AN EVALUATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS THAT EXTENS OR ABOLISHES THE PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS FROM THE PRESPECTIVE OF ABUSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM

Yıl 2020, Sayı: 1, 71 - 122, 18.02.2020

Aslıhan Kaplan Arık Ahmet Ekinci

https://doi.org/10.33432/ybuhukuk.632747

Cited By: 2

Öz

This study examines the constitutional amendments that extend or derogate the presidential term limit with regards to abuse of constitutional amendment power. In modern liberal democracies, the general norm is to restrain through the presidents term limits even if they are elected by the people. More-over, it seems by virtue of empirical data and comparative country examples that the term limits are necessary for a sustainable democracy. However, in some countries, presidents encouraged constitutional amendments which aimed to derogate or extend the term limits. The leaders of these countries have defended that unrestrained re-election complies with democracy. However, the idea behind this endeavour usually be based on populism and an autocratic ruling desire rather than a democratic and liberal constitutional idea, because it aims to hold a particular person on power. Therefore it is not compatible with democratic values. As a result, these constitutional amendments mostly mean to violate the constitutions by using constitutional methods. So, they are the practices of abusing of the power to make the constitutional amendment. In our study, initially, we examined why to put a limit on the presidential term is a necessity for constitutionalism which comprises of separation of powers, democracy and fundamental rights. Then we investigated which constitutional amending methods are used to remove the restrictions on the presidential terms in the light of empirical data.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Term limit, the president’s desire to stay on office, abusive constitutonalism, abusing of the power to make constitutional amendment, derivative constituent power

DEVLET BAŞKANININ ANAYASAL DÖNEM SINIRINI UZATAN YA DA ORTADAN KALDIRAN ANAYASA DEĞİŞİKLİKLERİNİN ANAYASA DEĞİŞTİRME İKTİDARININ KÖTÜYE KULLANILMASI BAĞLAMINDA DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ

Öz

Bu çalışma, başkanlık dönem sınırlarını genişleten veya kaldıran anayasa değişiklik-lerini, anayasa değiştirme iktidarının kötüye kullanılması bağlamında incelemektedir. Modern liberal demokrasilerde norm, başkanlar halk tarafından seçilse bile, onları dönem sınırları vasıtasıyla sınırlamaktır. Dahası, ampirik veriler ve karşılaştırmalı ülke örnekleri sayesinde anlaşılmaktadır ki dönem sınırları sürdürülebilir bir demokrasi için gerekliliktir. Bununla birlikte, bazı ülkelerde, başkanlar, dönem sınırını genişleten ya da yürürlükten kaldıran anayasa değişikliklerini teşvik etmektedir. Bu ülkelerin liderleri, sınırsız tekrar seçilmenin demokrasiye uygun olduğunu savunmuştur. Bununla birlikte, bu çabanın ardındaki fikir, demokratik ve liberal bir anayasal fikrin yerine popülizm ve otoriter bir yönetim arzusuna dayanır çünkü bu çaba belirli bir kişiyi iktidarda tutmayı amaçlar. Bundan dolayı da demokratik değerler ile bağdaşmaz. Sonuç olarak bu anayasa değişiklikleri, çoğu zaman anayasacılık yöntemleri kullanılarak anayasayı ihlal etmek anlamına gelir. Yani anayasayı değiştirme iktidarının kötüye kullanılmasını faaliyetleridir. Çalışmamızda öncelikle, başkanlık dönemine sınır koymanın niçin kuvvetler ayrılığı, temel hak ve özgürlükler ve demokrasiden oluşan anayasacılık için bir gereklilik olduğunu inceledik. Akabinde ampirik veriler ışığında hangi anayasayı değiştirme yöntemlerinin başkanın görev süresi üzerindeki sınırları kaldırmak amacıyla kullanıldığını ampirik veri ışığında tahlil ettik.

Anahtar Kelimeler

anayasa değişikliği, başkanın görevde kalma arzusu, Görev sınırı, anayasa değiştirme iktidarının kötüye kullanılması, demokrasi, tali kurucu iktidar

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