“Yeşile Boyama” Kavramının Analitik İncelenmesi: Sertifikalı Etiketlerin Sertifikasızlarla Karşılaştırılması

Öz

“Greenwashing” – labeling products as environmentally sound while actually not – occurs when a firm eschews sustainable business practices but still wishes to enter environmentfriendly markets. In response, environmentally conscious firms resort to eco-label certification to signal the authenticity of their products. Assuming that some consumers in the market are informed about product labeling while others are not, we study the problem of whether to certify one’s products using both a game-theoretic model and a profit-maximizing pricing model. In the game between a producer and multiple consumers, we find that the equilibrium solution is for the producer to pursue a segmentation strategy. We also find the optimal production policies in a demand setting and analyze the certification decision as a function of several parameters. Certification is superior in low price sensitive markets; when the informed-consumers market size is sufficiently large; and when the ratio of certification cost to production cost is not excessive.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Greenwashing, Corporate Social Responsibility, Sustainable Development.

“Yeşile Boyama” Kavramının Analitik İncelenmesi: Sertifikalı Etiketlerin Sertifikasızlarla Karşılaştırılması

Öz

“Yeşile Boyama”- ürünleri gerçekte olmadığı halde çevre dostuymuş gibi göstererek etiketlendirme- bir firmanın sürdürülebilir işletme politikalarını uygulamaktan kaçındığı ancak yine de çevre dostu ürün pazarına girmek istediği durumlarda görülür. Buna karşılık, çevresel bilince sahip şirketler kendi ürünlerinin gerçekliğine işaret etmek amacıyla eko-etiket sertifikasyonu yoluna başvurur. Pazardaki bir takım tüketicilerin ürün etiketleri hakkında bilgili olduğu ve diğer tüketicilerin olmadığı farzedilirse, bir firmanın ürünlerini sertifikalı yapıp yapmama problemini hem oyun teorisi hem de kar maksimizasyonu açısından fiyatlandırma modelleri yoluyla inceledik. Bir üretici ve birden çok tüketici arasındaki oyunda, denge çözümünü üreticinin bölümlendirme stratejisi izlemesi olarak bulduk. Ayrıca optimum üretim politikalarını talep açısından bulduk ve sertifikasyon kararını ilgili bir takım parametreler açısından analiz ettik. Sertifikasyon tercihinin düşük fiyat duyarlılığı olan pazarlarda, bilgili tüketici pazar büyüklüğünün yeterli büyüklükte olduğunda, ve sertifikasyon maliyetinin üretim maliyetine oranının çok büyük olmadığı durumlarda daha üstün olduğunu gördük.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Yeşile Boyama, Kurumsal Sosyal Sorumluluk, Sürdürülebilir Kalkınma.

Kaynakça

1. Beder, S., (1997), Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism. White River
2. Junction, VT: Chelsea Green. Bowen, H.R., (1953), Social Responsibility of the Businessman. New York: Harper &
3. Row. Cairncross, F., (1992), Costing the Earth: The Challenge for Governments, the Opportunities for Business. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Crespi, J.M., Marette, S., (2005), Eco-labelling economics: Is public involvement necessary? In: Krarup, S., Russell, C.S. (Eds.) Environment, Information and Consumer Behavior.
4. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 93-110. Darby, M. R., Karni, E., (1973), “Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud”.
5. Journal of Law and Economics, 16, 67-88. Fombrun, C., (1996), Reputation: Realizing Value from the Corporate Image. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J., (1991), Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Harsanyi, J., (1967), “Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players”.
6. Management Science, 14, 159-182. Hirshleifer, J., (1971), “The private and social value of information and the reward to inventive activity”. American Economic Review, 61, 561-574. Howard, P. H., Allen, P., (2006), “Beyond organic: consumer interest in new labeling schemes in the Central Coast of California”. International Journal of Consumer Studies, 30, 43945 Imkamp, H., (2000), “The interest of consumers in ecological product information is growing –evidence from two German surveys”. Journal of Consumer Policy, 23, 193-202. Kreps, D., Wilson, R., (1982), Sequential equilibria. Econometrica, 50, 863-894.
7. Laufer, W., (2003), “Social accountability and corporate greenwashing”. Journal of
8. Business Ethics, 43, 253-261. McCluskey, J., (2000), “A game theoretic approach to organic foods: an analysis of asymmetric information and policy”. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 29, 1-9. Nelson, P., (1970), “Information and consumer behavior”. Journal of Political Economy, 78, 311-329. Newell, S. J., Goldsmith, R. E., Banzhaf, E.J., (1998), “The effect of misleading environmental claims on consumer perceptions of advertisements”. Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice, 6, 48-59. Ramus, C., Montie, I., (2005), “When are corporate environmental policies a form of greenwashing?” Business & Society, 44, 377-414. Scammon, D. L., Mayer, R.N., (1993), “Environmental labeling and advertising claims: International action and policy issues”. European Advances in Consumer Research, 1, 338-344. Shrum, L. J., McCarthy, J. A., Lowrey, T.M., (1995), “Buyer characteristics of the green consumer and their implications for advertising strategy”. Journal of Advertising, 24, 72-82. Spence, M., (1973), “Job market signaling”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 35537 Sullivan, J., (2009), ‘Greenwashing’ gets his goat – environmental activist coined famous term. Recordonline.com - Times Herald-Record - Recordonline.com. Retrieved from http://www.recordonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090801/NEWS/908010329/ TerraChoice, (2009), Greenwashing Report. Retrieved from http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/findings/greenwashing-report-2009/ TerraChoice, (2010), Greenwashing Report. Retrieved from http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/findings/greenwashing-report-2010/ Trudel, R., Cotte, J., (2008), “Corporate reputation: Does being ethical pay?” The Wall

9. Street Journal, (May 12), R1. van Doorn, J., Verhoef, P.C., (2011), “Willingness to pay for organic products: Differences between virtue and vice foods”. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 28, 167-180.
10. Appendix Confirmation of (6): Let K = and substitute into (6). We obtain (r – c)(1 – K) + (r – m)K – K 2 < (r – m) – K ⇔ (r – c) + (c – m)K – K 2 < (r – m) – K ⇔ (c – m)K – K 2 < (c – m) – K ⇔ – K 2 < (c – m)(1 – K) – K ⇔ K – K 2 < (c – m)(1 – K) ⇔ K(1 – K) < (c – m)(1 – K) ⇔ ( ) < (c – m) ⇔ < c – m. Therefore, the market segmentation strategy in Section 3 has a higher expected value than the one-shot strategy. Deriving π * C Once we have obtained P * C and b = Then Replace this in the profit function ⇔ Therefore, we obtain . Deriving π* N ⇔ Now take the derivative of with respect to and set equal to 0. Now substitute as follows: let a = and b = Then, Replace this in the profit function Rearrange terms: