George Akerlof, Michael Spence Ve Joseph Stiglitz’in Asimetrik Bilgi Üzerine Katkıları

Öz

Nobel Economics Prize is given to the economists each year who contributed significant achievements in economics and contribution to the humanity. In 2001, the Royal Swedish Academy awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences to George A. Akerlof, A. Michael Spence ve Joseph E. Stiglitz, for academic life, especially their contributions to economic applications of asymmetric information. In this paper, I will analyze Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz as a person and as an academician and their contributions to game theory and asymmetric information.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• George Akerlof, Michael Spence, Joseph Stiglitz, Asymetric Information

GEORGE AKERLOF, MICHAEL SPENCE VE JOSEPH STIGLITZ’İN ASİMETRİK BİLGİ ÜZERİNE KATKILARI

Öz

Nobel Ekonomi Ödülü, ekonomi biliminde kaydedilen önemli başarıların insanlığa katkılarından dolayı her yıl bir veya birkaç ekonomiste verilmektedir. Nitekim 2001 yılında İsveç Kraliyet Bilimler Akademisi bu ödülü, akademik yaşamı boyunca özellikle asimetrik bilginin ekonomik uygulamaları üzerine yaptıkları çalışmaları için George A. Akerlof, A. Michael Spence ve Joseph E. Stiglitz'e vermiştir. Bu makalede öncelikle hem bir insan olarak Akerlof, Spence ve Stiglitz'in kendisini hem de akademik yaşamındaki yaşam serüvenine yer verilecek, daha sonra özellikle iktisat bilimine ve asimetrik bilgi ve oyun teorisi üzerine yaptıkları katkılar ayrıntılı olarak analiz edilecektir.

Kaynakça

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