Rare Earth Elements: New Battleground in the US-China Trade War

Abstract

Rare earth elements, the building blocks of modern economies and their strategic importance in global technological infrastructures, have become the new battleground in trade wars. These elements, vital components in the production of everything from green energy technologies to electric vehicles, advanced defense systems to semiconductor technologies, have made supply chains geopolitically strategic. While China has global dominance in the production and processing of rare earth elements, the import dependence of developed economies has made the supply and demand geography extremely asymmetric. In an era of intensifying global leadership competition, the weaponization of these strategically important raw materials in foreign policy has led to an increase in trade measures such as export controls and import restrictions. This study, prepared through the analysis of secondary data, analyzes the dependence on the import of rare earth elements and critical minerals, and trade policies such as export restrictions. Diversification, recycling technologies, and international cooperation have been highlighted as necessary to prevent vulnerabilities in the global trade of rare earth elements.

Keywords

• Rare Earth Element
• Import
• Export
• Trade War

Nadir Toprak Elementleri: ABD-Çin Ticaret Savaşında Yeni Cephe

Öz

Modern ekonomilerin yapı taşı olan ve küresel teknolojik altyapılardaki stratejik önemleri nedeniyle nadir toprak elementleri, günümüzde ticaret savaşlarının yeni cephesi haline gelmiştir. Yeşil enerji teknolojilerinden elektrikli araçlara, gelişmiş savunma sistemlerinden yarı iletken teknolojilerinin üretiminde hayati bileşen olan bu elementler, tedarik zincirlerini jeopolitik açıdan stratejik bir hale getirmiştir. Çin nadir toprak elementlerinin üretiminde ve işlenmesinde küresel hâkimiyete sahipken, gelişmiş ekonomilerin ithalata bağımlı olması arz ve talep coğrafyasını son derece asimetrik hale getirmiştir. Küresel liderlik yarışının şiddetlendiği çağımızda söz konusu stratejik öneme sahip hammaddeler dış politikada da silah olarak kullanılarak ihracat kontrolleri ve ithalat kısıtlamaları gibi ticari önlemlerin artmasına yol açmıştır. İkincil verilerin analizi ile hazırlanan bu çalışmada, nadir toprak elementlerinin ve kritik minerallerin ithalatına olan bağımlılık ve ihracat kısıtlamaları gibi ticaret politikaları analiz edilmiştir. Küresel nadir toprak elementlerinin ticaretindeki kırılganlıkların önlenebilmesi için çeşitlendirme, geri dönüşüm teknolojilerinin ve uluslararası iş birliği gerekliliği ortaya çıkarılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Nadir Toprak Elementleri
• İthalat
• İhracat
• Ticaret Savaşı

Kaynakça

1. Africa Mining. (2025). Power Move: China Seeking Dominance over African Lithium and Cobalt. Retrieved July 26, 2025, from https://www.africamining.co/china-tightens-scrutiny-on-battery-technology-exports/
2. Atkinson, A. B., & Brandolini, A. (2001). Promise and pitfalls in the use of" secondary" data-sets: Income inequality in OECD countries as a case study. Journal of Economic Literature, 39(3), 771–799. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.39.3.771
3. Baskaran, G., & Schwartz, M. (2025). Developing Rare Earth Processing Hubs: An Analytical Approach. Retrieved September 1, 2025, from https://www.csis.org/analysis/developing-rare-earth-processing-hubs-analytical-approach
4. Begert, B. (2024). Move over, EVs. AI needs critical minerals. - POLITICO. Retrieved August 31, 2025, from https://www.politico.com/newsletters/california-climate/2024/05/07/move-over-evs-ai-needs-critical-minerals-00156725
5. Benchmark Mineral Intelligence. (2024). Rise of African rare earths bolsters supply pipeline for China and the West. Retrieved July 26, 2025, from https://source.benchmarkminerals.com/article/rise-of-african-rare-earths-bolsters-supply-pipeline-for-china-and-the-west
6. Bloomberg. (2025). Global Investment in the Energy Transition Exceeded $2 Trillion for the First Time in 2024. Retrieved August 4, 2025, from https://about.bnef.com/insights/finance/global-investment-in-the-energy-transition-exceeded-2-trillion-for-the-first-time-in-2024-according-to-bloombergnef-report/
7. Bradsher, K. (2025). China Halts Critical Rare Earth Exports as Trade War Intensifies - The New York Times. Retrieved August 24, 2025, from https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/13/business/china-rare-earths-exports.html
8. British Geological Survey. (2021). Critical raw materials - MineralsUK. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://www.bgs.ac.uk/mineralsuk/ statistics/security-of-supply/critical-raw-materials/

