Ortak Yönetim Kurulu Üyeliği ile Firma Performansı Arasındaki İlişkide Yönetim Kurulu Çeşitliliğinin Moderatör Etkisi

Yıl 2023, , 177 - 206, 04.10.2023

Ramazan Koçoğlu , Kader Şahin

https://doi.org/10.20979/ueyd.1288214

Öz

Bu araştırmanın amacı, ortak yönetim kurulu üyeliği ile firma performansı arasındaki ilişkide, yönetim kurulu çeşitliliğinin moderatör etkisini ortaya koymaktır. Bu çalışmada, BİST 100 endeksinde işlem gören ve finansal olmayan işletmelere odaklanılmıştır. Çalışmanın örneklemi 49 işletmeden oluşmaktadır ve kapsamı ise 2014-2019 yılları arasıdır. Bu yıllar arasında elde edilen verilerin analizi için panel EKK modeli kullanılmıştır. Ortak yönetim kurulu üyeliklerinin performans üzerinde doğrudan bir etkisi tespit edilememiştir. Aileden ortak yönetim kurulu üyeliği ve kurul meşguliyeti performansı olumsuz yönde etkilemektedir. Kurul çeşitliliğinin ortak yönetim kurulu üyelikleri ve performans arasındaki ilişkiyi olumlu yönde etkileyeceği varsayımı destek görmemiştir. Araştırmanın sonuçları, Türkiye bağlamında kaynak bağımlılığı teorisinden ziyade vekâlet teorisine destek sağlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Finansal Performans, Ortak Yönetim Kurulu Üyeliği, Yönetim Kurulu Çeşitliliği

The Moderator Effect of Board Diversıty on the Relationship Interlocking Directors and Firm Performance

Öz

The aim of this research is to examine the moderator effect of board diversity on interlocking directors and firm performance relation. In this study, focused on non-financial businesses traded in the BIST 100 index. The sample of the study consists of 49 businesses and its scope is between 2014-2019. For the analysis of the data obtained between these years, the panel EKK model was used. No direct impact of interlocking directorships on performance has been identified. It was concluded that interlocking directors from the family and board busyness reduced performance. The assumption that board diversity would positively improve the relationship between interlocking directorship and performance was not supported. The results of the research provide support for the agency theory rather than the resource dependency theory in the context of Turkey.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Financial Performance, Interlocking Directors, Board Diversity

Kaynakça

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