The Riddle of Human Altruism in Social and Evolutionary Psychology

Yıl 2019, Cilt: 3 Sayı: 5, 93 - 110, 30.06.2019

Emir Üzümçeker , Gizem Naz Gezgin Serap Akfırat

https://doi.org/10.31461/ybpd.559805

Cited By: 1

Öz

Altruism is defined as the
behaviors which causes loss or damage for the individual, but provides benefit
for others. It is assumed that natural selection causes individuals to act
according to their own interest and such patterns of behavior to be transferred
to the future generations. However, altruistic human behavior is observed in
all cultures and in a wide array. In this paper, the evolutionary approaches
which are proposed to explain the origin of human altruism are systematically
examined. In this framework, theories of kin selection, reciprocal altruism and
costly signaling present biological explanations for the altruistic behaviors
that are observed in all species, including humans. Kin selection theory defends
that altruistic behavior increases the probability of passing one’s genes to
next generations by providing benefit to their relatives with whom they share
genes. Reciprocal altruism theory states that altruism provides benefit by
future help one recevies from those he/she helped. Costly signaling theory argues
that altruistic behavior increases individuals’ chance of mating by enabling
them to exhibit their resources. On the other hand, the approaches that are
based on group selection and cultural selection defend that human altruism is
qualitatively different from that of other species and propose different
evolutionary mechanisms. Group selection theory argues that the cooperation
provided by altruism ensures the group’s advantage in intergroup competition.
Theories based on cultural selection, in addition, state that altruistic
behaviors can be transmitted as cultural norms. The main assumptions and the
empirical studies that support the theories with these two approaches are
presented and their strong and weak point are discussed.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Altruism, Evolutionary psychology, Natural selection

Sosyal ve Evrimsel Psikolojide İnsan Özgeciliği Bilmecesi

Öz

Özgecilik, bireyin kendisi
için kayba veya zarara yol açan, ancak diğerlerine fayda sağlayan davranışların
sergilenmesi anlamına gelmektedir. Doğal seçilim sonucu, bireylerin, kendi
çıkarlarını gözetecek şekilde davrandığı, bu davranış örüntülerinin de gelecek
kuşaklara aktarıldığı varsayılmaktadır. Ancak, insanlarda özgeci davranış tüm
kültürlerde ve oldukça geniş bir yelpazede gözlenmektedir. Bu çalışmada insan
özgeciliğinin kökenini açıklamak üzere ortaya atılmış evrimsel yaklaşımlar
sistematik bir şekilde incelenmektedir. Bu çerçevede akraba seçilimi,
karşılıklı özgecilik ve masraflı sinyalleşme kuramları, insan dâhil tüm
canlılarda gözlenen özgeci davranışın evrimine dair çeşitli biyolojik
açıklamalar sunmaktadır. Akraba seçilimi kuramı, özgeci davranışın bireyin
genlerini paylaştığı akrabalarına fayda sağlayarak genlerinin gelecek kuşaklara
aktarılma olasılığını artırdığını savunur. Karşılıklı özgecilik kuramına göre bireyin
diğerlerine yaptığı yardımların karşılığı onlarda gelecekte alacağı yardımlardır.
Masraflı sinyalleşme kuramı, özgeci davranışın bireyin sahip olduğu kaynakları
sergileyerek eş bulma şansını artırarak bireye fayda sağlayabileceğini
belirtir. Grup seçilimine ve kültürel seçilime dayanan yaklaşımlar ise insan
özgeciliğinin diğer canlılardan nitel olarak farklı olduğunu savunmaktadır ve
daha farklı evrimsel mekanizmalar önermektedir. Grup seçilimi kuramı, özgeci
davranışın getirdiği işbirliğinin, özgeci bireylerden oluşan grupları diğer
gruplarla rekabette avantajlı hale getirdiğini savunmaktadır. Kültürel seçilime
dayanan kuramlar da, özgeci davranışın gruplar arası rekabet nedeniyle adaptif
hale geldiğini, ayrıca bu davranışların kültürel normlar olarak aktarıldığını
iddia etmektedir. Bu çalışmada bu iki farklı yaklaşıma sahip kuramlar
tanıtılmakta, temel varsayımları ve yaklaşımlara destek sağlayan görgül
çalışmalar sunularak yaklaşımların güçlü ve zayıf yanları tartışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Özgecilik, Evrimsel psikoloji, Doğal seçilim

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