Participation, Identity, and Resources: Inequality Dynamics in Local Governments

Yıl 2026, Cilt: 11 Sayı: 1, 557 - 594, 28.02.2026

İbrahim Yıldız

https://doi.org/10.25229/beta.1842666

https://izlik.org/JA27GL22YN

Öz

The relationship between local governments and social inequalities constitutes a central theme in contemporary public policy and democratic governance literature. Inequality is not confined solely to income disparities but is reproduced through unequal access to public services, infrastructure, spatial development, and political participation. Within this framework, local governments are regarded as key institutional arenas where inequalities are both generated and potentially transformed. While fiscal federalism theories suggest that redistributive policies are constrained at the local level, empirical and theoretical studies emphasize the indirect inequality-reducing effects of local service provision and public investment. Electoral competition, voter turnout, identity-based political preferences, and fiscal capacity significantly shape the ability and willingness of local governments to address inequality. This study approaches the relationship between local governance and inequality from a broader theoretical perspective rather than limiting the analysis to a single national context. By integrating insights from political economy, public finance, and democratic theory, it examines how political, fiscal, and institutional dynamics influence the persistence and transformation of inequalities at the local level.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Income inequality , Local governments , Social municipalism

Katılım, Kimlik ve Kaynak: Yerel Yönetimlerde Eşitsizlik Dinamikleri

https://izlik.org/JA27GL22YN

Öz

Yerel yönetimler ile toplumsal eşitsizlikler arasındaki ilişki, çağdaş kamu politikası ve demokrasi literatüründe merkezi bir tartışma alanı olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Eşitsizlik, yalnızca gelir dağılımındaki farklılıklarla sınırlı olmayıp; kamusal hizmetlere erişim, altyapı olanakları, mekânsal kalkınma düzeyleri ve siyasal katılım biçimleri üzerinden çok boyutlu olarak yeniden üretilmektedir. Bu çerçevede yerel yönetimler, eşitsizliklerin hem üretildiği hem de dönüştürülebileceği temel yönetsel ve siyasal mekânlar olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Literatürde bir yandan mali federalizm yaklaşımı yerel düzeyde yeniden dağıtıcı politikaların sınırlı olacağını savunurken, diğer yandan yerel hizmet sunumu ve kamu yatırımlarının dolaylı eşitsizlik azaltıcı etkilerine dikkat çekilmektedir. Seçim rekabeti, seçmen katılımı, kimlik temelli siyasal tercihler ve mali kapasite gibi faktörlerin, yerel yönetimlerin eşitsizlikle mücadele potansiyelini önemli ölçüde şekillendirdiği görülmektedir. Bu çalışma, yerel yönetimler ile eşitsizlik arasındaki ilişkiyi yalnızca Türkiye bağlamıyla sınırlamadan, genel teorik bir perspektif çerçevesinde ele almakta; siyasal, mali ve kurumsal dinamiklerin eşitsizliklerin sürekliliğindeki rolünü tartışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Gelir Eşitsizliği , Yerel Yönetimler , Sosyal Belediyecilik

Kaynakça

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