Erosion of the Rule of Law Principle through the Instrumentalization of Law: Practices from Council of Europe States

Öz

Today, authoritarian tendencies are reaching a global extent. It is
possible to say that these tendencies deserve the characterization of - in
Huntington's words- a Reverse Wave in the Third Wave of democratization.
This study examines the developments in the Russian Federation, Hungary,
and Poland, where authoritarianism and regression from the rule of law are
seen. A separation from democratization and the rule of law in all these three
countries is clear. It started in Russia and spread to other countries in the
form of an avalanche, especially in the field of judiciary. The regression in
the Third Wave is taking place in the judiciary, relatively the most harmless
political power, through instrumentalization of law. It is observed that the
supranational mechanisms, which protect human rights, are rendered
dysfunctional under the pretext of ensuring the supremacy of the
constitution, and the rupture from those mechanisms is veiled by presenting
it as a matter of sovereignty. Therefore, it is essential that the judiciary be
freed from the interventions of other powers and regains its essential role in
protecting rights. To that end, the necessity of nation-states’ reintegration
with supranational mechanisms which protect human rights is emphasized.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Rule of law
• Constitutional review
• Instrumentalization of law
• Reverse Wave in the Third Wave
• Russia-Hungary-Poland.

HUKUKUN ARAÇSALLAŞTIRILMASI YOLUYLA HUKUK DEVLETİ İLKESİNDE AŞINMA: AVRUPA KONSEYİ ÜLKELERİNDEN DENEYİMLER

Öz

Günümüzde devletlerin otoriterleşme eğiliminin küresel boyuta ulaştığı, hak temelli kamu politikaları yerine popülist söylemlerin kabul gördüğü ve yöneticilerin iktidarlarını sürdürebilmek adına hukuku göz ardı eden eylem ve işlemlerle otoritelerini pekiştirdikleri açıktır. Bu otoriterleşmenin, - Huntington’ın ifadesi ile - demokratikleşmenin Üçüncü Dalgsı’nda bir Ters Dalga nitelendirmesini hak ettiğini söylemek olanaklıdır. Çalışmada otoriterleşme ve hukuk devleti ilkesinden geriye gidişin sıklıkla dile getirildiği Rusya Federasyonu, Macaristan ve Polonya’daki gelişmeler incelenmiştir. Her üç ülkede de demokratikleşme ve hukuk devleti ilkesinden açık bir ayrılış yaşanmaktadır. Bu ayrılış Rusya’daki gelişmelerle başlayıp, çığlaşma biçiminde diğer ülkelere sıçramıştır. Bu durum özellikle, anayasa yargısının tasarımı ile yargı bağımsızlığı alanında gerçekleşmektedir. Üçüncü Dalga’daki geriye gidiş, görece en zararsız olan yargı erkinde gerçekleşmekte ve bunun hukukun araçsallaştırılması yoluyla yapılmaktadır. Bu çerçevede anayasanın üstünlüğü bahanesiyle insan haklarını koruyucu ulusal üstü mekanizmaların işlevsiz hale getirildiği ve bu durum egemenlik meselesi gibi gösterilerek Sözleşme sisteminden kopuşun perdelendiği gözlenmektedir. Bu gerilemenin onarılamaz sosyal, siyasal, toplumsal ve ekonomik sonuçları olacaktır. Bu çalışmada elde edilen tespitler sonucunda yargının diğer erklerden yönelen müdahalelerden kurtarılarak hakların korunmasındaki gerçek rolüne kavuşturulması, bu amaçla ulus devletlerin insan haklarını korumaya yönelik ulusal üstü mekanizmalarla yeniden bütünleşmesi gerekliliğine işaret edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Hukuk devleti
• Anayasa yargısı
• Hukukun araşsallaştırılması
• Üçüncü Dalga’da ters dalga
• Rusya-Macaristan-Polonya.

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