9. Çevik, V. A. (2024). Ekonomik milliyetçilik ve korumacılık politikalarındaki yükseliş; Küresel Ekonomideki Parçalanma. REFLEKTİF Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 5(2), 535-555. https://doi.org/10.47613/reflektif.2024.178
10. Çevik, V. A. (2024). From Decoupling to De-Risking: A New Era in Trade Between the West and China. Fiscaoeconomia, 8(1), 277–303. https://doi.org/10.25295/fsecon.1381106
11. Chen, W.-Q., Eckelman, M. J., Sprecher, B., Chen, W., & Wang, P. (2024). Interdependence in rare earth element supply between China and the United States helps stabilize global supply chains. One Earth, 7(2), 242–252.
12. Cobalt Institute. (2024). Cobalt Market Report 2024 | Cobalt Institute. Retrieved August 1, 2025, from https://www.cobaltinstitute.org/resource/cobalt-market-report-2024/
13. Dempsey, H., & Lewis, L. (2025). Donald Trump approves Nippon Steel’s $15bn takeover of US Steel. Retrieved August 27, 2025, from https://www.ft.com/content/ab85c9c0-b92a-4349-b165-cf87318ac05b
14. Department of Defense. (2023). Department of Defense Enters an Agreement to Expand Domestic Manufacturing to Strengthen U.S. Supply Chains for Rare Earth Magnets. Retrieved July 27, 2025, from https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3529874/department-of-defense-enters-an-agreement-to-expand-domestic-manufacturing-to-s/
15. Department of Defense. (2024). DOD Looks to Establish “Mine-to-Magnet” Supply Chain for Rare Earth Materials. Retrieved July 27, 2025, from https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3700059/dod-looks-to-establish-mine-to-magnet-supply-chain-for-rare-earth-materials/
16. Department of Energy. (2020). Energy Act of 2020. Retrieved September 3, 2025, from https://www.directives.doe.gov/ipt_members_area/doe-o-436-1-departmental-sustainability-ipt/background-documents/energy-act-of-2020
17. Ellram, L. M., & Tate, W. L. (2016). The use of secondary data in purchasing and supply management (P/SM) research. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, 22(4), 250–254.
18. European Commission. (2023). Critical Raw Materials Act - European Commission. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/critical-raw-materials/critical-raw-materials-act_en
19. Farrell, H., & Newman, A. (2025). The Weaponized World Economy: Surviving the New Age of Economic Coercion. Foreign Affairs, 104(5).
20. G7/G20 Documents Database. (2025). G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan (17/06/2025) - G7/G20 Documents Database. Retrieved August 27, 2025, from https://g7g20-documents.org/database/document/2025-g7-canada-leaders-leaders-language-g7-critical-minerals-action-plan
21. Ge, J., Wang, X., Guan, Q., Li, W., Zhu, H., & Yao, M. (2016). World rare earths trade network: Patterns, relations and role characteristics. Resources Policy, 50, 119–130.
22. Hiar, C., & Northey, H. (2025). Greenland’s riches have enticed US leaders for generations. Retrieved July 25, 2025, from https://www.eenews.net/articles/greenlands-riches-have-enticed-us-leaders-for-generations/
23. Howley, D. (2021). These 169 industries are being hit by the global chip shortage. Retrieved August 24, 2025, from https://finance.yahoo.com/news/these-industries-are-hit-hardest-by-the-global-chip-shortage-122854251.html
24. Hurst, C. (2010). China’s rare earth elements industry: what can the west learn? Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS)
25. IEA. (2021a). Minerals used in electric cars compared to conventional cars. Retrieved July 27, 2025, from https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/minerals-used-in-electric-cars-compared-to-conventional-cars
26. IEA. (2021b). Net Zero by 2050 – Analysis - IEA. Retrieved August 30, 2025, from https://www.iea.org/reports/net-zero-by-2050
27. IEA. (2022). Executive summary – Solar PV Global Supply Chains – Analysis - IEA. Retrieved August 24, 2025, from https://www.iea.org/reports/solar-pv-global-supply-chains/executive-summary
28. IEA. (2024). Renewable electricity capacity additions by technology and segment, 2016-2028. Retrieved August 30, 2025, from https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/renewable-electricity-capacity-additions-by-technology-and-segment-2016-2028
29. IEA. (2025a). Critical Minerals Policy Tracker – Data Tools - IEA. Retrieved August 1, 2025, from https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/critical-minerals-policy-tracker
30. IEA. (2025b). Energy and AI – Analysis - IEA. Retrieved August 31, 2025, from https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-and-ai
