Öz
Çalışmada, borç hedeflemesi rejimin, makroekonomik
performans üzerindeki etkilerinin, politik makroekonomi modelleri kullanılarak,
merkez bankasının bağımsız olduğu kurumsal yapıda araştırılması amaçlanmıştır.
Bu çerçevede, çalışmada, ilk olarak borç hedeflemesinin, politik
istikrarsızlığın arttığı durumda makroekonomik sonuçları incelenmektedir. Daha
sonra, daha sıkı borç hedeflemesinin ekonomik performans üzerindeki etkileri
değerlendirilmektedir. Çalışmada, son olarak, seçim sonuçlarına ilişkin belirsizlik
durumunda, borç hedeflemesi politikasının makroekonomik etkileri analiz
edilmektedir. Çalışmadan elde edilen sonuçlara
göre, politik istikrarsızlık sonucu mali sürdürülebilirlik problemleri ile
karşı karşıya kalan ekonomilerde kamu borcunun makul bir seviyede seyretmesini
sağlayacak bir borç hedeflemesi rejimi, politik istikrarsızlığın zamanlar arası
maliyetinin azaltılmasına yardımcı olmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Borç Hedeflemesi Politik Makroekonomi Modelleri Merkez Bankası Bağımsızlığı
Kaynakça
- Acemoğlu, D., Johnson, S. ve Robinson, J. (2003) “Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth” Journal of Monetary Economics, 50: 49–123.
- Aghion, P. ve Bolton, P. (1990) “Government Debt and the Risk of De-fault: A Political Economic Model of the Strategic Role of Debt” Dornbusch ve Draghi (eds.) Public Debt Management: Theory and Practice” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Alesina, A. ve Perotti, R. (1996) “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment”, European Economic Review, 40: 1203-1228.
- Alesina, A. ve Tabellini, G. (1987) “Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies”, Economic Inquiry, 25: 619-630.
- Alesina, A. ve Tabellini, G. (1990) “A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt”, Review of Economic Studies, 57(3): 403-14.
- Beetsma, R. ve Bovenberg, L. (1997) “Central Bank Independence and Public Debt Policy”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 21: 873-894.
- Cukierman, A., Edwards, S., ve Tabellini, G. (1992) “Seigniorage and Political Instability”, The American Economic Review, 82(3): 537-555.
- Çetin, İ. (2017) “Borç Hedeflemesi Rejimi ve Ekonomik Performans: Politik Makroekonomik Bir Bakış”, Doktora Tezi, Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara.
- de Haan, J. ve Eijffinger, S. (2016) “The Politics of Central Bank Independence”, DBB Working Paper, 539.
- Devereux, M. B., ve Wen, J. F. (1998) “Political Instability, Capital Taxation, and Growth”, European Economic Review, 42: 1635-1651.
- Dornbusch, R. ve Draghi, M. (Eds.) (1990) “Public Debt Management: Theory and History”, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- İsmihan, M. (2009) “The Role of Politics and Instability in Macroeconomic Performance”, Saarbrücken: VDM Dr Verlag Muller.
- İsmihan, M. ve Özkan, F. G. (2005) “Political Instability, public investment and macroeconomic performance”, Economics Bulletin, 5: 1-12.
- Özler, S., & Tabellini G. (1991). External Debt and Political Instability. NBER Working Paper No. 3772 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Persson, T. ve Svensson, L. (1989) “Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistency Preferences”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (2): 325-45.
- Rodrik, D. ve Subramanian, A. (2003) “The Primacy of Institutions (And What This Does and Does Not Mean)”, Finance&Development, June: 31-34.
- Snowdon, E. ve Vane, H. R. (2012) “Modern Makroekonomi Temelleri Gelişimi ve Bugünü”, N. Yıldırım, D., M. Akan, H. Deniz, A. Arı, F., K. Özenç, B., E. Balın, B. Kablamacı, E. Tahsin, A., A. Cingöz, E. Ersoy. (çev.), Ankara: Efil Yayınevi.
- İsmihan, M. (2009) “The Role of Politics and Instability in Macroeconomic Performance”, Saarbrücken: VDM Dr Verlag Muller.
