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Moral Obligation and Moral Objectivity

Year 2022, Volume: 9 Issue: 2, 1252 - 1274, 15.09.2022
https://doi.org/10.51702/esoguifd.1137659

Abstract

“Why should I be moral?" is the most basic question that determines our value judgments and motivations regarding morality. Why being moral is necessary and what can be the source of moral responsibilities is an important problem. Moral truths are some laws that people feel obliged to behave in accordance with these truths and therefore try to avoid wrongs. If a law or a truth is deemed obligatory, it will be wrong for a person not to comply with it, so that it is necessary truth that will create a sanction power on its own. It can be said that the source of power of morality derives from the fact that moral truths are objective and therefore necessary truths. This means that the source of moral truths has a reference that transcends the world. In this study, the questions of whether moral obligations are possible or not, and if possible, what their nature and source might be will be discussed. By considering these questions within the framework of a realistic moral understanding, it will be argued that a relationship can be established between God and morality, and accordingly, moral obligations should be based on God.

References

  • Adams, Robert Merrihew. Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
  • Alston, William P. “Moral Attitudes and Moral Judgements”, Noûs 2:1 (1968), 1-23.
  • Brink, David O. & Dana K. Nelkin, “Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility”, Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 1, ed. David Shoemaker, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 284-312.
  • Byrne, Peter. The Philosophical and Theological Foundations of Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Theory and its Relation to Religious Belief, (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).
  • Clarke, Randolph. “Free Will and the Conditions of Moral Responsibility”, Philosophical Studies: An Internationa Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 66:1 (1992), 53-72.
  • Edwards, Rem Blanchard. Freedom, Responsibility and Obligation, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969).
  • Evans, C. Stephen. God and Moral Obligation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
  • Frankfurt, Harry G. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, The Journal of Philosophy, 66:23 (1969), 829-839.
  • Fischer, John M. & Mark Ravizza. S.J., Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
  • Kant, Immanuel. Ahlak Metafiziğinin Temellendirilmesi, çev. İoanna Kuçuradi, (Ankara: Türkiye Felsefe Kurumu, 2020).
  • Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty, Utilitarianism and Other Essays, ed. Mark Philp, Frederick Rosen, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
  • Reçber, M. Sait. “Değerlerin Aşkınlığı Üzerine”, Felsefe- Edebiyat ve Değerler, (ed.) C. Kabakcı & S. Yakar, (Ankara: Öncü Basımevi, 2014), 463-473.
  • Richman, Robert J. God , Free Will and Morality, (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983).
  • Ritchie, Angus. From Morality to Metaphyics: The Theistic Implications of our Ethical Commitments, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
  • Strawson, P. F. Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, (New York: Routledge, 2008).
  • Swinburne, Richard G. “The Objectivity of Morality”, Philosophy 51:195 (1976), 5-20.
  • Wallace, R. Jay. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
  • Watson, Gary. “Two Faces of Responsibility”, Philosophical Topics 24:2 (1996), 227-248.
  • Widerker, David & Michael McKenna (ed.). Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essay on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, (New York: Routledge, 2018).
  • Zimmerman, Michael J. The Concept of Moral Obligation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
  • Zimmerman, Michael J. “Varieties of Moral Responsibility”, The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays, ed. Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna ve Angela M. Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 45-64.

Ahlakî Yükümlülük ve Ahlakî Nesnellik

Year 2022, Volume: 9 Issue: 2, 1252 - 1274, 15.09.2022
https://doi.org/10.51702/esoguifd.1137659

