Kamu Malı Deneylerinde Geribildirim Tipleri ve Ceza Davranışı

Yıl 2023, , 531 - 559, 19.09.2023

Umut Öneş

https://doi.org/10.33630/ausbf.1175009

Öz

Davranışsal iktisat yazınında, kamu mallarının merkezi otorite olmaksızın sağlanmasını modelleyen gönüllü katılım mekanizması deneylerinde, deneklere cezalandırma olanağı sunulmasının hem katkı düzeylerinin hem de kazanç miktarlarının oturum sonuna kadar yüksek seviyede seyretmesini sağladığı gösterilmiştir. Bu çalışmada, deney tasarımına deneylerin standart iktisadi kurama göre dominant stratejilerini değiştirmeyecek şekilde grup davranışına dair farklı veya ilave geribildirimler sunulmasının ceza ve katkı davranışına etkisi incelenmiştir. Deneklere, ceza aşamasında gruptaki diğer deneklerin katkı miktarları yerine ceza öncesi kazanç miktarları gösterildiği tretmanda, grup kazancının anlamlı bir şekilde arttığı, bunun yanında verilen normal ve anti-sosyal ceza miktarında anlamlı bir düşüş olduğu gözlenmiştir. Ayrıca bu tretmanda, deneklerin bedavacıları daha şiddetli bir şekilde cezalandırdığı ve grup içi katkı miktarının daha homojen olduğu bulunmuştur. Deneklere ceza aşaması sonrası gruptaki diğer deneklerin aldığı ceza miktarlarının da gösterildiği tretmanda ise verilen normal ve anti-sosyal ceza miktarlarında kontrole göre anlamlı bir fark gözlenmezken, bedavacıların cezalandırma şiddeti ve kazanç düzeylerinin anlamlı şekilde daha yüksek olduğu görülmüştür.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kamu malı deneyleri, Ceza, Anti-sosyal ceza, Gönüllü katılım mekanizması, Çerçeveleme etkisi

Feedback and Punishment Behavior in Public Good Experiments

Öz

It’s been shown by numerous studies that higher contribution levels can be sustained by introducing a punishment mechanism to voluntary contribution public game experiments. Our study analyses the impact of providing different or additional information about earnings and punishment behavior of others in the group. These new feedback forms should not alter the dominant strategies of the subjects, according to the standard economics theory. In the first treatment, the preliminary earnings information of others in the group is displayed instead of contributions before the punishment stage. We found the earnings are significantly higher and the amount of punishment -both normal and anti-social- is significantly lower compared to baseline. Additionally, free riders were punished more severely and in-group variance of contribution levels were significantly lower. In our second treatment, information about the punishment received by others in the group were displayed at the end of each period. While no impact on amounts of normal or anti-social punishment or in-group variance of contribution was found compared to baseline; free riders were found to be punished more harshly and average earnings were significantly higher.

Anahtar Kelimeler

public goods experiments, peer punishment, anti-social punishment, voluntary contribution mechanism, framing effects

Kaynakça

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