31. IEA. (2025c). Geographical distribution of refined material production for key minerals in the base case. Retrieved July 29, 2025, from https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/geographical-distribution-of-refined-material-production-for-key-minerals-in-the-base-case
32. IEA. (2025d). Trends in electric car markets – Global EV Outlook 2025. Retrieved July 30, 2025, from https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2025/trends-in-electric-car-markets-2
33. Ip, G. (2025). The U.S. Marches Toward State Capitalism With American Characteristics. Retrieved August 27, 2025, from https://www.wsj.com/ economy/the-u-s-marches-toward-state-capitalism with-american -characteristics-f75cafa8?mod=author_content_page_1_pos_6
34. IUPAC. (2005). Nomenclature of Inorganic Chemistry (IUPAC Recommendations 2005). Retrieved August 1, 2025, from https://old.iupac.org/publications/books/rbook/Red_Book_2005.pdf
35. IUPAC. (2025). International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry. Retrieved August 3, 2025, from https://iupac.org/
36. Johnston, M. P. (2014). Secondary data analysis: A method of which the time has come. Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Libraries, 3(3), 619–626.
37. Kakaes, K. (2016). The All-American iPhone | MIT Technology Review. Retrieved July 29, 2025, from https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/06/09/159456/the-all-american-iphone/
38. Kedrosky, P. (2025a). Honey, AI Capex is Eating the Economy. Retrieved August 4, 2025, from https://paulkedrosky.com/honey-ai-capex-ate-the-economy/
39. Kedrosky, P. (2025b). Honey, AI Capex Keeps Eating ... Everything. Retrieved August 23, 2025, from https://paulkedrosky.com/honey-ai-capex-keeps-eating-everything/
40. Leith, C. K. (1938). Mineral resources and peace. Foreign Aff., 16, 515.
41. Levkowitz, L., & Beauchamp-Mustafaga, N. (2010). China’s rare earths industry and its role in the international market. US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
42. McCormick, M., & Fontanella-Khan, J. (2025). Dirigiste-in chief: Trump opens the door to ‘state-run capitalism.’ Retrieved August 27, 2025, from https://www.ft.com/content/0e7b6d49-446a-4ed7-a523-477e04aff771
43. McKinsey. (2022). The net-zero transition: Its cost and benefits. Retrieved August 30, 2025, from https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/sustainability/our-insights/the-net-zero-transition-what-it-would-cost-what-it-could-bring
44. McKinsey. (2024). Data centers and AI: How the energy sector can meet power demand Retrieved August 23, 2025, from https://www.mckinsey.com/ industries/private-capital/our-insights/how-data-centers-and-the-energy-sector-can-sate-ais-hunger-for-power
45. McMorrow, R., & Liu, N. (2025). China won the rare earths race. Can it stay on top? Retrieved August 30, 2025, from https://www.ft.com/content /045bf600-a89d-4dda-b63b-0a88024b80a4?utm_source=chatgpt.com
46. Mims, C. (2025). Silicon Valley’s New Strategy: Move Slow and Build Things Retrieved August 4, 2025, from https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/silicon-valley-ai-infrastructure-capex-cffe0431
47. Nayar, J. (2021). Not So “Green” Technology: The Complicated Legacy of Rare Earth Mining. Retrieved September 1, 2025, from https://hir.harvard.edu/not-so-green-technology-the-complicated-legacy-of-rare-earth-mining/
48. Nyabiage, J. (2025). China-Africa trade makes ‘moderate’ gains despite US tariffs, currency weakness. Retrieved July 26, 2025, from https://www.scmp.com/news/us/diplomacy/article/3307305/moderate-china-africa-trade-growth-seen-win-given-us-tariffs-currency-weakness
49. OECD (2025), OECD Inventory of Export Restrictions on Industrial Raw Materials 2025: Monitoring the Use of Export Restrictions Amid Growing Market and Policy Tensions, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/facc714b-en.
50. Otts, C. (2025). Ford Still Scrambling to Get Rare-Earth Magnets, Retrieved August 26, 2025, from https://www.wsj.com/business/autos/ford-still-scrambling-to-get-rare-earth-magnets-2bc0aee6
51. Pehrson, E. W. (1945). Our Mineral Resources and Security. Foreign Aff., 23, 644.
52. Salim, H., Sahin, O., Elsawah, S., Turan, H., & Stewart, R. A. (2022). A critical review on tackling complex rare earth supply security problem. Resources Policy, 77, 102697.
53. SFA Oxford. (n.d.). Critical Minerals in Artificial Intelligence. Retrieved August 31, 2025, from https://www.sfa-oxford.com/knowledge-and-insights/critical-minerals-in-low-carbon-and-future-technologies/critical-minerals-in-artificial-intelligence/
54. Stacciarini, J. H. S., & Gonçalves, R. J. de A. F. (2025). Data Centers, Critical Minerals, Energy, and Geopolitics: The Foundations of Artificial Intelligence. Center for Open Science.
