“Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard”

Yıl 2009, Cilt: 16 Sayı: 1, 107 - 114, 01.03.2009

Meltem Tumay

Öz

Anahtar Kelimeler

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Sigorta Piyasalarında Asimetrik Bilgi ve İstenmeyen Tercih: Etik Tehlike Problemi

Öz

Asimetrik Bilgi problemi bir ekonomik işlemin taraflarından birinin doğru bir karar verebilmek için diğer taraf hakkında eksik bilgiye sahip oldugu durumlarda ortaya çıkan bir problemdir. Öte taraftan Etik Tehlike kavramı ise, bir sözleşmenin tamamlanmasından sonra taraflardan birinin digerinin zararina olacak sekilde davranişini değiştirmesi riskini ifade eder. Sigorta Piyasalarında Etik Tehlike kişilerin sigorta ettirilen şeyin zarara uğramasi veya çalınmasi risklerine karşı daha az çaba harcamasi şeklinde ortaya çikar

Anahtar Kelimeler

Asimetrik Bilgi, Etik Tehlike, Yetersiz Bilgi, Sigorta Piyasalari

Kaynakça

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