Modeling the War of Militarily Inequivalent Two Countries by Game Theory

Abstract

In this study, we model the international conflict that has evolved into a war that causes material and moral losses between two countries, one strong and the other weak militarily, using matrix games with matrix entries. In order to create our model, we first examined the international events that took place in the past and recent and turned into a state of war. In light of the information we have obtained, we explain in detail the scenario of the game that we present in the study. According to the scenario we presented, we model our game in the form of a matrix game with matrix entries, which can turn into three different matrix games. According to the created model, the active war situation turns into a ceasefire or continuation of the war. In the event of a ceasefire, the game ends, while in the event of a continuation of the war, the game turns into a matrix game with a new matrix entry in the form of holding the occupied places or returning to the previous border. While this game, which actually occurs in the event of a return to the previous borders, ends, if the occupied places are held, a new game arises in which the war strategies of these two warring countries will be determined. In this last game, countries have to choose between strategies to move to one of the defensive or offensive situations, and this decision is finally solved by the final state of the war. Thus, by considering each situation of the matrix game model with matrix entries containing three different games separately, we reach the solution to the actual problem by obtaining their solutions and determining the ideal strategies by which the countries in the scenario can protect the interests of the country in a crisis. Therefore, we model the war between the two countries by using game theory and present the results.

Keywords

• Game theory
• international crisis
• international relation
• matrix games with matrix entries
• war game

Askeri Açıdan Denk Olmayan İki Ülke Savaşının Oyun Teorisi ile Modellenmesi

Abstract

Bu çalışmada, askeri açıdan biri güçlü diğeri zayıf olan iki ülke arasında yaşanan maddi ve manevi kayıplara neden olan savaşa dönüşmüş bir uluslararası çıkmazı matris girdili matris oyunları kullanarak modelledik. Modelimizi kurmak için ilk olarak geçmişte ve günümüzde yaşanan ve savaş durumuna dönüşen uluslararası olayları inceledik. Elde ettiğimiz bilgiler ışığında çalışmada sunacağımız oyunun senaryosunu detaylı bir şekilde açıkladık. Sunduğumuz senaryoya göre oyunumuzu üç farklı matris oyuna dönüşebilecek bir matris girdili matris oyunu şeklinde modelledik. Oluşturulan modele göre yaşanan aktif savaş durumu, ateşkes durumuna veya savaşa devam etme durumlarına dönüşmektedir. Ateşkes durumunda oyun biter-ken, savaşa devam etme durumunda ise oyun işgal edilen yerleri tut veya de facto duruma geri dön şeklinde yeni bir matris girdili matris oyununa dönüşmektedir. De facto sınırlara dönülmesi durumunda ortaya çıkan bu oyun sona ererken, işgal edilen yerlerin tutulması durumunda ise savaşan bu iki ülkenin savaş stratejilerinin belirleneceği yeni bir oyun ortaya çıkmaktadır. Oluşan bu son oyunda ise ülkelerin savunma veya saldırı durumlarından birine geçeceği stratejiler arasından seçim yapmaları gerekmektedir ve bunun sonunda savaşın son durumu belirlenmektedir. Böylece içinde üç farklı oyun içeren matris girdili matris oyun modelinin her bir durumunu ayrı ayrı ele alıp, çözümlerini elde ederek gerçek problemin çözümüne ulaştık ve senaryodaki ülkelerin kriz durumunda ülke menfaatlerini koruyabilecekleri en ideal stratejileri belirledik. Böylece iki ülke arasında yaşanan bir savaşı oyun teorisi kullanarak modelledik ve sonuçlarını sunduk.

Keywords

• Matris girdili matris oyunlar
• oyun teorisi
• savaş oyunu
• uluslararası ilişkiler
• uluslararası kriz

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