Sorumluluk ve Kaçınılmazlık

Öz

John Martin Fischer, özgür irade ve determinizm ile ilgili tartışmalarda öne sürülen düşüncelerden biri olan yarı-bağdaşırcılık görüşünün önde gelen isimlerindendir. Ona göre, determinizm kabul edildiğinde özgürce bir seçimde bulunabilmek mümkün olmasa bile, kişiler, eylemlerinden ahlaken sorumlu tutulabilirler. Bu durumda ahlaki sorumluluk için birden fazla seçenekten birini seçebilme, yani başka türlü eylemde bulunabilme imkânı gerekli değildir. Fischer, çevirisini sunduğumuz Sorumluluk ve Kaçınılmazlık adlı makalesinde, kişilerin eylemlerinden, gerçekleştirmedikleri eylemlerden (ihmallerden) ve eylemlerinin veya ihmallerinin sonuçlarından nasıl sorumlu olacaklarını açıklayan bir ahlaki sorumluluk teorisini genel hatlarıyla ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Yarı-Bağdaşırcılık
• Sorumluluk
• Ahlaki Sorumluluk
• Determinizm
• Kontrol

Responsibility and Inevitability

Öz

John Martin Fischer is one of the leading proponents of semi-compatibilism, one of the ideas proposed in the debates on free will and determinism. According to him, even if it is not possible to make a free choice once determinism is accepted, persons can be held morally responsible for their actions. Thus, the ability to choose one of several alternatives, i.e. to act otherwise, is not necessary for moral responsibility. In his translated article Responsibility and Inevitability, Fischer sketches an outline of a theory of moral responsibility that explains how persons are responsible for their actions, for the actions they do not perform (omissions), and for the consequences of their actions or omissions.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Semi-Compatibilism
• Responsibility
• Moral Responsibility
• Determinism
• Control

Kaynakça

1. Berofsky, Bernard. Freedom from Necessity. New York and London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987.
2. Fischer, John Martin. “Responsibility and Control”. The Journal of Philosophy 79/1 (1982), 24-40.
3. Fischer, John Martin. “Responsibility and Failure”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society New Series 86 (86 1985), 251-270.
4. Fischer, John Martin. “Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility”. Responsibility, Character and the Emotions. ed. Ferdinand Schoeman. 81-106. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
5. Fischer, John Martin. “Review of Peter Van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will”. Philosophical Review 97 (1988), 401-408.
6. Frankfurt, Harry G. “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”. The Journal of Philosophy 66/33 (1969), 829-839.
7. Frankfurt, Harry G. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”. The Journal of Philosophy 68/1 (1971), 5-20.
8. Goldman, Alvin. A Theory of Human Action. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

9. Heinaman, Robert. “Incompatibilism without the Principle of Alternative Possibilities”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64/3 (1986), 266-276.
10. Pike, Nelson. “Over-Power and God’s Responsibility for Sin”. The Existence and Nature of God. ed. Alfred J. Freddoso. 11-35. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983.
11. Rowe, William L. “Causing and Being Responsible for What Is Inevitable”. American Philosophical Quarterly 26/2 (1989), 153-160.
12. Van Inwagen, Peter. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford, NY: Clarendon Press, 1983.
13. Wolf, Susan. “Asymmetrical Freedom”. The Journal of Philosophy 77/3 (1980), 151-166.
14. Zimmerman, Michael J. An Essay on Moral Responsibility. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988.