SUİSTİMALCİ ANAYASACILIK VE UYGULAMALARI: MACARİSTAN VE POLONYA ÖZELİNDE DEĞERLENDİRME

Öz

0. yüzyılda savaş, ekonomik kriz gibi global sorunlar ve kitlesel göç hareketleri, demokratik yollarla seçilen popülist liderlerin halkın büyük oranda desteğini alarak, ülkelerin yönetimlerinde güçlü şekilde iktidara gelmesini sağlamıştır. Popülist iktidarların güçlerini ve istikrarlarını pekiştirme gayesiyle anayasa mekanizmalarını ve demokratik kurumları anayasa değişiklikleri yoluyla güdümüne alması ise doktrinde suistimalci anayasacılık kavramı ile açıklanmaktadır. Günümüzde hukukun üstünlüğü ilkesine, demokrasiye ve insan haklarına halel getiren suistimalci anayasacılık uygulamaları birçok ülkede yaygın şekilde görülmektedir. Özellikle Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinden olan Macaristan ve Polonya’da popülizmin yükselişe geçmesi, otoriter eğilimlerinin hızla artmasına ve insan haklarına dayanan özgürlükçü demokrasiye ilişkin tartışmalarının yoğun şekilde gündeme gelmesine sebep olmuştur. Ayrıca Macaristan, Avrupa’da son on yılda yeni anayasanın yapıldığı tek örnek olduğundan, süreci anayasacılık yönünden değerlendirmek önem arzetmektedir. Çalışmada öncelikle anayasacılık kavramından hareketle karşılaştırmalı anayasa hukuku literatüründe suistimalci anayasacılık kavramına ilişkin yaklaşımlar ortaya konulacaktır. Bu minvalde suistimalci anayasacılık uygulamalarının temel kaynaklarına değinilerek, bu uygulamaların en bariz şekilde görüldüğü ülkelerden olan Macaristan ve Polonya özelinde değerlendirmeler yapılacaktır. Ayrıca suistimalci anayasa uygulamaları karşısında Avrupa Birliği Adalet Divanı ve Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’nin tutumu değerlendirilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Anayasacılık
• suistimalci anayasacılık
• popülizm
• otoriter rejim
• ABAD
• AİHM

Abusive Constitutionalism and Its Practices: A Case Study of Hungary and Poland

Öz

In the 20th century, global problems such as wars, economic crises and mass migration movements have led to the rise of democratically elected populist leaders who have gained the support of the public and come to power in countries. The concept of abusive constitutionalism is explained in the doctrine as populist governments manipulating constitutional mechanisms and democratic institutions through constitutional amendments to consolidate their power and stability. Nowadays, abusive constitutionalism practices that undermine the rule of law, democracy and human rights are widespread in countries. Especially in the Eastern European countries of Hungary and Poland, the rise of populism has led to a rapid increase in authoritarian tendencies and intensified debates on libertarian democracy based on human rights. Additionally, since Hungary is the only example in Europe where a new constitution was adopted in the last decade, it is important to evaluate the process from a constitutionalism perspective. In this study, firstly, the approaches to the concept of abusive constitutionalism in the comparative constitutional law literature will be presented. In this respect, the main sources of abusive constitutional practices will be mentioned and evaluations will be made in Hungary and Poland, which are the countries where these practices are most evident. Furthermore, the attitude of the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights towards abusive constitutional practices will be evaluated.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Constitutionalism
• abusive constitutionalism
• populism
• authoritarian regime
• CJEU
• ECtHR.

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