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Introducing the Response to Sponsorship Dataset: Determinants of Responses by Target States to State Sponsors of Rebel Groups

Yıl 2024, Erken Görünüm, 1 - 20
https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.1601889

Öz

Empirical studies on the sponsorship of rebel groups have focused on understanding why and how supporter states help rebels, whether this engagement benefits the rebels, and the effects of sponsorship on the conflict outcomes. By comparison, the responses of target states to sponsorship behavior have been neglected despite the possibility of interstate crises, disputes, and conflict due to the sponsorship. This study introduces a new dataset, the Response Sponsorship Dataset (RSD), which measures target states’ responses toward state sponsors of rebel groups intending to terminate the sponsorship. The data includes information on the responses of 58 target states to 102 supporter states concerning the support of 150 rebel groups between 1991 and 2010, comprising 3719 observations. The RSD identifies diplomatic, economic, militarized, domestic, covert responses and inaction as target state responses as well as classifying them as coercive or non-coercive based on target states’ foreign policy engagements with sponsors. The RSD provides new opportunities for researchers and policymakers to analyze target responses with regards to conflict management and foreign policy as well as promising future research on support termination.

Kaynakça

  • Arıöz, Zeynep, and Derya Topdağ. 2024. Fragile States and Aid Allocation for Sub-Saharan African Countries: An Empirical Research. Uluslararası İlişkiler 21, 81: 45-59.
  • Aronson, Jacob, Paul Huth, Mark Lichbach, and Kiyoung Chang. 2015. How Rebels Win and (Why They Lose). https://www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/speri/files/9314/5294/8814/Paul_Huth_-_how_rebels_win_11_26_15.pdf. (accessed May 9, 2023).
  • Bapat, Navin, Luis De La Calle, Kaisa H. Hinkkainen, and Elena V. McLean. 2015. Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrrorism, and the Incentive to Misinterpret. The Journal of Politics 78, 1: 249-264.
  • Boyle, Michael J. 2008. The War on Terror in American Grand Strategy. International Affairs 84, 2: 191-209.
  • Byman, Daniel. 2005. Passive Sponsors of Terrorism. Survival 47, 4:117-144.
  • Byman, Daniel. 2007. Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
  • Byman, Daniel. 2020. Understanding, and Misunderstanding, State Sponsorship of Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 45,12: 1031-49.
  • Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan.
  • 2001. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
  • Carter, David B. 2012. A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups. International Organization 66, 1: 129-151.
  • Carter, David B., and Saurabh Pant. 2019. Terrorism and State Sponsorship in World Politics. In The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism, ed. Erica Chenoweth et al. Oxford Academic.
  • Carter, Brittnee, Maya Van Nuys, and Cagil Albayrak. 2020. States Sponsorship of Religiously Motivated Terrorism: A Deadly Combination. Democracy and Security 17, 2 : 181-209.
  • Collins, Stephen D. 2004. Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? (An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against Libya). Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27, 1: 1-18.
  • Collins, Stephen D. 2014. State-sponsored Terrorism. Politics & Policy 42: 131-159.
  • Crescenzi, Mark, Rebecca H. Best, and Bo Ram Kwon. 2018. Reciprocity in International Studies. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies.
  • Cunningham, David E. 2010. Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars. Journal of Peace Research 47, 2: 115-127.
  • The East African. 2005. Arms and Military Affairs; DRC And Uganda Army to Destroy Rebel Camps". Africa News. February 21.
  • Golubev, Denis S., and Irina A. Antonova. 2019. Internationalization of Armed Conflict Dataset: Codebook & Description. https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/15402/4/Codebook__Internationalization_of_armed_conflicts_ENG.pdf. (accessed December 12, 2023).
  • Goede, Marieke De. 2008. The Politics of Preemption and The War on Terror in Europe. European Journal of International Relations 14, 1: 161-185.
  • Hussain, Z. 2003. India sets up hotlines for rebels as Bhutan troops in "hot pursuit". Agence France Presse -- English. December 23.
  • Agence France Presse – English. 2000. India to impose anti-guerrilla night border curfew. December 4.
  • Indo-Asian News Service. 2006. India begins supplying Myanmar military hardware. October 4.
  • Indo-Asian News Service. 2010. Bangladesh crackdown puts pressure on ULFA chief. December 27.
  • Iran News Agency. 2003. Bhutan launches military crackdown on Indian. IRNA. December 16.
  • Jenkins, Brian M. 1990. “International Terrorism: The Other World War”. In International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, and Controls, ed. Charles W. Kegley, New York: St. Martin's Press: 27-38.
  • Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 2010. Jordan receives 17 passports of flotilla activists from Israel. June 8.
  • Karlén, Niklas. 2017. Turning off the Taps: The Termination of State Sponsorship. Terrorism and Political Violence 31,4: 733-58.
