The Rhetoric of Technical Neutrality: IMF Policies in the 1997 East Asian Crisis and US Geopolitical Interests

Öz

This study systematically analyzes within a structural framework how the lending and conditionality policies of the International Monetary Fund during the 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis deviated from the institution’s claimed principle of ‘technical neutrality’ and were shaped by the changing post-Cold War geopolitical and economic interests of the United States. The myth of technical neutrality, concealed behind standardized accounting methods such as the IMF’s Balance of Payments and Special Drawing Rights, is deciphered through the perspective of International Political Economy. Using a comparative case study method, the crisis experiences of South Korea and Thailand, which were under the US military umbrella, alongside Indonesia, which lost its geopolitical indispensability, and Malaysia, which maintained its strategic autonomy, are examined in depth. Research findings indicate that the IMF overstepped the boundaries of macroeconomic stabilization by imposing severe structural conditions even on the strategic allies of the United States. These interventions functioned as a geopolitical lever, opening the property regimes of the target countries to American capital and Foreign Direct Investment through the mechanism of ‘weaponized interdependence.’ Conversely, Malaysia’s refusal of IMF prescriptions and its achievement of a successful recovery through capital controls presented a viable alternative to the hegemonic crisis management based on the Washington Consensus. The study proves that the international financial architecture is not merely a technical surveillance mechanism, but a political apparatus driven by power asymmetries and hegemonic interests.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• East Asian Financial Crisis
• IMF
• US Hegemony
• Informal Governance
• Technical Neutrality

Teknik Tarafsızlık Retoriği: 1997 Doğu Asya Krizinde IMF Politikaları ve ABD'nin Jeopolitik Çıkarları

Öz

Bu çalışma, 1997 Doğu Asya Finansal Krizi sürecinde Uluslararası Para Fonu’nun kredi ve şartlılık politikalarının, kurumun iddia ettiği ‘teknik tarafsızlık’ ilkesinden saptığını ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Soğuk Savaş sonrası değişen jeopolitik ve ekonomik çıkarları tarafından şekillendirildiğini yapısal bir çerçevede analiz etmektedir. IMF’nin Ödemeler Dengesi ve Özel Çekme Hakları gibi standartlaştırılmış muhasebe metotları arkasına gizlenen teknik tarafsızlık retoriği, uluslararası politik ekonomi perspektifiyle deşifre edilmektedir. Karşılaştırmalı vaka analizi yöntemi kullanılarak; ABD’nin askeri şemsiyesi altındaki Güney Kore ve Tayland ile jeopolitik vazgeçilmezliğini yitiren Endonezya ve stratejik otonomisini koruyan Malezya’nın kriz deneyimleri derinlemesine incelenmiştir. Araştırma bulguları, IMF’nin makroekonomik istikrar sınırlarını aşarak ABD’nin stratejik müttefiklerine dahi ağır yapısal şartlar dayattığını göstermektedir. Bu müdahaleler, hedef ülkelerin mülkiyet rejimlerini ‘silahlandırılmış karşılıklı bağımlılık’ mekanizması üzerinden Amerikan sermayesine ve Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlara açan jeopolitik bir kaldıraç olarak işlev görmüştür. Buna karşılık, IMF reçetelerini reddederek sermaye kontrolleriyle başarılı bir toparlanma sağlayan Malezya, Washington Uzlaşısı'na dayalı hegemonik kriz yönetimine karşı uygulanabilir bir alternatif sunmuştur. Çalışma, uluslararası finansal mimarinin teknik bir gözetim mekanizmasından ziyade, güç asimetrilerinin ve hegemonik çıkarların yönlendirdiği politik bir aygıt olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Doğu Asya Finansal Krizi
• IMF
• ABD Hegemonyası
• Gayriresmi Yönetişim
• Teknik Tarafsızlık

Kaynakça

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