55. Stanford University. (2025). The 2025 AI Index Report. Retrieved August 4, 2025, from https://hai.stanford.edu/ai-index/2025-ai-index-report
56. Taylor-Vaisey, N. (2025). Trump’s annexation fixation is no joke, Trudeau warns - POLITICO. Retrieved August 26, 2025, from https://www.politico.com/news/2025/02/07/canada-trudeau-trump-51-state-00203156
57. The Census Bureau. (2025). Construction Spending - Historical Data. Retrieved August 4, 2025, from https://www.census.gov/construction/c30/historical_data.html
58. The Economist. (2011). Rare action. Retrieved September 6, 2025, from https://www.economist.com/business/2011/01/20/rare-action
59. The Economist. (2025a). America has just tried to grab Ukraine’s vast mineral wealth. Retrieved July 25, 2025, from https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/02/16/america-has-just-tried-to-grab-ukraines-vast-mineral-wealth
60. The Economist. (2025b). America throws big money at a small rare-earths mine. Retrieved July 26, 2025, from https://www.economist.com/business/2025/07/17/america-throws-big-money-at-a-small-rare-earths-mine
61. Tripp Mickle. (2025). Nvidia Becomes First Public Company Worth $4 Trillion - The New York Times. Retrieved August 31, 2025, from https://www.nytimes.com/2025/07/10/technology/nvidia-4-trillion-market-value.html
62. U.S. Department of State. (2025). Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the American Compass Fifth Anniversary Gala. Retrieved August 29, 2025, from https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/06/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-at-the-american-compass-fifth-anniversary-gala
63. U.S. Geological Survey. (2022). U.S. Geological Survey Releases 2022 List of Critical Minerals. Retrieved August 1, 2025, from https://www.usgs.gov/news/national-news-release/us-geological-survey-releases-2022-list-critical-minerals
64. U.S. Geological Survey. (2025a). Mineral commodity summaries 2025. Retrieved July 29, 2025, from https://pubs.usgs.gov/publication/mcs2025
65. U.S. Geological Survey. (2025b). Rare Earths Statistics and Information, Retrieved August 1, 2025, from https://www.usgs.gov/centers/national-minerals-information-center/rare-earths-statistics-and-information
66. Ukraine Government Portal. (2025). Agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of the United States of America. Retrieved July 25, 2025, from https://www.kmu.gov.ua/storage /app/uploads/public/ 681/33c/e8f/68133ce8f2e82842702204.pdf
67. UN. (2015). Net Zero Coalition | United Nations. Retrieved September 10, 2025, from https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/net-zero-coalition
68. UNCTAD. (2024). Powering trade: Fine-tuning trade policy for solar and wind energy value chains (Graphic summary).
69. United Nations. (2024). Secretary-General’s special address on climate action “A Moment of Truth.” Retrieved August 30, 2025, from https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/secretary-general/speeches/2024-06-05
70. von der Leyen, U. (2025). Statement by President von der Leyen at Session II - working lunch of the G7. Retrieved July 27, 2025, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/statement_25_1522
71. Ward, H. (2009). Resource nationalism and sustainable development: a primer and key issues. International Institute for Environmental Development, 1–58.
72. Way, R., Ives, M. C., Mealy, P., & Farmer, J. D. (2022). Empirically grounded technology forecasts and the energy transition. Joule, 6(9), 2057–2082.
73. White House. (2023). Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on Renewing American Economic Leadership at the Brookings Institution. Retrieved August 24, 2025, from https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2023/04/27/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-renewing-american-economic-leadership-at-the-brookings-institution/
74. Winkler, R., Rattner, N., & Herrera, S. (2025). Big Tech’s $400 Billion AI Spending Spree Just Got Wall Street’s Blessing - WSJ. Retrieved August 4, 2025, from https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/tech-ai-spending-company-valuations-7b92104b?mod=hp_lead_pos3
75. WTO. (2024). High demand for energy-related critical minerals creates supply chain pressures. Retrieved July 29, 2025, from https://www.wto.org/english/blogs_e/data_blog_e/blog_dta_10jan24_e.htm
76. Xinhua. (2019). Xi Jinping makes inspection tour in Jiangxi. Retrieved August 30, 2025, from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/20/c_138074674.htm
77. Yang, F. W. (2025). Rare Earth and Resource Nationalism: What Happened Before and After China’s Embargo on Japan?. Journal of Contemporary China, 34(153), 383–400.