  • Karlén, Niklas and Vladimir Rauta. 2023. Dealers and Brokers in Civil Wars: Why States Delegate Rebel Support to Conduit Countries. International Security 47, 4: 107-146.
  • Niklas Karlén, Vladimir Rauta, Idean Salehyan, Andrew Mumford, Belgin San-Akca, Alexandra Stark, Michel Wyss, Assaf Moghadam, Allard Duursma, Henning Tamm, Erin K Jenne, Milos Popovic, David
  • S Siroky, Vanessa Meier, Alexandra Chinchilla, Kit Rickard, and Giuseppe Spatafora. 2021. Forum: Conflict Delegation in Civil Wars. International Studies Review 23, 4: 2048–2078.
  • Keels, Eric, Jay Benson, and Michael Widmeier. 2021. Teaching From Experience: Foreign Training and Rebel Success in Civil War. Conflict Management and Peace Science 38, 6: 696-717.
  • Khan, Akbar, and Han Zhaoying. 2020. Conflict Escalation in the Middle East Revisited: Thinking Through Interstate Rivalries and State-sponsored Terrorism. Israel Affairs 26, 2: 242-256.
  • Kınay Kılıç, Latife. 2024. Replication data for: Introducing the Response to Sponsorship Dataset: Determinants of Responses by Target states to State Sponsors of Rebel Groups”, Harvard Dataverse, V1, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/XNU8NO (accessed November 18, 2024)
  • Leng, Russell J., and Hung G. Wheeler. 1979. Influence Strategies, Success, and War. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, 4: 655–684.
  • Li, Quan, and Drew Schaub. 2004. Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, 2: 230-258.
  • Agence France Presse -- English. 2009. Mali army attacks Al-Qaeda base: security sources. June 16.
  • Maoz, Zeev, and Belgin San-Akca. 2012. Rivalry and State Support of Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs), 1946-2001. International Studies Quarterly 56, 4: 720-34.
  • Mehmetcik, Hakan, Melih Koluk, and Galip Yuksel. 2022. Perceptions of Turkey in the US Congress: A Twitter Data Analysis. Uluslararası İlişkiler 19, 76: 69-89.
  • Meier, Vanessa, Niklas Karlén, Therese Pettersson, and Mihai Croicu. 2023. External Support in Armed Conflict: Introducing the UCDP External Support Dataset (ESD), 1975-2017. Journal of Peace Research 60, 3: 545-554.
  • Paye-Layhey, J. 2001. Liberia imposes 120-day diamond ban. Associated Press International. March 7.
  • Reliefweb. 1997. Background in the current situation in Angola. https://reliefweb.int/report/angola/background-current-situation-angola (accessed February 1, 2024).
  • Qiu, Xiaoyan. 2022. State Support for Rebels and Interstate Bargaining. American Journal of Political Science 66: 993-1007.
  • Rauta, Vladimir. 2020. Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict: Take Two. The RUSI Journal 165,2: 1-10.
  • Rubin, Michael. 2010. “Counterterrorism Strategies: Do We Need Bomb over Bridges?”. In Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses, ed. Stuart Gottlieb. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
  • Salehyan, Idean. 2008. No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict. The Journal of Politics 70, 1: 54-66.
  • Salehyan, Idean. 2010. The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, 3: 493–515.
  • Salehyan, Idean, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, David E. Cunningham. 2011. Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups. International Organization 65, 4: 709–744.
  • San-Akca, Belgin. 2016. States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Sawyer, Katherine, Kathleen G. Cunningham, and William Reed. 2017. The Role of External Support in Civil War Termination. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, 6: 1174-1202.
  • Sayrs, Lois W. 1992. The Effect of Provocation on Foreign Policy Response: A Test of the
  • Matching Hypothesis. International Interactions 18, 2: 85-100.
  • Schultz, Kenneth A. 2010. The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars. International Organization 64, 2: 281–312.
  • Slantchev, Branislav. 2003. The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States. The American Political Science Review 97, 1: 123-133.
  • Slantchev, Branislav. 2005. Military Coercion in Interstate Crises. The American Political Science Review 99, 4: 533-547.
  • Tamm, Henning. 2016. Rebel Leaders, Internal Rivals, and External Resources: How State Sponsors Affect Insurgent Cohesion. International Studies Quarterly 60, 4: 599–610.
  • Agence France Presse -- English. 1998. Turkey says Syria must stop supporting PKK "terrorism". October 12.
  • Vuksanovic, Vuk. 2023. So Similar, Yet So Different: Russia and Turkey in the Western Balkans- The Case of Serbia. Uluslararası İlişkiler 20, 79: 105-122.
  • Waisberg, Tatiana. 2009. The Colombia–Ecuador Armed Crisis of March 2008: The Practice of Targeted Killing and Incursions against Non-State Actors Harbored at Terrorist Safe Havens in a Third Party State. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, 6: 476-488.
  • White House. 2003. Progress Report on the War on Terrorism. September. https://web.archive.org/web/20090206080007/https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/24268.pdf. (accessed September 13, 2023).
  • Wilkinson, Paul. 1986. “Fighting the Hydra: International Terrorism and the Rule of Law”. In Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution, ed. Noel O’Sullivan, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books: 205-224.
  • Wilner, Alex. 2018. The Dark Side of Extended Deterrence:Thinking through the State Sponsorship of Terrorism. Journal of Strategic Studies 41, 3: 410-437.

