Hamas’ın 7 Ekim 2023 İsrail Saldırısı Sonrası “Direniş Ekseni”nin Krizi

Öz

Bu makale, Hamas’ın İsrail’e yönelik gerçekleştirdiği 7 Ekim 2023 saldırılarının ardından “direniş ekseni”nin nasıl bir durumda olduğunu incelemektedir. Çalışmanın temel amacı, 7 Ekim 2023 sonrasında yaşanan askeri ve siyasi gelişmelerin “direniş ekseni”nin varlığını ve işlevselliğini nasıl etkilediğini ve İran’ın bu süreçte nasıl bir politika izlediğini ortaya koymaktır. Mevcut literatürde “direniş ekseni” genellikle caydırıcılık, güç dengesi ve stratejik derinlik gibi kavramlarla açıklanırken, bu çalışma bu tür açıklamaların “direniş ekseni”nin temellerini ve yansımalarını kavramak için yetersiz olduğunu savunmaktadır. Makale, “direniş ekseni”nin stratejik ya da rasyonel bir politika olmaktan ziyade, İran İslam Cumhuriyeti'nin devrim sonrası kimliği, anti-Amerikancılığı ve anti-Siyonizm’ine yerleşik, katı bir rutin politika uygulaması olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Ancak çalışmada gösterildiği üzere İran’ın “direniş ekseni”ni katı bir rutin olarak devam ettirmesi kazançlarının ötesinde büyük maliyetlere ve kayıplara yol açmıştır. Nitekim 7 Ekim 2023 sonrası dönemde İran'ın maddi ve ideolojik taahhütleri ile maddi kapasitesi arasında derin bir uyumsuzluk ortaya çıkmıştır. Hamas ve Hizbullah'ın ağır kayıpları, Esad rejiminin çöküşü ve İran’ın İsrail ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin askeri baskısına giderek daha fazla maruz kalması, “direniş ekseni”nin caydırıcılık ve stratejik derinlik aracı olarak etkinlik sağlayamadığını göstermiştir. Bulgular, “direniş ekseni”nin tamamen ortadan kalkmasa bile 7 Ekim 2023 sonrasında önemli ölçüde yıprandığını ve ağır kayıplar verdiğini, İran’ın ise “direniş ekseni” politikasına katı bağlılığı yüzünden maliyetli bir çatışma sürecinin içerisine sürüklendiğini göstermektedir. Öte yandan İran ve müttefikleri “direniş paradigması”na verdikleri ideolojik, kimliksel ve jeopolitik önemden dolayı “direniş ekseni”ni inatçı bir şekilde sürdürmeye devam etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Direniş Ekseni
• Hamas
• İran
• İsrail
• 7 Ekim 2023 Saldırıları

The Crisis of the “Axis of Resistance” Following Hamas’ October 7, 2023 Attack on Israel

Öz

This article examines the status of the “axis of resistance” following Hamas’ attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023. The main objective of this study is to reveal how the military and political developments that took place after October 7, 2023 affected the existence and functionality of the “axis of resistance” and what policy Iran pursued during this process.Although existing literature often interprets the “axis of resistance” using concepts such as deterrence, balance of power, and strategic depth, these frameworks are insufficient for capturing its foundations. The study contends that the “axis of resistance” constitutes a routinized foreign policy practice rooted in the Iran Islamic Republic’s post-revolutionary identity, anti-Americanism, and anti-Zionism, rather than a purely strategic or rational policy. The analysis demonstrates that Iran’s persistent adherence to this rigid routine now incurs costs that surpass its benefits. After October 7, 2023, a pronounced gap emerged between Iran’s material and ideological commitments and its material capabilities. The significant losses suffered by Hamas and Hezbollah, the collapse of the Assad regime, and Iran’s heightened vulnerability to military pressure from Israel and the United States of America indicate that the “axis of resistance” can no longer serve effectively as a tool of deterrence or strategic depth. The findings reveal that, while the “axis of resistance” has not entirely disappeared, it has been substantially weakened since October 7, 2023, and Iran is now ensnared in a costly conflict dynamic due to its inflexible commitment to this policy. Nonetheless, Iran and its allies persist in upholding the “axis of resistance” primarily because of the ideological, identity based and geopolitical importance they attribute to the resistance paradigm.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Axis of Resistance
• Hamas
• Iran
• Israel
• October 7 2023 Attacks

