Yıl 2019, Cilt 6 , Sayı 12, Sayfalar 61 - 93 2019-12-26

HUKUK VE İKTİSAT PERSPEKTİFİNDEN ANAYASA MAHKEMELERİNİN İKTİSADİ ANALİZİ

Ali PİŞKİN [1]


Anayasa ile teminat altına alınan özel mülkiyet güvenliği ve sözleşme güvenliği, rant kollama ve siyasi yandaşlık gibi nedenlerden dolayı her zaman sağlanamamaktadır. Bu nedenle yasama ve yürütme erklerinin yaptığı ve uyguladığı hukuki normlar anayasa mahkemesinin anayasallık denetimine tabi olmalıdır. Bu denetim bağımsız olduğu ölçüde iktisadi birimlere istikrarlı ve öngörülebilir bir ortam temin etmektedir. Böylece ekonomilerin üretim ve yatırım hacmi artmakta, finans piyasaları genişlemektedir. Ancak anayasa mahkemesinin bağımsızlık derecesi çeşitli etkenlere göre değişiklik göstermektedir. Bunun en önemli nedenleri: mahkemenin, anayasanın siyasi bir metin olmasından dolayı siyasi çıktılar üretmesi, hâkimlerin karar verirken yorum yapabilmeleri, iptal davalarının erkler arası çatışmalara sahne olması ve mahkeme üyelerinin siyasi aktörler tarafından atanmasıdır. Bahsedilen nedenler, hâkimlerin oy davranışlarının stratejik yaklaşım ile açıklanabilmesine olanak tanımaktadır. Literatürde yapılan çeşitli çalışmalar bu sonucu doğrulamakla beraber ülkelerin hukuk sistemlerinin ve kurumsal yapılanmalarının farklı olması, ülkelere özgü analizlerin yapılmasını gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Hukuk ve İktisat disiplini kapsamında, anayasa mahkemelerinin iktisadi analizinin nasıl gerçekleştirildiğini ilgili teoriyi ve ampirik çalışmaları göstererek açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Yöntem olarak; disiplinin tarihsel gelişim patikası dikkate alınarak önce teorik ilerlemelerin, devamında ise uygulamalı çalışmaların verilmesi benimsenmektedir. Anayasa mahkemelerinin iktisadi analizi, hem disiplinlerarası bir çalışma yöntemini gerekli kılması, hem de kurumsal yapıların ülkeden ülkeye farklılık göstermesi nedeniyle hala gelişime açık bir çalışma alanı olma özelliği taşımaktadır.

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Orcid: 0000-0002-6138-7697
Yazar: Ali PİŞKİN (Sorumlu Yazar)
Kurum: DOĞUŞ ÜNİVERSİTESİ
Ülke: Turkey


Teşekkür Değerli katkılarından dolayı doktora tez danışmanım Doç. Dr. Tamer ÇETİN'e ve Dr. Öğretim Üyesi Dinçer DEDEOĞLU'na teşekkür ederim. Eksikler ve hatalar şahsıma aittir.
Tarihler

Başvuru Tarihi : 28 Kasım 2019
Kabul Tarihi : 28 Aralık 2019
Yayımlanma Tarihi : 26 Aralık 2019

Bibtex @olgu sunumu { akademik-hassasiyetler652035, journal = {Akademik Hassasiyetler}, issn = {2148-5933}, address = {}, publisher = {Hüzeyfe Süleyman ARSLAN}, year = {2019}, volume = {6}, pages = {61 - 93}, doi = {}, title = {HUKUK VE İKTİSAT PERSPEKTİFİNDEN ANAYASA MAHKEMELERİNİN İKTİSADİ ANALİZİ}, key = {cite}, author = {PİŞKİN, Ali} }
APA PİŞKİN, A . (2019). HUKUK VE İKTİSAT PERSPEKTİFİNDEN ANAYASA MAHKEMELERİNİN İKTİSADİ ANALİZİ. Akademik Hassasiyetler , 6 (12) , 61-93 . Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/akademik-hassasiyetler/issue/51005/652035
MLA PİŞKİN, A . "HUKUK VE İKTİSAT PERSPEKTİFİNDEN ANAYASA MAHKEMELERİNİN İKTİSADİ ANALİZİ". Akademik Hassasiyetler 6 (2019 ): 61-93 <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/akademik-hassasiyetler/issue/51005/652035>
Chicago PİŞKİN, A . "HUKUK VE İKTİSAT PERSPEKTİFİNDEN ANAYASA MAHKEMELERİNİN İKTİSADİ ANALİZİ". Akademik Hassasiyetler 6 (2019 ): 61-93
RIS TY - JOUR T1 - HUKUK VE İKTİSAT PERSPEKTİFİNDEN ANAYASA MAHKEMELERİNİN İKTİSADİ ANALİZİ AU - Ali PİŞKİN Y1 - 2019 PY - 2019 N1 - DO - T2 - Akademik Hassasiyetler JF - Journal JO - JOR SP - 61 EP - 93 VL - 6 IS - 12 SN - 2148-5933- M3 - UR - Y2 - 2019 ER -
EndNote %0 Akademik Hassasiyetler HUKUK VE İKTİSAT PERSPEKTİFİNDEN ANAYASA MAHKEMELERİNİN İKTİSADİ ANALİZİ %A Ali PİŞKİN %T HUKUK VE İKTİSAT PERSPEKTİFİNDEN ANAYASA MAHKEMELERİNİN İKTİSADİ ANALİZİ %D 2019 %J Akademik Hassasiyetler %P 2148-5933- %V 6 %N 12 %R %U
ISNAD PİŞKİN, Ali . "HUKUK VE İKTİSAT PERSPEKTİFİNDEN ANAYASA MAHKEMELERİNİN İKTİSADİ ANALİZİ". Akademik Hassasiyetler 6 / 12 (Aralık 2019): 61-93 .
AMA PİŞKİN A . HUKUK VE İKTİSAT PERSPEKTİFİNDEN ANAYASA MAHKEMELERİNİN İKTİSADİ ANALİZİ. Akademik Hassasiyetler. 2019; 6(12): 61-93.
Vancouver PİŞKİN A . HUKUK VE İKTİSAT PERSPEKTİFİNDEN ANAYASA MAHKEMELERİNİN İKTİSADİ ANALİZİ. Akademik Hassasiyetler. 2019; 6(12): 93-61.