Introducing the Response to Sponsorship Dataset: Determinants of Responses by Target States to State Sponsors of Rebel Groups

Yıl 2024, Erken Görünüm, 1 - 20
https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.1601889

Öz

Empirical studies on the sponsorship of rebel groups have focused on understanding why and how supporter states help rebels, whether this engagement benefits the rebels, and the effects of sponsorship on the conflict outcomes. By comparison, the responses of target states to sponsorship behavior have been neglected despite the possibility of interstate crises, disputes, and conflict due to the sponsorship. This study introduces a new dataset, the Response Sponsorship Dataset (RSD), which measures target states’ responses toward state sponsors of rebel groups intending to terminate the sponsorship. The data includes information on the responses of 58 target states to 102 supporter states concerning the support of 150 rebel groups between 1991 and 2010, comprising 3719 observations. The RSD identifies diplomatic, economic, militarized, domestic, covert responses and inaction as target state responses as well as classifying them as coercive or non-coercive based on target states’ foreign policy engagements with sponsors. The RSD provides new opportunities for researchers and policymakers to analyze target responses with regards to conflict management and foreign policy as well as promising future research on support termination.

Kaynakça

  • Arıöz, Zeynep, and Derya Topdağ. 2024. Fragile States and Aid Allocation for Sub-Saharan African Countries: An Empirical Research. Uluslararası İlişkiler 21, 81: 45-59.
  • Aronson, Jacob, Paul Huth, Mark Lichbach, and Kiyoung Chang. 2015. How Rebels Win and (Why They Lose). https://www.unige.ch/sciences-societe/speri/files/9314/5294/8814/Paul_Huth_-_how_rebels_win_11_26_15.pdf. (accessed May 9, 2023).
  • Bapat, Navin, Luis De La Calle, Kaisa H. Hinkkainen, and Elena V. McLean. 2015. Economic Sanctions, Transnational Terrrorism, and the Incentive to Misinterpret. The Journal of Politics 78, 1: 249-264.
  • Boyle, Michael J. 2008. The War on Terror in American Grand Strategy. International Affairs 84, 2: 191-209.
  • Byman, Daniel. 2005. Passive Sponsors of Terrorism. Survival 47, 4:117-144.
  • Byman, Daniel. 2007. Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
  • Byman, Daniel. 2020. Understanding, and Misunderstanding, State Sponsorship of Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 45,12: 1031-49.
  • Byman, Daniel, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan.
  • 2001. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
  • Carter, David B. 2012. A Blessing or a Curse? State Support for Terrorist Groups. International Organization 66, 1: 129-151.
  • Carter, David B., and Saurabh Pant. 2019. Terrorism and State Sponsorship in World Politics. In The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism, ed. Erica Chenoweth et al. Oxford Academic.
  • Carter, Brittnee, Maya Van Nuys, and Cagil Albayrak. 2020. States Sponsorship of Religiously Motivated Terrorism: A Deadly Combination. Democracy and Security 17, 2 : 181-209.
  • Collins, Stephen D. 2004. Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? (An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed Against Libya). Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27, 1: 1-18.
  • Collins, Stephen D. 2014. State-sponsored Terrorism. Politics & Policy 42: 131-159.
  • Crescenzi, Mark, Rebecca H. Best, and Bo Ram Kwon. 2018. Reciprocity in International Studies. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies.