Kaynakça

1. Abatan, K. (2025, Kasım 11). Direniş Ekseni’nin karmaşık yeniden doğuşu. Yeni Yaşam. https://yeniyasamgazetesi9.com/direnis-ekseninin-karmasik-yeniden-dogusu/
2. Adib-Moghaddam, A. (2021). What is Iran?: Domestic politics and international relations in five musical pieces (C. 15). Cambridge University Press.
3. Ahmadian, H. (2021). Dignity, Wisdom and Expediency: How Ideational Factors Shape Iran’s Foreign Policy. The International Spectator, 56(4), 33-48.
4. Akbarzadeh, S., & Conduit, D. (Ed.). (2016). Iran in the World. Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-58577-6
5. Al Jazeera. (2025, Ağustos 30). Yemen’s Houthis confirm prime minister killed in Israeli strike on Sanaa. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/30/yemens-houthis-confirm-israeli-airstrike-killed-the-groups-prime-minister
6. Ali-Khan, V., & Cambanis, T. (2025, Mart 19). Down but Not Out: Reassessing the Axis of Resistance. The Century Foundation. https://tcf.org/content/report/down-but-not-out-reassessing-the-axis-of-resistance/
7. Asadi, A. (2019). The role of Saudi Arabia in the Iranian security structure. Faselnameye Mütalate Rahbordi, 22(85), 83-106.
8. Bazoobandi, S. (2019). Iran’s Revolutionary Guards: Four Decades of Expanded Business and Military Influence. Washington, DC: Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. Accessed June, 28, 2020.

