AUDIT QUALITY AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY

Yıl 2019, , 67 - 78, 09.04.2019

Ahmet Ozcan

https://doi.org/10.18092/ulikidince.464537

Cited By: 4

Öz

Earnings management is
one of the controversial issues in the current business environment. The value
relevance of earnings is adversely influenced by earnings management. The
objective of this study is to analyze the association between audit quality and
earnings management for non-financial firms quoted on Borsa Istanbul. Ordinary
least square regression analysis is employed in this study in analyzing the association
between earnings management and audit quality. Three different proxies for
audit quality (auditor independence, audit industry specialization and auditor
tenure) were analyzed based on a sample of 97 non-financial firms quoted on
Borsa Istanbul from 2013 to 2018. Empirical analysis indicates that auditor
independence and audit industry specialization are significantly negatively related
with likelihood of earnings management and long-term auditor and client
relationship enables the management of firms to more actively engage in
earnings management. This paper finds support for the notion that the
high-quality audit is one of the prominent factors that can mitigate earnings
management practices.   

Anahtar Kelimeler

Audit Quality, Earnings Management, Financial Reporting

AUDIT QUALITY AND EARNINGS MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY

Öz

Kazanç yönetimi iş
dünyasında en fazla tartışılan konular arasındadır. Kazançların değer
ilgililiği kazanç yönetiminden olumsuz olarak etkilenmektedir. Bu çalışmanın
amacı, denetim kalitesi ve kazanç yönetimi arasındaki ilişkiyi Borsa İstanbul’a
kote olan şirketler açısından analiz etmektir. Denetim kalitesi ve kazanç
yönetimi arasındaki ilişki sıradan en küçük kareler yöntemi kullanılarak analiz
edilmektedir. 2013-2018 yıllarını kapsayan ve Borsa İstanbul’a kote olan 97
reel sektör firmasının verilerinden yararlanarak denetim kalitesinin üç
göstergesi (denetçi bağımsızlığı, denetçinin sektörel uzmanlığı ve denetim
firmasının müşteri firmaya hizmet süresi) sıradan en küçük kareler yöntemi
kullanılarak analiz edilmektedir. Sıradan en küçük kareler yönteminin sonuçlarına
göre; denetçi bağımsızlığı ve denetçinin sektörel uzmanlığı kazanç yönetimini
önemli derecede azaltmaktadır ve denetim firması ile müşteri firma arasındaki
uzun süreli ilişki, müşteri firmanın daha yoğun bir şekilde kazanç yönetimini
uygulamasına yol açmaktadır. Bunlara ek olarak, bağımsız denetiminin
kalitesinin yüksek olması firmaların kazanç yönetimi uygulamalarını önemli
derecede azaltmaktadır.  

Anahtar Kelimeler

Denetim Kalitesi, Kazanç Yönetimi, Finansal Raporlama

Kaynakça

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