ANAYASA YARGISI KARŞISINDA PARLAMENTO EGEMENLİĞİNİ YENİDEN DÜŞÜNMEK

Öz

Hukuk devletini otoriter, totaliter, faşist devletlerden ayıran iki nitelik vardır. İlki, özgür ve eşit yurttaşların seçim yoluyla kendilerine uygulanacak üstün kuralları yapacak siyasilere vekalet vermesidir. Cebri hukuk düzenine meşruiyet temin eden, kendi kendine yönetimin özünü oluşturan hukuk devletinin olmazsa olmaz koşulu olan bu unsur, demokratik ilke olarak adlandırılabilir. Diğer nitelik ise tüm kamu gücünün anayasal/yasal kurallara uygun olarak kullanılmasını zorunlu kılan yasallık ilkesidir. Yüksek Mahkemelerin herkesi bağlayan nihai kararları, yalnızca kuralların yapımında yurttaşların eşit katılımına izin vermediği için değil özerk ve sorumsuz hakimlerin kullandığı kamu gücünün her tür yaptırımdan muaf olması nedeniyle de hukuk devleti için sakıncalıdır. Makale hukukun üstünlüğünden meşruiyete, güçlü ve zayıf anayasa yargısından siyasi soruna kadar çok sayıda kavramı açıklamayı ve bu kavramların demokratik teoriyle ne kadar uyumlu olduğunu irdelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda tespit edilen sorunlara çözüm önerisi olarak anayasal düzenin vesayet mercii haline gelen yüksek yargı yetkilerinin daraltılarak zayıf anayasa yargısına geçilmesi ve Meclise Anayasa Mahkemesi (AYM) kararlarını ortadan kaldırma yetkisinin tanınması önerilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Yargısal Aktivizm
• Yargı Üstünlüğü
• Siyasal Sorun
• Çoğunluk Karşıtı Zorluk
• Zayıf Anayasa Yargısı

Rethinking Parliamentary Sovereignty Against Constitutional Adjudication

Öz

Two qualities distinguish the rule of law from authoritarian, totalitarian, and fascist states. The first is that free and equal citizens, through elections, authorize politicians to make the superior rules to be applied to themselves. This element is the democracy principle. It is the sine qua non condition of the rule of law, which provides legitimacy to the coercive legal order and constitutes the essence of self-government. The other characteristic is the principle of legality, which obliges all public power to be exercised in accordance with constitutional/legal rules. The final judgments of the Supreme Courts, which are binding on everyone, are problematic for the rule of law not only because they do not allow equal participation of citizens in rule-making, but also because the public power exercised by autonomous and irresponsible judges is exempt from all sanctions. As a solution, this article proposes a weak constitutional adjudication by narrowing the powers of the high courts, which have become the custodians of constitutional order, and granting the Parliament the power to annul the decisions of the Constitutional Court.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Judicial Activism
• Judicial Supremacy
• Political Question
• Counter-majoritarian Difficulty
• Weak Constitutional Adjudication

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