9. BBC News. (2025, Ocak 4). İran’ın Direniş Ekseni ayakta kalabilecek mi? BBC News Türkçe. https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/ced87ggl24jo
10. Carl, N., & Carter, B. (2025). The State of the Axis of Resistance: Assessing Risks and Opportunities for the United States. American Enterprise Institute. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep72839
11. Cingöz, M., Özev, M. H., & İzol, R. (2025). Saudi Arabia’s Quest for Regional Hegemony on the Basis of Opposition to Iran. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 00219096251313551. https://doi.org/10.1177/00219096251313551
12. Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2011). The Sage handbook of qualitative research. Sage Publication.
13. El-Hatip, L. (2024, Eylül 4). “Direniş Ekseni” efsanesinin sonu. Independent Türkçe. https://www.indyturk.com/node/744549/d%C3%BCnyadan-sesler/direni%C5%9F-ekseni-efsanesinin-sonu
14. Flockhart, T. (2016). The problem of change in constructivist theory: Ontological security seeking and agent motivation. Review of international studies, 42(5), 799-820.
15. Garayag, D. (2008). Principles and values of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An analysis on the texts. Quarterly Journal of Strategic Studies, 11(40), 270-313.
16. Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford University Press.
17. Goforth, S. (2011). Axis of Unity: Venezuela, Iran & the Threat to America. Potomac Books, Inc. https://books.google.com/books?hl=tr&lr=&id=k-LWDPWFKlsC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=axis+of+resistance+and+venezuela&ots=0fGQx8oXNL&sig=3lkr7N9dWHakQXTnfwD4T-FSWk4
18. Hashempour, P., Haghighi, A., & Zarei, G. (2021). The identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within the axis of Islamic resistance. Faselnameye Ulum Tahsise Sepehre Siyaset, 8(27).
19. INSS. (2025, Eylül 11). Fracturing the Axis: Degrading and Disrupting Iran’s Proxy Network. INSS. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/fracturing-the-axis/
20. jahannews. (2013, Mart 18). Bidare Eslami ve Ayendeye Mihvere Mukavemet. جهان نيوز. jahannews.com. https://www.jahannews.com/phototitr/277333/
21. kayhan.ir. (2025, Ağustos 19). Mihvere Mukavemet Ser Sahtane Der Hal Mebareze Est [Text,Image]. kayhan.ir. (World). Kayhan.ir. https://kayhan.ir/fa/news/316289
22. Laing, R. D. (1965). The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness (Reprint edition). Penguin Books.
23. Laurence, L. (2022). Sunnis and Shi’a. Princeton University Press.
24. Mahmoudian, A. (2025, Ocak 10). Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ Weakened But Still Dangerous • Stimson Center. Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2025/irans-axis-of-resistance-weakened-but-still-dangerous/
25. Mansour, R., & Al- Shakeri, H. (2025, Haziran 11). The shape-shifting ‘axis of resistance’ | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/shape-shifting-axis-resistance
26. Mansour, R., & Azizi, H. (2025, Eylül 2). The Silent Frontlines: Why the “Axis of Resistance” Stayed Quiet in the Iran-Israel War | Clingendael. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/silent-frontlines-why-axis-resistance-stayed-quiet-iran-israel-war
27. Mashreghnews. (2025, Ekim 20). San: İran der Hal Bazsazi Mihvere Mukavemete Mentekaye Est. مشرق نیوز. Mashreghnews. https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/1758485/
28. Mason, R. (2021). Strategic Depth Through Enclaves: Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. Middle East Policy, 28(2), 96-108.
29. Mesbahi, M. (2011). Free and confined: Iran and the international system. Iranian review of foreign affairs, 2(5), 9-34.
30. Mitzen, J., & Larson, K. (2017). Ontological Security and Foreign Policy. Içinde Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.458
31. Mroue, B., & El- Deeb, S. (2023, Ekim 9). Hamas official says Iran and Hezbollah had no role in Israel incursion but they’ll help if needed. AP News. https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-israel-palestinian-hamas-hezbollah-iran-2ccfaa49139358e6d2add89878a0cfe4
32. Muradî, C. (2019). An Analysis on the Reasons of Iran’s Syrian Presence. Faselnameye Metalaate Beynelmileli, 16(3).
33. Okalan, E., & İşyar, Ö. G. (2023). İRAN DESTEKLİ Şİİ MİLİSLERİN SURİYE İÇ SAVAŞINDAKİ ROLÜ. Uluslararası Afro-Avrasya Araştırmaları Dergisi, 8(16), 13-35.
34. Oppermann, K., & Hansel, M. (2019). The ontological security of special relationships: The case of Germany’s relations with Israel. European Journal of International Security, 4(1), 79-100.
35. Parchizadeh, R. (2025). (99+) Discussion: Iran’s Axis of Resistance after the 12-Day War with Israel - Academia.edu. https://www.academia.edu/s/cf6f49ad4c?source=ai_email
36. RadioFerda. (2021, Mayıs 31). Iran has spent 30 billion dollars in Syria. Radio Ferda. https://www.radiofarda.com/a/iran-mp-says-30-billions-expended-in-syria-by-islamic-republic/30623613.html
37. RFE. (2021, Temmuz 26). China in Eurasia Widget Form-GR-1878. RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/31157800.html
38. Rieffer-Flanagan, B. A. (2009). Islamic Realpolitik: Two-Level Iranian Foreign Policy. International Journal on World Peace, 26(4), 7-35.
39. Ringmar, E. (2015). Introduction the international politics of recognition. İçinde International politics of recognition (ss. 3-23). Routledge.
40. Steele, B. (2008). Ontological Security in International Relations: Self-Identity and the IR State. Routledge & CRC Press.
41. Steinberg, G. (2021). The” axis of resistance”: Iran’s expansion in the Middle East is hitting a wall.
42. Subotić, J. (2016). Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change 1. Foreign Policy Analysis, 12(4), 610-627.
43. Tejeda, G. (2025, Eylül 18). The Diminished Strategic Value of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”. The Soufan Center. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-september-18/
44. Wastnidge, E., & Mabon, S. (2024). The resistance axis and regional order in the Middle East: Nomos, space, and normative alternatives. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 51(5), 954-971. https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2023.2179975
45. Wehrey, F. M. (2009). The rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the domestic roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (C. 821). Rand Corporation.