Kamu Sektöründe Bireysel Performansa Göre Ücret Uygulamaları: Başarısızlığın Yaygınlaşması

Yıl 2016, , 627 - 651, 15.06.2016

Selim Coşkun , Hakan Dulkadiroğlu , Nevzat Kunduracı

https://doi.org/10.1501/SBFder_0000002405

Cited By: 1

Öz

Kamu yönetiminde uzun süredir performans temelli bütçe programları, stratejik yönetim, kalite
yönetimi, piyasa analizi, performans yönetimi gibi özel sektör kaynaklı araçlar kullanılmaktadır. Bu
araçlardan en fazla tartışılanlardan birisi performansa göre ücret programlarıdır. Performansa göre ücret
uygulamaları giderek yaygınlaşmasına karşın araştırmalar kamuda bireysel performansa göre ücret
programlarının büyük oranda başarısız olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu çalışma kapsamında farklı ülkelerin
kamu yönetiminde gerçekleştirilen performansa göre ücret uygulamaları, bu alanda yapılan araştırmalar ve
programların uygulama nedenleri irdelenmektedir. Bireysel düzeyde gerçekleştirilmeye çalışılan performansa
göre ücret uygulamalarındaki başarısızlıklara rağmen uygulamanın yaygınlaşmasındaki paradoksal durum
analiz edilmeye çalışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kamu Sektörü, Bireysel Performans, Performansa Göre Ücret, Kamu Reformu, Yaygınlaşma

Individual Pay for Performance in the Public Sector: Dissemination of the Failure

Öz

For a long time public organizations have been using tools and techniques originating from the private sector such as performance based budget programs, strategic management, quality management, market analysis and performance management. Among these tools and techniques, pay for performance programs may be the most discussed one. Even though reports and surveys indicate that individual pay for performance schemes in the public sector failed to a large extent, these programs have been diffusing throughout the world. This study analyzes pay for performance practices in public administration in different countries. In this context, the research on the success/failure of the pay for performance programs will be explained briefly. Then, different views on the dissemination of the programs in the public sector are reviewed. Even if pay for performance programs at the individual level do not have a success, we are going to
explain why the programs are getting popular as a paradox

Anahtar Kelimeler

Public Sector, Individual Performance, Pay for Performance, Public Reform, Dissemination

Kaynakça

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