Doğal Kaynaklar Temelinde İç Çatışmaların Ekonomik Teorisi

Year 2017, Volume: 17 Issue: 2, 27 - 42, 15.06.2017

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Zelal Beyaz , Prof. Dr. İbrahim Bakırtaş

https://doi.org/10.18037/ausbd.417236

Cited By: 1

Abstract

 II. Dünya Savaşı’nın sona ermesinden sonra, uluslararası savaşlardan daha yaygın hale gelmesine karşın, akademik çevre 1990’lı yılların sonlarına kadar silahlı iç çatışma sorununa ilişkin çalışmalara ağırlık vermemiştir. Bu tarihten itibaren yapılan pek çok çalışma doğal kaynaklar ile silahlı iç çatışma veya iç savaş başlangıcı, süresi ve şiddeti arasında bir ilişki olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Literatürde doğal kaynaklar ile silahlı iç çatışma başlangıcı arasındaki ilişki altı farklı mekanizmayla açıklanmaktadır. Bunlar; açgözlü ayaklanma, dışarıdan müdahale, kindarlık, elverişlilik, zayıf devlet ve seyrek ticaret ağıdır. Mekanizmaların farklı önermeler üzerine inşa edilmiş olması hem terminolojik hem de kuramsal bir altyapının oluşturulmasını zorlaştırmaktadır Bazı kaynaklarda geçen teorilere diğer bazı kaynaklarda hiç yer verilmemesi ya da benzer teorilerin daha farklı, hatta bazen de çelişir şekilde kullanılması mevcut sorunu daha da büyütmektedir. Benzer şekilde farklı teorilerin sıralandığı iddia edilen kaynaklarda da sıralanan teorilerin birbiriyle iç içe oldukları, kullanılan teorilerin birbirinin tekrarından öteye geçemedikleri ya da tamamlayıcı oldukları görülmektedir. Mevcut literatürdeki bu eksiklik ve zorluklar bu çalışmanın hazırlanmasındaki ana etkendir. Bu etken bağlamında bu çalışmanın iki amacı vardır. Bunun ilki, mevcut çalışmalar ışığında doğal kaynaklar ile iç çatışma başlangıcı arasındaki ilişkiyi iç çatışma mekanizmaları yardımıyla iktisadi olarak tanımlamaktır. İkinci amaç ise bu tanımlamalarla terminolojik eşgüdümün oluşturulmasına ve kuramsal altyapının şekillenmesine katkıda bulunmaktır. 

