The Conditions of Judicial Review of the Substance of Constitutional Amendments: A Brief Overview

Year 2024, Issue: 5, 16 - 42

Can Ceylan

https://doi.org/10.59399/cuhad.1399164

Abstract

Judicial review of the substance of constitutional amendments is one of the most controversial topics of constitutional law. There are two conditions of substance review: First, there has to be either explicit or implicit limitations placed upon constitutional amendments. Second, the judiciary must be authorized to review the substance of constitutional amendments. In those countries the substance of constitutional amendments is subject to judicial review, judicial review is grounded on either explicit or implicit limitations. In those other countries the substance of constitutional amendments is not subject to judicial review, courts indicate that they do not have the authority to review the substance of constitutional amendments. In this article, the requirement for courts to be explicitly authorized by the constitution to review the substance of constitutional amendments is emphasized. In this regard, courts that review the substance of constitutional amendments without an explicit authorization by the constitution are criticized.

Keywords

Constitutional Amendment, Substance, Form, Judicial Review, Explicit Limitations, Implicit Limitations, Authority

Anayasa Değişikliklerinin Esas Bakımından Yargısal Denetiminin Koşulları: Kısa Bir İnceleme

Abstract

Anayasa değişikliklerinin esas bakımından yargısal denetimi, anayasa hukukunun en tartışmalı konularından biridir. Esas denetiminin iki koşulu vardır: İlk olarak, anayasa değişiklikleri için öngörülmüş açık veya örtülü sınırlar bulunmalıdır. İkinci olarak, yargı organı, anayasa değişikliklerini esas bakımından denetlemek için yetkilendirilmiş olmalıdır. Anayasa değişikliklerinin esas bakımından yargısal denetime tabi tutulduğu ülkelerde, yargısal denetim açık veya örtülü sınırlara dayandırılmaktadır. Anayasa değişikliklerinin esas bakımından yargısal denetiminin söz konusu olmadığı ülkelerde mahkemeler, anayasa değişikliklerini esas bakımından denetlemeye yetkili olmadıklarını kabul etmektedir. Bu makalede, mahkemelerin anayasa değişikliklerini esas bakımından denetleyebilmek için anayasa tarafından açıkça yetkilendirilmiş olmaları gerektiğine vurgu yapılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, anayasa ile açıkça yetkilendirilmediği halde anayasa değişikliklerini esas bakımından denetleyen mahkemeler eleştirilmiştir.

Keywords

Anayasa Değişikliği, Esas, Usul, Yargısal Denetim, Açık Sınırlar, Örtülü Sınırlar, Yetki

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