  • Cunningham, David E. 2010. Blocking Resolution: How External States Can Prolong Civil Wars. Journal of Peace Research 47, 2: 115-127.
  • The East African. 2005. Arms and Military Affairs; DRC And Uganda Army to Destroy Rebel Camps". Africa News. February 21.
  • Golubev, Denis S., and Irina A. Antonova. 2019. Internationalization of Armed Conflict Dataset: Codebook & Description. https://dspace.spbu.ru/bitstream/11701/15402/4/Codebook__Internationalization_of_armed_conflicts_ENG.pdf. (accessed December 12, 2023).
  • Goede, Marieke De. 2008. The Politics of Preemption and The War on Terror in Europe. European Journal of International Relations 14, 1: 161-185.
  • Hussain, Z. 2003. India sets up hotlines for rebels as Bhutan troops in "hot pursuit". Agence France Presse -- English. December 23.
  • Agence France Presse – English. 2000. India to impose anti-guerrilla night border curfew. December 4.
  • Indo-Asian News Service. 2006. India begins supplying Myanmar military hardware. October 4.
  • Indo-Asian News Service. 2010. Bangladesh crackdown puts pressure on ULFA chief. December 27.
  • Iran News Agency. 2003. Bhutan launches military crackdown on Indian. IRNA. December 16.
  • Jenkins, Brian M. 1990. “International Terrorism: The Other World War”. In International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, and Controls, ed. Charles W. Kegley, New York: St. Martin's Press: 27-38.
  • Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 2010. Jordan receives 17 passports of flotilla activists from Israel. June 8.
  • Karlén, Niklas. 2017. Turning off the Taps: The Termination of State Sponsorship. Terrorism and Political Violence 31,4: 733-58.
  • Karlén, Niklas and Vladimir Rauta. 2023. Dealers and Brokers in Civil Wars: Why States Delegate Rebel Support to Conduit Countries. International Security 47, 4: 107-146.
  • Niklas Karlén, Vladimir Rauta, Idean Salehyan, Andrew Mumford, Belgin San-Akca, Alexandra Stark, Michel Wyss, Assaf Moghadam, Allard Duursma, Henning Tamm, Erin K Jenne, Milos Popovic, David
  • S Siroky, Vanessa Meier, Alexandra Chinchilla, Kit Rickard, and Giuseppe Spatafora. 2021. Forum: Conflict Delegation in Civil Wars. International Studies Review 23, 4: 2048–2078.
  • Keels, Eric, Jay Benson, and Michael Widmeier. 2021. Teaching From Experience: Foreign Training and Rebel Success in Civil War. Conflict Management and Peace Science 38, 6: 696-717.
  • Khan, Akbar, and Han Zhaoying. 2020. Conflict Escalation in the Middle East Revisited: Thinking Through Interstate Rivalries and State-sponsored Terrorism. Israel Affairs 26, 2: 242-256.
  • Kınay Kılıç, Latife. 2024. Replication data for: Introducing the Response to Sponsorship Dataset: Determinants of Responses by Target states to State Sponsors of Rebel Groups”, Harvard Dataverse, V1, https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/XNU8NO (accessed November 18, 2024)
  • Leng, Russell J., and Hung G. Wheeler. 1979. Influence Strategies, Success, and War. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, 4: 655–684.
  • Li, Quan, and Drew Schaub. 2004. Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, 2: 230-258.
  • Agence France Presse -- English. 2009. Mali army attacks Al-Qaeda base: security sources. June 16.
  • Maoz, Zeev, and Belgin San-Akca. 2012. Rivalry and State Support of Non-State Armed Groups (NAGs), 1946-2001. International Studies Quarterly 56, 4: 720-34.
  • Mehmetcik, Hakan, Melih Koluk, and Galip Yuksel. 2022. Perceptions of Turkey in the US Congress: A Twitter Data Analysis. Uluslararası İlişkiler 19, 76: 69-89.
  • Meier, Vanessa, Niklas Karlén, Therese Pettersson, and Mihai Croicu. 2023. External Support in Armed Conflict: Introducing the UCDP External Support Dataset (ESD), 1975-2017. Journal of Peace Research 60, 3: 545-554.