Keywords

Doğal Kaynaklar, Silahlı İç Çatışma, İç Savaş

References

• Basedau, M. and Lay, J. (2009). Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambigious Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 46 (6), 757-776.
• Blattman, C. and Miguel, E. (2010). Civil War. Journal of Economic Literature, 48 (1), 3-57.
• Boulding, Kenneth E. (1963). Conflict and Defence: A General Theory. New York: Harper & Brothers.
• Burton, J.W. (1997). Violence Explained: The Sources of Conflict, Violence, and Crime and Their Prevention, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
• Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (1998). On Economic Causes of Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers, (50), 563-573.
• Collier, P. (2000). Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activitiy. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44 (6), 839-853.
• Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2000). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2355, Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/18853/multi_page.pdf?sequence=1, (03.08.2016).
• Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2001). Data Issues in the Study of Conflict. Conference on Data Collection on Armed Conflict, Uppsala 8-9 June.
• Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2002a). On the Incidence of civil War in Africa. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46 (1), 13-28.
• Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2002c). The Political Economy of Secession. Development Research Group, World Bank, Center for the Study of African Economies, Available at: https://core.ac.uk/download/files/153/6464805.pdf, (04.03.2016).
• Collier, P., Elliot, L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynol-Querol, M. and Sambanis, N. (2003). Breaking The Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development. Wahington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press.
• Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers, 56 (4), 563-596.
• Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2005). Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 (4), 625-633.
• Cullen, A. (2005). Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law. Military Law Review, 183, 69-109.
• Dashwood, S.H. (2000). Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transformation. Toronto. Canada: University of Toronto Press.
• Di John, J. (2007). Oil Abundance and Violent Political Conflict: A Critical Assessment. Journal of Development Studies, 43(6), 961-986.
• Doyle, M. (1997). Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism. New York: Norton.
• Englebert, P. and Ron, J. (2004). Primary Commodities and War: Congo-Brazzaville’s Ambivalent Resource Curse. Comparative Politics, 37(1), 61-81.
• Evans, G., and J. Newnham (2007). Uluslararası İlişkiler Sözlüğü. çev. H. Ahsen Utku, İstanbul: Gökkubbe.
• Fearon, D. J. and Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American Political Science Review, 97 (1), 75-90.
• Fearon, D.J. (2005). Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 (4), 483-507.
• Human Rights Watch, The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities, New York: January 1999.
• Humphreys, M. (2005). Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution, Uncovering the Mechanisms. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49 (4), 508-537.
• İnat, K., Gieler, W (2007). Kongo Demokratik Cumhuriyeti (Zaire): Birinci Afrika Dünya Savaşı. Dünya Çatışma Bölgeleri (ed.: K. İnat- B. Duran- M. Ataman), Ankara: Nobel. International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Natural Resources and Law Enforcement, ICG Asia Report No: 29, Jakarta and Brussels, 20 December 2001, pp.10-18.
• Jeong, H. (2008). Understanding Conflict and Conflict Analysis. Los Angeles: SAGE.
• Jones Luong, P. and Weinthal, E. (2006). Rethinking the Resource Curse: Ownership Structure, Institutional Capacity, and Domestic Constraints. Annual Review of Political Science, 9, 241–263.
• Karl, T. L. (1997). The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
• Keen, D. (1998). The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. Adelphi Paper 320, New York: Oxford University Press.
• Leamer, E. E., Maul, H., Rodriguez, S. and Schott, P.K. (1999). Does Natural Resource Abundance Increase Latin American Income Inequality. Journal of Development Economics, 59, 3-42.
• Lee, J., D. Ashmore and D. Wilder, (2001). Social Identity and Intergroup Conflict: Introduction. Lee, J., D. Ashmore and D. Wilder (ed.). Social Identity and Intergroup Conflict. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Le Billon, P. (2001). The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflict. Political Geography, 20 (5), 561-84.
• Lootsteen, Y.M. (2000). The Concept of Belligerency in International Law. Military Law Review 166, 109-141.
• Lujala, P. (2010). The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources. Journal of Peace Research, 47 (1), 15-28.
• Lujala, P. and Rustad, S.A. (2011). High-value Natural Resources: A Blessing or a Curse for Peace?. Sustainable Development Law & Policy, 12 (1), 19-57.
• Mahdavy, H., (1970). The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran. in Studies in Economic History of the Middle East, ed. M. A. Cook, London: Oxford University Press.
• Malone, D. and Nitzschke, H., (2004). Economic Agendas in Civil Wars: What We Know, What We Need to Know, WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2005/07 (Helsinki: WIDER).
• Malthus, T. (1798). An Essay on the Principle of Population. New York: Penguin (1970 edition).
• Marshall, G. (1999). Sosyoloji Sözlüğü. Çev. Derya Kömürcü, Osman Akınhay, Ankara: Bilim ve Sanat.
• Meldrum, A. (2000). Good-bye, New Republic On-Line, April 17.
• Mengiler, Ö. (2005). Birleşmiş Milletler Çerçevesinde Uluslararası Uyuşmazlıkların Barışçı Çözümü. Ankara: Platin.
• Mial, H., O. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, T. (2007). Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts. Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Morrison, K.M., (2010). Oil, Conflict, and Stability, Working Paper, Cornell University.
• Oneal, J., B Russett. (1999). Assessing the liberal peace with alternative specifications: Trade still reduces conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 36(4), 423-32.
• Öğüt, S. (2013). Uluslararası Hukuk Açısından Suriye. İstanbul: DÜBAM.
• Pazarcı, H. (1994). Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri. III. Kitap, Ankara: Turhan.
• Renner, M., (2002). The Anatomy of Resource Wars, World Watch Paper, No:162, Washington, DC: World Watch Institute.
• Reno, W. (1995). Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone. New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Ross, M. L. (1999). The Political Economy of the Resource Curse. World Politics, 51(2), 297–322.
• Ross, M. L. (2003a). Natural Resources and Civil War: An Overview, World Bank Research Observer, Available at: http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/conflict/ross_2003.pdf, (19.08.2016).
• Ross, M. L. (2003b). Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: The Varying Roles of Natural Resources in Civil War, In The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (eds. K. Ballentine and J. Sherman), Lynee Rienner Publishers: Boulder.
• Ross, M. L. (2003c). “How Does Mineral Wealth Affect the Poor?”, Working Paper, UCLA, Available at: www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/ross/minpoor.pdf, (18.08.2016).
• Ross, M. (2004a). What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?. Journal of Peace Research, 41(3), 337–56.
• Ross, M. (2004b). How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases. International Organization, 58(1), 35–67.
• Ross, M. (2005). Booty Futures , Unpublished Working Paper, Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, pp.1-30.
• Smith, B., (2004), Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-1999. American Journal of Political Science, 48(2), 232-246.
• Spilimbergo, A., Londono, J. L., and Szekely, M. (1999). Income Distribution, Factor Endowments, and Trade Openness. Journal of Development Economics, 59(1), 77-101.
• Stiglitz, J. E., (2007). What is the Role of the State?. In Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs & Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), Escaping the Resource Curse. New York: Columbia University Press.
• UN Panel of Experts (2000). “Report of the Panel of Experts Appointed Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000), Paragraph 19, in Relation to Sierra Leone,” United Nations Security Council S/2000/1195, Available at: https://mondediplo.com/IMG/pdf/un-report.pdf, (22.06.2016).
• UN Panel of Experts (2001). “Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo (S/2001/357),” United Nations Security Council, Available at: https://documentsdds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/323/54/IMG/N0132354.pdf?OpenElement, (22.06.2016).
• Wantchekon, L., (1999), Why Do Resource Abundant Countries Have Authoritarian Goverments? Yale University Leitner Center Working Paper 99-12, Available at: https://www.princeton.edu/~lwantche/Why_Do_Resource_Dependent_Countries_Have_Authoritarian_Governments, (24.08.2016).
• Wilson, H.A. (1988). International Law and Use of Force by National Liberation Movements. Oxford: Clarendon Press.