Does Metaphorizing the Mind Dethrone It?

Abstract

This article contributes to ongoing debates in the philosophy of mind concerning the ontological status of mental states by examining mental fictionalism. Within a pragmatic and naturalist framework, mental fictionalism reconsiders the tension between the Cartesian legacy, which treats mental states as metaphysically and ontologically serious entities, and strict behaviorism, which entirely neglects this inner dimension. Drawing on the work of analytic philosophers such as Sellars, Ryle, and Quine, mental fictionalism suspends commitment to the ontological status of mental states. Instead, it legitimizes the functional role of folk psychology. On this account, mental states are grounded not in inner representations but in patterns of behavioral regularity and social norms. The article consists of three sections: the first outlines the theoretical framework of mental fictionalism; the second discusses the place of folk psychology within this framework; and the third examines the epistemic and pragmatic implications of these two lines of inquiry. The aim of this paper is not merely to describe mental fictionalism, but to show that metaphorizing the mind may offer a way to reconsider its epistemic and pragmatic function. Within this framework, metaphorizing the mind is understood not as a form of reduction, but as a strategy for preserving the epistemic strength of mental discourse.

Keywords

• Eliminativism
• Fictionalism
• Folk Psychology
• Mental Fictionalism
• Metaphor
• Mind

Metaforlaştırmak Zihni Tahtından İndirir mi?

Öz

Bu makale, zihinsel durumların ontolojik statüsüne ilişkin zihin felsefesindeki güncel tartışmalara zihinsel kurguculuğu inceleyerek katkıda bulunmaktadır. Zihinsel kurguculuk, pragmatik ve natüralist bir çerçevede, zihinsel durumları metafizik ve ontolojik olarak ciddiye alan Kartezyen miras ile bu içsel boyutu tümüyle göz ardı eden katı davranışçılık arasındaki gerilimi yeniden ele alır. Sellars, Ryle ve Quine gibi analitik filozofların çalışmalarına dayanarak, zihinsel durumların ontolojik statüsüne yönelik bağlılığı askıya alır; bunun yerine folk psikolojinin işlevsel rolünü meşrulaştırır. Bu yaklaşıma göre zihinsel durumlar, içsel temsillere değil, davranışsal düzenliliklere ve toplumsal normlara dayandırılır. Makale üç bölümden oluşmaktadır: İlk bölüm zihinsel kurgusalcılığın teorik çerçevesini özetlemekte; ikinci bölüm halk psikolojisinin bu çerçevedeki yerini tartışmakta; ve üçüncü bölüm bu iki araştırma çizgisinin epistemik ve pragmatik etkilerini incelemektedir. Bu makalenin amacı yalnızca zihinsel kurguculuğu tanımlamak değil, aynı zamanda zihnin metaforlaştırılmasının epistemik ve pragmatik işlevini yeniden değerlendirmenin bir yolunu sunabileceğini göstermektir. Bu çerçevede, zihnin metaforlaştırılması bir indirgeme biçimi olarak değil, zihinsel söylemin epistemik gücünü korumaya yönelik bir strateji olarak anlaşılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Eliminativizm
• Folk Psikoloji
• Kurguculuk
• Metafor
• Zihin
• Zihinsel Kurguculuk

Kaynakça

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