  • Paye-Layhey, J. 2001. Liberia imposes 120-day diamond ban. Associated Press International. March 7.
  • Reliefweb. 1997. Background in the current situation in Angola. https://reliefweb.int/report/angola/background-current-situation-angola (accessed February 1, 2024).
  • Qiu, Xiaoyan. 2022. State Support for Rebels and Interstate Bargaining. American Journal of Political Science 66: 993-1007.
  • Rauta, Vladimir. 2020. Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict: Take Two. The RUSI Journal 165,2: 1-10.
  • Rubin, Michael. 2010. “Counterterrorism Strategies: Do We Need Bomb over Bridges?”. In Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on Causes, Contexts, and Responses, ed. Stuart Gottlieb. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
  • Salehyan, Idean. 2008. No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict. The Journal of Politics 70, 1: 54-66.
  • Salehyan, Idean. 2010. The Delegation of War to Rebel Organizations. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, 3: 493–515.
  • Salehyan, Idean, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, David E. Cunningham. 2011. Explaining External Support for Insurgent Groups. International Organization 65, 4: 709–744.
  • San-Akca, Belgin. 2016. States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Sawyer, Katherine, Kathleen G. Cunningham, and William Reed. 2017. The Role of External Support in Civil War Termination. The Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, 6: 1174-1202.
  • Sayrs, Lois W. 1992. The Effect of Provocation on Foreign Policy Response: A Test of the
  • Matching Hypothesis. International Interactions 18, 2: 85-100.
  • Schultz, Kenneth A. 2010. The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars. International Organization 64, 2: 281–312.
  • Slantchev, Branislav. 2003. The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States. The American Political Science Review 97, 1: 123-133.
  • Slantchev, Branislav. 2005. Military Coercion in Interstate Crises. The American Political Science Review 99, 4: 533-547.
  • Tamm, Henning. 2016. Rebel Leaders, Internal Rivals, and External Resources: How State Sponsors Affect Insurgent Cohesion. International Studies Quarterly 60, 4: 599–610.
  • Agence France Presse -- English. 1998. Turkey says Syria must stop supporting PKK "terrorism". October 12.
  • Vuksanovic, Vuk. 2023. So Similar, Yet So Different: Russia and Turkey in the Western Balkans- The Case of Serbia. Uluslararası İlişkiler 20, 79: 105-122.
  • Waisberg, Tatiana. 2009. The Colombia–Ecuador Armed Crisis of March 2008: The Practice of Targeted Killing and Incursions against Non-State Actors Harbored at Terrorist Safe Havens in a Third Party State. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32, 6: 476-488.
  • White House. 2003. Progress Report on the War on Terrorism. September. https://web.archive.org/web/20090206080007/https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/24268.pdf. (accessed September 13, 2023).
  • Wilkinson, Paul. 1986. “Fighting the Hydra: International Terrorism and the Rule of Law”. In Terrorism, Ideology and Revolution, ed. Noel O’Sullivan, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books: 205-224.
  • Wilner, Alex. 2018. The Dark Side of Extended Deterrence:Thinking through the State Sponsorship of Terrorism. Journal of Strategic Studies 41, 3: 410-437.
Toplam 61 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil İngilizce
Konular Uluslararası Güvenlik, Uluslararası İlişkilerde Uyuşmazlık Çözümü
Bölüm Araştırma Makalesi
Yazarlar

