Dünya Ticaret Örgütü Uyuşmazlık Çözüm Mekanizmasında Misilleme Yaptırımı

Yıl 2014, Cilt 16 Özel Sayı, 1713 - 1739, 01.07.2014

Özlem Canbeldek Akın

Öz

Dünya Ticaret Örgütü (DTÖ), uluslararası ticaretin eşitlik ilkesi gözetilerek liberalleştirilmesi amacıyla 1995 yılında Dünya Ticaret Örgütü
Kuruluş Anlaşması’yla1
(Marrakesh Anlaşması)kurulmuş uluslararası bir
örgüttür. DTÖ Kuruluş Anlaşması ülkemizde 25.02.1995 tarih ve 22213
sayılı Mükerrer Resmî Gazete’de yayımlanarak yürürlüğe girmiş ve Türkiye
26.03.1995 tarihinde DTÖ’nün kurucu üyelerinden biri olmuştur.

Kaynakça

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