Russian operational art for attrition in Ukraine

Yıl 2024, , 90 - 128, 30.04.2024

Ali Cenk Çakıroğlu

https://doi.org/10.52792/tws.1467513

Cited By: 1

Öz

Originally intended as a swift regime-change operation by the Russian leadership, the Russo-Ukrainian War has evolved into a prolonged war of attrition. In that sense, this paper reassesses the transformation of the Russian way of warfare during the war through a focus on the battles of Severodonetsk-Lysychansk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and the Ukrainian Summer Offensive. Accordingly, the theoretical underpinnings of Russian strategy, particularly the enduring influence of Soviet-era legacy, are highlighted in the first part. In the second part, this research offers insights into the Russian military praxis during the war by drawing on various sources, including Telegram channels. It is shown that the Russian army has focused on the combined employment of a new reconnaissance-fire system (ROS), reconnaissance-strike system (RUS), infantry assaults, and umbrella of integrated air defence and electronic warfare systems for force protection and attrition during costly offensives like Bakhmut and Avdiivka. Consequently, this paper asserts that the Russian war machine effectively responded to the necessities of attrition warfare by updating its operational art, drawing on the Soviet legacy.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Operational art, attrition warfare, Russo-Ukrainian War, Bakhmut, Avdiivka.

Rusya'nın Ukrayna'da yıpratmaya yönelik harekat sanatı

Öz

Başlangıçta Rus liderliği tarafından hızlı bir rejim değişikliği operasyonu olarak tasarlanan Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı, uzun süreli bir yıpratma savaşına dönüşmüştür. Bu anlamda, bu makale Severodonetsk-Lysychansk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Bakhmut, Avdiivka ve Ukrayna Yaz Taarruzu muharebelerine odaklanarak savaş sırasında Rus savaş tarzının dönüşümünü yeniden değerlendirmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, ilk bölümde Rus stratejisinin teorik temelleri, özellikle de Sovyet dönemi mirasının kalıcı etkisi vurgulanmaktadır. İkinci bölümde ise bu araştırma, Telegram kanalları da dahil olmak üzere çeşitli kaynaklardan yararlanarak savaş sırasında Rus askeri pratiğine dair içgörüler sunmaktadır. Rus ordusunun, Bakhmut ve Avdiivka gibi maliyetli taarruzlar sırasında kuvvet koruma ve yıpratma amacıyla yeni bir keşif-ateş sistemi (ROS), keşif-taarruz sistemi (RUS), piyade taarruzları ve entegre hava savunma ve elektronik harp sistemleri şemsiyesinin birlikte kullanımına odaklandığı gösterilmektedir. Sonuç olarak bu makale, Rus savaş makinesinin Sovyet mirasından yararlanarak harekat sanatını güncellemek suretiyle yıpratma savaşının gerekliliklerine etkin bir şekilde yanıt verdiğini ileri sürmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Operasyonel sanat, yıpratma savaşı, Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı, Bakhmut, Avdiivka.

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