Latife Kınay Kılıç 0000-0002-8756-5076

Erken Görünüm Tarihi 29 Aralık 2024
Yayımlanma Tarihi
Gönderilme Tarihi 25 Ocak 2024
Kabul Tarihi 9 Aralık 2024
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2024 Erken Görünüm

Kaynak Göster

APA Kınay Kılıç, L. (2024). Introducing the Response to Sponsorship Dataset: Determinants of Responses by Target States to State Sponsors of Rebel Groups. Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi1-20. https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.1601889
AMA Kınay Kılıç L. Introducing the Response to Sponsorship Dataset: Determinants of Responses by Target States to State Sponsors of Rebel Groups. uidergisi. Published online 01 Aralık 2024:1-20. doi:10.33458/uidergisi.1601889
Chicago Kınay Kılıç, Latife. “Introducing the Response to Sponsorship Dataset: Determinants of Responses by Target States to State Sponsors of Rebel Groups”. Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi, Aralık (Aralık 2024), 1-20. https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.1601889.
EndNote Kınay Kılıç L (01 Aralık 2024) Introducing the Response to Sponsorship Dataset: Determinants of Responses by Target States to State Sponsors of Rebel Groups. Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi 1–20.
IEEE L. Kınay Kılıç, “Introducing the Response to Sponsorship Dataset: Determinants of Responses by Target States to State Sponsors of Rebel Groups”, uidergisi, ss. 1–20, Aralık 2024, doi: 10.33458/uidergisi.1601889.
ISNAD Kınay Kılıç, Latife. “Introducing the Response to Sponsorship Dataset: Determinants of Responses by Target States to State Sponsors of Rebel Groups”. Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi. Aralık 2024. 1-20. https://doi.org/10.33458/uidergisi.1601889.
JAMA Kınay Kılıç L. Introducing the Response to Sponsorship Dataset: Determinants of Responses by Target States to State Sponsors of Rebel Groups. uidergisi. 2024;:1–20.
MLA Kınay Kılıç, Latife. “Introducing the Response to Sponsorship Dataset: Determinants of Responses by Target States to State Sponsors of Rebel Groups”. Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi, 2024, ss. 1-20, doi:10.33458/uidergisi.1601889.
Vancouver Kınay Kılıç L. Introducing the Response to Sponsorship Dataset: Determinants of Responses by Target States to State Sponsors of Rebel Groups. uidergisi. 2024:1-20.