- Tabellini, G. ve Alesina A. (1990) “Voting on the Budget Deficit”, The American Economic Review, 80(1): 37-49.
Öz
This study aims to explore the effects of debt targeting regime on macroeconomic perfomance by using political macroeconomic models in decentralized framework. Within this frame, firstly, the study aims to investigate the macroeconomic outcomes of debt targeting in a situation where political instability increases. Afterwards, the effects of more stricter debt targeting on macroeconomic performance is explored. In the study finally, macroeconomic effects of debt targeting policy are analyzed under electoral uncertainty. According to the findings, debt targeting regime enabling for the public debt to remain at a prudent level, helps in reducing the inter-temporal costs of political instability in the economies faced with the problems of fiscal sustainability as a result of political instability.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Debt Targeting Political Macroeconomic Models Central Bank Independence
Kaynakça
- Acemoğlu, D., Johnson, S. ve Robinson, J. (2003) “Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth” Journal of Monetary Economics, 50: 49–123.
- Aghion, P. ve Bolton, P. (1990) “Government Debt and the Risk of De-fault: A Political Economic Model of the Strategic Role of Debt” Dornbusch ve Draghi (eds.) Public Debt Management: Theory and Practice” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Alesina, A. ve Perotti, R. (1996) “Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment”, European Economic Review, 40: 1203-1228.
- Alesina, A. ve Tabellini, G. (1987) “Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies”, Economic Inquiry, 25: 619-630.
- Alesina, A. ve Tabellini, G. (1990) “A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt”, Review of Economic Studies, 57(3): 403-14.
- Beetsma, R. ve Bovenberg, L. (1997) “Central Bank Independence and Public Debt Policy”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 21: 873-894.
- Cukierman, A., Edwards, S., ve Tabellini, G. (1992) “Seigniorage and Political Instability”, The American Economic Review, 82(3): 537-555.
- Çetin, İ. (2017) “Borç Hedeflemesi Rejimi ve Ekonomik Performans: Politik Makroekonomik Bir Bakış”, Doktora Tezi, Hacettepe Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara.
- de Haan, J. ve Eijffinger, S. (2016) “The Politics of Central Bank Independence”, DBB Working Paper, 539.
- Devereux, M. B., ve Wen, J. F. (1998) “Political Instability, Capital Taxation, and Growth”, European Economic Review, 42: 1635-1651.
- Dornbusch, R. ve Draghi, M. (Eds.) (1990) “Public Debt Management: Theory and History”, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- İsmihan, M. (2009) “The Role of Politics and Instability in Macroeconomic Performance”, Saarbrücken: VDM Dr Verlag Muller.
- İsmihan, M. ve Özkan, F. G. (2005) “Political Instability, public investment and macroeconomic performance”, Economics Bulletin, 5: 1-12.
- Özler, S., & Tabellini G. (1991). External Debt and Political Instability. NBER Working Paper No. 3772 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Persson, T. ve Svensson, L. (1989) “Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistency Preferences”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (2): 325-45.
- Rodrik, D. ve Subramanian, A. (2003) “The Primacy of Institutions (And What This Does and Does Not Mean)”, Finance&Development, June: 31-34.
- Snowdon, E. ve Vane, H. R. (2012) “Modern Makroekonomi Temelleri Gelişimi ve Bugünü”, N. Yıldırım, D., M. Akan, H. Deniz, A. Arı, F., K. Özenç, B., E. Balın, B. Kablamacı, E. Tahsin, A., A. Cingöz, E. Ersoy. (çev.), Ankara: Efil Yayınevi.
- İsmihan, M. (2009) “The Role of Politics and Instability in Macroeconomic Performance”, Saarbrücken: VDM Dr Verlag Muller.
- Tabellini, G. ve Alesina A. (1990) “Voting on the Budget Deficit”, The American Economic Review, 80(1): 37-49.
Ayrıntılar
| Birincil Dil | Türkçe |
|---|---|
| Bölüm | Makaleler |
| Yazarlar | |
| Yayımlanma Tarihi | 30 Haziran 2018 |
| Yayımlandığı Sayı | Yıl 2018 Cilt: 16 Sayı: 2 |