The Intuitive Trap: Understanding Cognitive Bias in the Digital Age

Yıl 2024, Sayı: 17, 345 - 364, 26.12.2024

Cansu Akoglan

https://doi.org/10.55609/yenimedya.1545623

Öz

This article presents a philosophical perspective on the relationship between critical thinking and new media, employing dual-process theories to explore the cognitive mechanisms involved. Dual-process theories, which distinguish between fast, intuitive thinking and slower, analytical reasoning, provide a valuable framework for understanding how individuals engage with the overwhelming flow of information in digital environments. The paper argues that while critical thinking is traditionally seen as an analytical activity, more is needed in the context of new media. The fast-paced, heuristic-driven nature of digital content - ranging from rapidly evolving news feeds to algorithm-driven information ecosystems - means that intuitive processes often dominate user engagement, leading to cognitive biases. Therefore, this work advocates for a holistic approach that balances the need for criticality in new media with an understanding of both intuitive and analytical thinking. By offering a novel integration of dual-process theories with media literacy frameworks, this study demonstrates how a comprehensive awareness of cognitive mechanisms can lead to more effective critical engagement with digital content. The findings underscore the importance of a dual approach in fostering both reflective and adaptive new media literacy, and the results highlight the limitations of purely analytical methods while emphasizing the value of heuristic awareness in navigating complex new media environments.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Media Literacy, Cognitive Biases, Metacognition, Philosophy of Cognition, Critical Thinking

Sezgi Tuzağı: Dijital Çağda Bilişsel Yanlılıkları Anlamak

Öz

Bu makale, eleştirel düşünme ve yeni medya arasındaki ilişkinin felsefi bir incelemesini sunmakta ve ilgili bilişsel mekanizmaları anlamak üzere ikili süreç teorilerini kullanmaktadır. Hızlı, sezgisel düşünme ile daha yavaş, analitik akıl yürütme arasında ayrım yapan ikili süreç teorileri, bireylerin dijital ortamlardaki ezici bilgi akışıyla nasıl etkileşime girdiğini anlamak için değerli bir çerçeve sağlar. Bu makale, eleştirel düşünmenin geleneksel olarak analitik bir faaliyet olarak görülmesine rağmen, yeni medya bağlamında daha fazlasına ihtiyaç duyulduğunu savunmaktadır. Hızlı haber akışlarından algoritma güdümlü bilgi ekosistemlerine kadar, çevrimiçi platformların hızlı tempolu, sezgisel güdümlü doğası, sezgisel süreçlerin genellikle kullanıcı katılımına hakim olduğu ve bilişsel yanlılıklara yol açtığı anlamına gelir. Bu çalışma, ikili süreç teorilerinin medya okuryazarlığı çerçeveleriyle yeni bir birleşimini sunarak, bilişsel mekanizmalara ilişkin kapsamlı bir farkındalığın dijital içerikle nasıl daha etkili bir eleştirel etkileşimi sağlayabileceğini göstermektedir. Bulgular, hem reflektif hem de adaptif yeni medya okuryazarlığını teşvik etmede ikili bir yaklaşımın önemini vurgulamakta ve sonuçlar, karmaşık yeni medya ortamlarında gezinirken sezgisel farkındalığın değerini vurgulayıp, salt analitik yöntemlerin sınırlılıklarını ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Medya Okuryazarlığı, Bilişsel Yanlılıklar, Metabiliş, Biliş Felsefesi, Eleştirel Düşünme

Kaynakça

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