Uluslararası ve Bölgesel Yolsuzlukla Mücadele Rejimlerinde Yaptırım ve Sosyal Baskı: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Analiz

Abstract

Uluslararası yaptırımlar, devletlerin üyesi oldukları kurumların prensiplerini ihlal eden politikalarına karşı kullanılan önemlerdir. Ekonomik, cezai ve hukuki yaptırımların ihlalci ülkelerde sınırlı etkiye sahip olması bir alternatif yöntem olarak kınama, ikna ve özellikle akran değerlendirmesine dayalı sosyal baskıyı öne çıkarmaktadır. Sosyal baskı, devletlerin üyesi oldukları kurumların değerlendirme takımları tarafından ortaya konan politika önerilerini dikkate almalarını, statü ve prestij kazanma arzusu veya statü kaybının yol açacağı dışlanma, aşağılanma gibi sosyal cezalardan kaçınma gibi motivasyonlarla reform yapmalarını teşvik edebilir. Uluslararası ve bölgesel örgütlerin üye ülkeleri için geliştirdikleri izleme yöntemleri ve değerlendirme takımlarının kurumsal yapısı sosyal baskının kapasitesini değiştiren özellikler taşıyabilir. İzleme ve akran değerlendirmesi tutarlı, şeffaf ve tarafsız şekilde uygulanır ve karşılıklı fikir alışverişine dayanırsa hedef hükümet tarafından daha meşru olarak algılanır ve sosyal anlamda oluşturacağı baskı da artar

Çalışma kapsamında Birleşmiş Milletler (küresel), OECD (alt-bölgesel), Avrupa Konseyi (bölgesel) ve Avrupa Birliği (bölgesel) gibi yolsuzlukla mücadelede öne çıkan rejimlerin kurumsal özellikleri incelenmiş ve sosyal baskı oluşturmak için belirtilen koşulları (karşılıklılık, tarafsızlık, tutarlılık, şeffaflık) ne ölçüde karşıladıkları analiz edilmiştir.Bu dört örgüt yolsuzlukla mücadele sözleşmelerinde yer alan ilkelerin üye ülkelerde ne ölçüde uygulanıp uygulanmadığını akran değerlendirmeleri ile izler ve detaylı öneriler ve eleştiriler sunarak ülkeleri baskı altına almayı hedeflerler. Fakat bu çalışma kapsamında yapılan karşılaştırmalı analiz, BM, OECD, Avrupa Konseyi ve Avrupa Birliği’nin yolsuzlukla mücadele rejimlerinin yol açtığı sosyal baskının varyasyonlar gösterdiğini ortaya koymuş, örgütlerin izleme ekiplerinin yapısı ve akran değerlendirme yöntemlerindeki farklıklara odaklanmıştır.

Keywords

• Yaptırım,yolsuzluk,sosyal baskı,izleme,Avrupa Birliği

Sanctions and Social Pressure in International and Regional Anti-Corruption Regimes: A Comparative Analysis

Abstract

Sanctions are measures that are used by international or regional organizations against the countries breaching membership principles. As the economic, material or legal sanctions have limited impact to redress breaches of membership principles, social sanctions based on shaming, persuasion and peer pressure have gained more relevance. The recommendations which are put forward by the evaluation teams of the international or regional organizations might push countries into reforms once they are exposed to the social pressure of peers and the public and aim to gain or maximize status, prestige or to avoid a loss of status. The institutional structure of monitoring mechanisms and evaluation teams of the international or regional organizations might have properties that lead to variation in the social pressure. Once the monitoring and peer reviews are applied in a transparent, consistent impartial way and based on reciprocal interactions with the target government, the legitimacy of international demands and criticism increases and thereby the social pressure becomes more effective.

In this research, the institutional properties of  four well-known anti-corruption regimes, namely the United Nations (global), OECD (sub-regional), Council of Europe (regional) and European Union (regional), are examined to understand to what extent they meet conditions (reciprocity, impartiality, consistency, transparency) for effective social pressure. The comparative analysis conducted in this paper indicates that the social pressure that emanate from the anti-corruption regimes of United Nations, OECD, Council of Europe and European Union vary as the institutional structure of their evaluation teams and methods of their peer reviews have different properties.

Keywords

• Sanction,corruption,social pressure,monitoring,European Union

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