Abstract

“Neden ahlaklı olmalıyım?” sorusu ahlaka ilişkin değer yargılarımızı ve motivasyonlarımızı belirleyen en temel sorudur. Bu soruya bağlı olarak ahlaklı olmanın neden bir gereklilik olduğu ve ahlaki yükümlülüklerin kaynağının ne olabileceği önemli bir sorunsaldır. Ahlaki doğrular insanların bu doğrulara uygun davranışlarda bulunmalarını zorunlu hissettikleri ve bu nedenle bu doğrulara aykırı davranmaktan kaçınmaya çalıştıkları birtakım yasalardır. Bir yasanın ya da doğrunun zorunlu kabul edilmesi halinde buna uymamak insan için yanlış olacağı için bunun doğru olması kendi başına bir yaptırım gücü oluşturacaktır. Ahlaki yükümlülüklerin kaynağını ahlaki doğruların nesnel olması, dolayısıyla zorunlu doğrular olmasından aldığı söylenebilir. Bu ise ahlaki doğruların ve yükümlülüklerin kaynağının insanı aşan bir düzleme referansı olduğu anlamına gelir. Bu çalışmada ahlaki yükümlülüklerin mümkün olup olmadığı, mümkünse bunların mahiyeti ve kaynağının ne olabileceği soruları üzerinde durulacaktır. Bu sorular realist bir ahlak anlayışı çerçevesinde ele alınarak Tanrı ve ahlak arasında bir ilişkinin kurulabileceği ve buna bağlı olarak ahlaki yükümlülüklerin Tanrı’ya dayandırılması gerektiği iddia edilecektir.

References

  • Adams, Robert Merrihew. Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
  • Alston, William P. “Moral Attitudes and Moral Judgements”, Noûs 2:1 (1968), 1-23.
  • Brink, David O. & Dana K. Nelkin, “Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility”, Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 1, ed. David Shoemaker, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 284-312.
  • Byrne, Peter. The Philosophical and Theological Foundations of Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Theory and its Relation to Religious Belief, (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).
  • Clarke, Randolph. “Free Will and the Conditions of Moral Responsibility”, Philosophical Studies: An Internationa Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 66:1 (1992), 53-72.
  • Edwards, Rem Blanchard. Freedom, Responsibility and Obligation, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969).
  • Evans, C. Stephen. God and Moral Obligation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
  • Frankfurt, Harry G. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, The Journal of Philosophy, 66:23 (1969), 829-839.
  • Fischer, John M. & Mark Ravizza. S.J., Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
  • Kant, Immanuel. Ahlak Metafiziğinin Temellendirilmesi, çev. İoanna Kuçuradi, (Ankara: Türkiye Felsefe Kurumu, 2020).
  • Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty, Utilitarianism and Other Essays, ed. Mark Philp, Frederick Rosen, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
  • Reçber, M. Sait. “Değerlerin Aşkınlığı Üzerine”, Felsefe- Edebiyat ve Değerler, (ed.) C. Kabakcı & S. Yakar, (Ankara: Öncü Basımevi, 2014), 463-473.
  • Richman, Robert J. God , Free Will and Morality, (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983).
  • Ritchie, Angus. From Morality to Metaphyics: The Theistic Implications of our Ethical Commitments, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
  • Strawson, P. F. Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, (New York: Routledge, 2008).
  • Swinburne, Richard G. “The Objectivity of Morality”, Philosophy 51:195 (1976), 5-20.
  • Wallace, R. Jay. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
  • Watson, Gary. “Two Faces of Responsibility”, Philosophical Topics 24:2 (1996), 227-248.
  • Widerker, David & Michael McKenna (ed.). Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essay on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities, (New York: Routledge, 2018).
  • Zimmerman, Michael J. The Concept of Moral Obligation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
  • Zimmerman, Michael J. “Varieties of Moral Responsibility”, The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays, ed. Randolph Clarke, Michael McKenna ve Angela M. Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 45-64.
There are 21 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language Turkish
Subjects Religious Studies
Journal Section Articles
Authors

Münteha Beki 0000-0001-6906-3366

Publication Date September 15, 2022
Submission Date June 29, 2022
Acceptance Date September 6, 2022
Published in Issue Year 2022 Volume: 9 Issue: 2

Cite

ISNAD Beki, Münteha. “Ahlakî Yükümlülük Ve Ahlakî Nesnellik”. Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 9/2 (September 2022), 1252-1274. https://doi.org/10.51702/esoguifd.1137659.

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