ortaya konulan model kullanılarak; Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası TCMB tarafından resmi olarak açıklanan döviz kuru rejimi de jure ile uygulanan döviz kuru rejimi de facto arasında farklılığın olup olmadığı, diğer bir ifadeyle dalgalanma korkusu nedeniyle farklı bir döviz kuru rejimine yönelim olup olmadığı araştırılmıştır. Ülkelerin kurlara müdahalesinin nedenini “dalgalanma korkusu” olarak açıklayan Calvo ve Reinhart’a 2002 göre, bağımsız döviz kuru uygulandığını ilan eden ülkelerin aslında kurlardaki dalgalanmalardan çekindiklerini ve fiili olarak sabit kur veya ara rejimli uygulamalara yöneldiklerini ifade etmektedir. Özellikle düşük kredibilite, ani duruş sorunu, ilk günah problemi, yüksek dolarizasyon, döviz kurlarından fiyatlara geçiş etkisi, güvenirlik sorunu ve finansal piyasalarla kısıtlı bütünleşme gibi problemlerle karşılaşacağını düşünen ülkelerin parasal otoriteleri dalgalanma korkusu nedeniyle döviz kurun­daki büyük dalgalanmalara duyarsız kalamayarak, döviz piyasasına fiili ola­rak müdahalede bulunmaktadır. Çalışmada araştırma dönemi 2003-2017 yıllarını kapsamakta olup, elde edilen bulgulara göre, araştırma dönemi boyunca Türkiye’de dört farklı ‘de facto’ kur rejimi uygulandığı ortaya çıkmıştır. Belirlenen alt dönemler için model uygulanmış ve döviz piyasasında baskıyı temsil eden EMP değişkenin katsayısına bağlı olarak ülkenin döviz kuru rejiminin esnekliği belirlenmeye çalışılmıştır. EMP değişkenin her dönemde anlamlı çıkması, fiilen sabit kur rejimi uygulanmadığının kesin bir göstergesiyken; EMP katsayılarının düşük çıkması fiilen ara rejim uygulamasının olduğunu ifade etmekdir. Bu sonuçlar, 2003-2017 döneminde fiilen ara rejim uygulandığını göstermekte olup, Calvo ve Reinhart 2002 tarafından ortaya konulan “dalgalanma korkusu” kavramını desteklerken, Fischer 2001 tarafından önerilen “iki kutupluluk” hipotezini reddetmektedir. Ayrıca EMP sonuçları dikkate alındığında, ABD Merkez Bankası Fed’in yeni dönem politikalarıyla birlikte Türkiye’nin 2014 yılından sonra daha katı bir kur rejim uygulamasına geçtiği analiz sonuçlarından açıkça görülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Döviz Kuru Rejimleri, De Jure Döviz Kuru Rejimi, De Facto Döviz Kuru Rejimi, Dalgalanma Korkusu

Determination of ‘De Facto’ Exchange Rate Regime of Turkey

Öz

Studies in which researchers criticize the incompatibility of ‘de facto-de jure’, and exchange rate regimes of countries are classified started in 1979, and they still bear high importance. Incompatibilities between the results of prominent studies have pushed researchers into working on new models that determine exchange rate flexibility. One of these models were proposed in 2008 by Frankel and Wei. Using the model presented by Frankel and Wei 2008 in this study, whether there is any difference between the exchange rate regime de jure officially announced by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey CBRT and the applied exchange rate regime de facto , in other words, whether there is a trend towards a different exchange rate regime due to the fear of fluctuation has been studied. According to Calvo and Reinhart 2002 who explained the reason for the interference of countries in exchange rates as a "fear of floating", countries that declared an independent exchange rate actually refrain from the fluctuations in the rates and, de facto, tend towards fixed exchange rates or interim regimes. In particular, monetary authorities of countries that think that they will encounter problems such as low credibility, sudden stop problem, original sin problem, high dollarization, effect of transition from exchange rates to prices, reliability problem and limited integration with financial markets have de facto intervened in foreign exchange market by no remaining insensitive to great fluctuations in exchange rates due to the fear of floating. The research period in the study covers the years between 2003-2017, and according to the findings, it has been revealed that four different 'de facto' exchange rate regimes were applied in Turkey during this research period. The model was applied for the specified sub-periods and the flexibility of the exchange rate regime of the country have been tried to be determined depending on the coefficient of the EMP variable representing the pressure in the foreign exchange market. While the meaningfulness of the EMP variable in each period is the precise indication of the fact that the fixed exchange rate regime is not de facto applied, the low EMP coefficients indicate that there is a de facto interim regime application. These results show that the de facto interim regime was applied in the period 2003-2017, however, it rejects the hypothesis of "bipolar view " proposed by Fischer 2001 while supporting the concept of "fear of floating" introduced by Calvo and Reinhart 2002 . Moreover, it is clear in the results of the analysis that Turkey has implemented a stricter exchange rate regime after 2014 along with the new term policies of the Fed, US Central Bank, when the EMP results are taken into consideration

Anahtar Kelimeler

Exchange Rate Regimes, De Jure Exchange Rate Regime, De Facto Exchange Rate Regime, Fear of Floating

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